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ABSTRACT
This dissertation is an empirical attempt to explain how nongovernmental organizations
(NGOs) and public opinion influence Indonesia’s Constitutional Court (Mahkamah Konsti-
tusi). In doing so, it argues that the extent to which a court interacts with and responds
to civil society – its “embeddedness” – is an important indicator of judicial empowerment.
Embedded courts are better able to rely upon external stakeholders to bring important pol-
icy questions to the court’s attention, provide it with relevant and accurate information, and
protect the institution from government reprisals.
The dissertation analyzes three mechanisms through which litigants interact with and
influence the Constitutional Court. First, Indonesian citizens and organizations can file
petitions for constitutional review. Because the Court can only adjudicate constitutional
questions raised in the petitions, petitioners have considerable power to set the Court’s
agenda. Using an automated topic model, this dissertation finds that NGOs are significantly
more likely to file petitions covering socioeconomic rights, such as education and labor, and
human rights. This allows NGOs to not only determine which rights claims reach the Court,
but also to frame the legal and policy questions for the justices.
Second, litigants send signals about public opinion. The Indonesian public can empower
the Constitutional Court by detecting and punishing government attempts to undermine
judicial decisions. Although the justices do not measure public opinion directly, they can
observe the size of the coalition supporting or opposing the petition, which acts as a signal of
public opinion. This dissertation finds that the Court is significantly more likely to grant a
petition if it is supported by a large number of petitioners. By contrast, it is less likely to do
xv
so if it receives a large number of non-litigant briefs opposing the petition. Thus, the justices
seem to consider the level of public support for or opposition to petitions when adjudicating
cases.
Third, litigants can convince the Constitutional Court justices to quote their briefs in
the final decision. Justices are more likely to quote a brief if they view the source as credible.
Using plagiarism-detection software, this dissertation finds that the justices are more likely
to quote text from briefs submitted by NGOs. NGOs possess the resources and expertise
necessary to provide accurate information. They also rely heavily on their moral capital and
reputation to advance policy goals. This helps persuade the justices to view their briefs as
credible and informative.
The dissertation utilizes an original dataset of 541 petitions for constitutional review
submitted during the terms of the first three chief justices (August 13, 2003 – October 2,
2013), as well as 249 statements from the president, 243 statements from the legislature,
62 briefs from third parties supporting of the petition, and 141 briefs from third parties
opposing the petition. This dissertation also makes use of dozens of interviews conducted
with lawyers, NGO staff, judges, and scholars in Indonesia about litigation strategies, as well
as qualitative analysis of several high-profile cases.
xvi
CHAPTER I
Introduction
Since the end of the Cold War, constitutional courts have become increasingly impor-
tant political actors. In what Tate and Vallinder (1997, 1) call the “global expansion of
judicial power,” judges around the world have proved willing to issue judgments on contro-
versial and politically salient disputes. Moreover, this trend has not been confined to regions
with a long tradition of judicial review, such as the United States and Western Europe.
Indeed, some of the most active and activist courts are located in new democracies. During
the past 20 years, judges have required the South African government to provide retroviral
treatments to HIV victims (Sunstein, 2001); ordered the Indian government to convert all
buses in Delhi to compressed natural gas (Rosencranz and Jackson, 2003); legalized abor-
tion in Colombia (Cook, 2007); and even annulled the election of Pakistani dictator Pervez
Musharraf (International Crisis Group, 2008).
Scholars have studied the political and economic causes of judicial empowerment ex-
tensively over the past few decades (see Woods and Hilbink, 2009; Helmke and Rosenbluth,
2009). In particular, they have focused on the question of why a government would design
an institution that could potentially constrain the government’s discretion. One strand of
the literature argues that political elites empower courts when they anticipate significant
political transition as a way to enshrine and protect their policy preferences from opponents
(e.g., Ginsburg, 2003; Hirschl, 2004; Finkel, 2008). Another popular theory posits that gov-
1
ernments grant courts independence in order to enwcourage investment and economic growth
because courts credibly commit the government to protecting property and contract rights
(North and Weingast, 1989; Feld and Voigt, 2003; LaPorta, 2004; Wang, 2015). Finally,
courts can help governments build and maintain their legitimacy by demonstrating their
respect for the rule of law, which is especially important for new and developing countries
(Toharia, 1975; Trochev, 2004).1
Yet, these theories do not fully explain the behavior of courts once the governments
have granted them independence and review powers. As Horowitz (2006, 131) notes, “not
even the most careful design of a constitutional court can guarantee that it will become a
bulwark of law and guarantor of human rights.” At its core, this dissertation is an attempt to
provide an explanation of how and why constitutional courts decide to rule against political
elites and in favor of citizens seeking to enforce constitutional rights. In particular, it is a
study of how civil society affects case outcomes in Indonesia’s Constitutional Court.
In this chapter, I introduce the dissertation and briefly outline the organization of the
following six chapters. I start by presenting the theoretical puzzle about judicial behav-
ior that I attempt to answer. I then explain why I decided to use data from Indonesia’s
Constitutional Court to test my theory about the role of litigants. Finally, I discuss my
methodological approach and summarize my findings.
1.1 The Puzzle: Embedded Autonomy
The central puzzle that motivates this dissertation is why constitutional courts rule
against governments, despite the potential for reprisals and evasion from government actors.
When and how can non-state actors succeed in influencing policy debates through consti-
tutional litigation? Does support from civil society enhance the scope and effectiveness of
judicial power? As Deinla (2014, 1) asks in her study of the Philippine Supreme Court:
1They can also help governments maintain popular legitimacy by allowing elites to deflect the blame for
unpopular decisions (Graber, 1993; Salzberger, 1993).
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Why and how does a judiciary mired in political struggle among the elites de-
cide particularly for or against the ruling coalition? What is the motivation of
the Court in policing constitutional democracy against the weight of rewards,
pressure or threats from a powerful ruling party?
In this section, I briefly explain why the existing literature fails to completely answer these
questions, and then present an alternative theoretical approach. I provide a more detailed
literature review in Chapter III, as well as at the beginning of each of the empirical chapters
(Chapters IV-VI). I then provide a partial explanation that focuses on the role of civil
society.
As noted above, institutional design is a necessary but not sufficient condition for judi-
cial empowerment; even if the government grants a court de jure and de facto independence,
the judges will not necessarily use their powers to enforce the constitution. One explanation
is that judges rule against the government when doing so aligns with their personal policy
preferences (see Segal and Cover, 1989; Segal and Spaeth, 1996). If judges believe ruling in
favor of a farmer against the president will lead to a better policy outcome, they can and
will do so. However, as U.S. Founding Father Alexander Hamilton famously warned, the
judiciary has “no influence over either the sword or the purse” (Hamilton, 1788). Even inde-
pendent courts face the risk that the legislature will attempt to override an adverse decision
or that the executive branch will refuse to comply with it.
This raises the question of when and how judges believe that the rewards of ruling
against the government outweigh the risks. One option judges have is to decide cases in a
way that minimizes the political risks. In other words, judges try to anticipate the reaction of
the government and only rule against it when they believe they can avoid legislative override
or noncompliance. The literature has convincingly demonstrated that judges do behave
strategically (see Maltzman, Spriggs and Wahlbeck, 1999; Bergara, Richman and Spiller,
2003), but it tends to focus almost exclusively on the influence of state institutions. In
particular, it overlooks other important political actors, such as civil society. The literature
also tends to test strategic behavior by examining judicial voting outcomes, ignoring other
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important steps in the process of constitutional litigation.
In this dissertation, I propose a new theoretical framework called “embedded auton-
omy” that accounts for the influence of non-state actors on judicial behavior.2 I argue that
judicial empowerment is a function of both autonomy from government and embeddedness
in society. By embeddedness, I refer to the extent to which the Court has institutionalized
channels to and engages with non-state actors, such as nonprofit organizations, corporations,
and the general public. In the dissertation, I focus on explaining embeddedness because the
literature has already extensively addressed the importance of autonomy (e.g., Woods and
Hilbink, 2009; Helmke and Rosenbluth, 2009). Instead, I examine the ways in which non-
state actors can influence judicial behavior. I look at not just judicial voting and case
outcomes, but also at other parts in the litigation process.
First, in most constitutional systems, non-state actors can initiate cases by filing peti-
tions. They essentially set the court’s agenda because, with a few exceptions, judges cannot
adjudicate policy disputes if they do not receive petitions (Epp, 1998). The distribution of
topics on the court’s agenda thus depends upon the distribution of litigants bringing cases.
Organizations and individuals can file petitions addressing the policy issues of greatest con-
cern to them, bringing them to the court’s attention. Non-state actors can also assist the
court by monitoring and detecting any attempts by the government to avoid complying with
court judgments.
Second, courts in democratic countries have an incentive to cultivate – or at least
not stray too far from – public opinion. The public’s perception of how the court handles
individual cases is important to its perception of the court as an institution. This is especially
true for new courts that cannot rely upon a historical legacy for its legitimacy (Gibson,
Caldeira and Baird, 1998). In turn, the court’s legitimacy can determine the extent to which
the public at large and key stakeholders support the institution. Public support raises the
audience cost to the government of any attempt to retaliate against the court, providing the
2The term “embedded autonomy” comes from the literature on bureaucracies, particularly the work of
Evans (1995).
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judges with additional security. Thus, judges are more likely to rule against the government
when they believe the public will support their decision, or at least defend it.
Finally, non-state actors involved in litigation can influence the factual information and
legal arguments that judges receive through their briefs and other evidence. For the most
part, courts cannot and do not conduct their own research into the facts outside of what
is presented to them in the briefs. Thus, judges face an information asymmetry problem;
they do not know how much they can trust the information contained in a brief. In a low-
information environment, judges can better assess the credibility of a brief if they have some
prior information about the party that filed it. As such, judges are more likely to trust
non-state actors that have gained a reputation for integrity and expertise.
Throughout the dissertation, I focus on one particularly interesting type of litigant:
nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). NGOs are nonprofit, formally constituted organi-
zations with the goal of pursuing some collective good or policy change. NGOs engaged
in constitutional litigation typically compete against better funded parties, particularly the
national government. This is especially true in developing countries, where NGOs often lack
financial support from large-scale donors (Epp, 1998). At the same time, NGOs usually
possess more policy expertise and legal resources than the average individual; some even
engage in constitutional litigation on a regular basis. They also frequently have the capacity
to mobilize the public, or at least key stakeholders, to resolve collective action problems and
pursue public goods. This dissertation explores how and why NGOs exert policy influence
through constitutional litigation.
1.2 A Single-Country Approach: Indonesia
This dissertation uses a single-country approach to test the implications of the embed-
ded autonomy model, relying on data from Indonesia’s Constitutional Court. Focusing on
a single country improves my ability to make causal claims about the relationship between
the court and non-state actors. However, this approach does entail tradeoffs compared to
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a cross-national comparison. In this section, I explain why I adopted a single-country ap-
proach, as well as why I chose Indonesia. I provide a more detailed history of Indonesia and
the Constitutional Court in Chapter II.
A single-country approach reduces the potential number of confounding variables. Ju-
dicial behavior is complex, driven by the actions of political actors, institutional design,
and historical traditions. A cross-national study comparing judicial behavior across differ-
ent types of judicial systems would allow allow me to test embedded autonomy in a wider
range of contexts, but it would also exponentially increase the number of variables that I
would need to consider. For example, judges in common law systems play a very different
role in litigation compared to judges in civil law systems (Rubin, 1977; Shapiro, 1986). A
cross-national statistical model would have to account for all potential differences lest it suf-
fer from omitted variable bias. By contrast, limiting the research to a single constitutional
system allows me to focus on the independent variables of interest (i.e., litigant identity)
and control for historical and institutional design factors. Although this approach sacrifices
generalizability, it enables me to draw stronger causal inferences.
In addition, existing cross-national datasets on judicial behavior simply do not have
sufficient geographic or temporal coverage to yield truly generalizable results. Although
there are a variety of measures for judicial independence (e.g., Keith, 2002; Feld and Voigt,
2003; LaPorta, 2004; Tate and Keith, 2009; Kaufman, Kraay and Mastruzzi, 2010; Linzner
and Staton, 2015), conceptual and practical concerns make them ill-suited to the research
questions I pursue in this dissertation. For example, some measures rely upon sources, such
as surveys, that do not adequately account for cross-national differences (i.e., do Americans
define judicial independence the same way as Thais?). More importantly, no cross-national
dataset currently includes information about all parties and outcomes in all constitutional
cases. The High Courts Judicial Database includes detailed information about constitutional
cases and litigants over several years, but it only covers 11 countries (see Haynie et al., 2007).
The CompLaw dataset covers over 10,000 cases from 43 countries, but only for single year
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(see Carrubba et al., 2013).3 A single-country approach allowed me to collect and code all
the necessary data. Moreover, I managed to capture more refined information about the
identity of litigants than anything currently available in the cross-national datasets.
In selecting a constitutional court, I focused on five criteria. First, the court need to
have existed for at least several years to give the political system enough time to adapt
to the new equilibrium. This means that I treated any questions of institutional design
as exogenous or secondary. Second, the court needed to be sufficiently independent such
that it could rule against the government in politically salient cases if it so desired. Third,
the court must have adjudicated a sufficiently large number of cases to have meaningful
variation in case outcomes. Fourth, members of the public must have legal standing to
submit constitutional petitions, even if subject to certain requirements. I thus excluded
from consideration institutions that only permit government actors to submit constitutional
claims.4 Finally, the court must have publicly available records to allow me to obtain copies
of written judgments and briefs.
Indonesia’s Constitutional Court (Mahkamah Konstitusi), fits each of these criteria.
First, the Constitutional Court was created in 2003, after Indonesia’s transition to democ-
racy. According to the Indonesian Constitution, the Court is the first and final arbiter of
constitutional disputes. It can receive petitions challenging the constitutionality of any piece
of legislation passed by the national legislature. Second, the Court possesses both de jure
and de facto independence. The president, legislature, and Supreme Court each select three
justices to serve on the Court. Each justice serves a five-year term and can be reappointed
once. In addition, there is no provision in the constitution for impeachment of a justice; the
Court has its own internal mechanism for dealing with ethics violations.
Third, the Constitutional Court has received over a thousand petitions for constitu-
tional review since it was established. The number of decisions has steadily increased each
3As of 2016, the CompLaw dataset was in a pilot phase and only contained decisions published in the
year 2003. The authors plan to expand temporal coverage in future versions.
4Such as France’s Conseil Constitutionnel before 2010.
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year, from 31 in 2004 to 108 in 2017 (see Table 2.4). Moreover, it regularly grants petitions;
it has declared a law unconstitutional in whole or part in around 26% of cases. Most im-
portantly, the Court regularly rules against the government in high-profile and politically
salient disputes (see Section 2.3 of Chapter II for examples). Fourth, although the Court
does require petitioners to prove that they have suffered a constitutional harm, in practice it
applies this standing test very liberally. The Court has even expanded standing to essentially
allow any public interest NGO to file a constitutional petition.
Finally, the Constitutional Court is amongst the most transparent and accessible gov-
ernment institutions in Indonesia. The Court posts its decisions online within hours of
reading them in session.5 It also posts transcripts of hearings for all cases. The Court is
open to the public and allows people and the media to observe hearings. I visited the Court’s
library in Jakarta in November 2013 and obtained digital copies of all the briefs submitted
in constitutional review cases between August 13, 2003 to October 2, 2013.
The Constitutional Court’s institutional design has the added benefit of facilitating
causal inference and limiting the number of potentially confounding variables. As in most
civil law systems, the constitutional court is separate from the rest of the judiciary and
has exclusive jurisdiction over constitutional issues. As such, we need not worry about
appeals or conflicts between different jurisdictions. Moreover, the Court can only review
national legislation, not local statutes or administrative regulations. There is almost no
chance that the national government would support a petition to challenge its own laws
(although the intensity of its preferences might vary across cases). We also do not need to
worry about whether the judges might be more deferential to the bureaucracy when reviewing
administrative regulations or ministerial orders.
The Mahkamah Konstitusi also presents an exciting research opportunity because it
has received relatively little attention from American political scientists, despite its activism.
A group of Australian legal scholars has produced much of the English-language literature
5Available at http://www.mahkamahkonstitusi.go.id/.
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on the Court’s jurisprudence (see, e.g., Crouch, 2012; Butt, 2015; Butt and Lindsey, 2008;
Rosser, 2015a).6 Meanwhile, a small group of Indonesian scholars educated in Australia
and the U.S. have begun to apply political science models to better understand the Court
as a political actor (see, e.g., Hendrianto, 2016c; Siregar, 2015). However, as Butt, Crouch
and Dixon (2016, 2) note in a recent review of the literature on the Court, “The Court’s
role in constitutional politics also remains under-studied in a broader comparative context.”
Moreover, the current scholarship on the Court does little to engage with the broader political
science literature on judicial behavior, either in testing older theories or developing new
ones. As such, this dissertation not only advances a novel theoretical argument, but it also
introduces a rich new case study to American scholars of comparative constitutional law.
1.3 Empirical Methods & Findings
This dissertation focuses on the Indonesian Constitutional Court during the terms of
its first three chief judges (August 13, 2003 - October 2, 2013). My primary source of data
is a collection of case files for constitutional review cases. During this period, the Court
received 541 petitions, several of which were withdrawn before the Court reached a decision,
resulting in 460 final decisions. For these cases, the Court received 483 petitions, 249 written
statements from the president, 243 written statements from the legislature, 62 briefs from
related parties (i.e., amicus curiae) supporting of the petition, and 141 briefs from related
parties opposing the petition. A team of Indonesian law students coded the documents to
obtain information about the identity of the litigants in each case.
In addition, during the summer of 2012 and fall of 2013, I conducted over 40 interviews
with lawyers, NGO activists, judges, and scholars in Indonesia. In these interviews, I focused
on understanding the strategic choices that lawyers face in constitutional litigation. In
particular, I wanted to understand how and why petitioners formed coalitions with other
6Almost all of the top Australian scholars studying the Court received their doctorate degrees from the
University of Melbourne.
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litigants when pursuing constitutional claims. I also obtained background information about
the Constitutional Court, the justices, and their relationship with specific NGOs.
In each of the three empirical chapters, I consider one of the ways in which non-state
actors can influence judicial behavior. In Chapter IV, I focus on the role of litigants in
setting the Constitutional Court’s agenda by filing petitions. I use a Structural Topic Model
in order to derive information about the topics on the Court’s docket from the distribution
of words in the petitions. I then use the results to determine if certain types of litigants
are more likely to file petitions challenging certain types of laws. I find that NGOs are
significantly more likely to file petitions covering socioeconomic topics, such as education
and labor, as well as human rights. This allows them to not only determine which issues
reach the Court, but also frame the legal and policy debates for the judges. I demonstrate
how this agenda-setting power works with a qualitative description of a series of cases in
which education NGOs challenged the constitutionality of the national budget.
In Chapter V, I focus on the role of litigants in influencing judicial voting behavior.
I use a standard logit model to predict the likelihood that the Constitutional Court will
grant a petition. I find that the Court is significantly more likely to grant a petition if it
is supported by a larger and more diverse coalition of petitioners. By contrast, the Court
is less likely to do so as more related parties file briefs opposing the petition. I argue that
the composition of the coalitions for or against a petition sends a signal to the Court about
public opinion. I demonstrate how public opinion can influence judges with a qualitative
description of a case in which the Court reviewed the constitutionality of the controversial
1965 Blasphemy Law. Surprisingly, I find no evidence that president’s policy preferences
influence the Court.
In Chapter VI, I focus on the role of litigants in convincing the Constitutional Court to
quote text from their briefs. I use WCopyfind, a plagiarism-detection software, to measure
the similarity between the briefs and the Court’s written opinion. I then use a fractional logit
model in order to understand the conditions under which the Court adopts text from a brief.
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I find that the Court is significantly more likely to adopt text from petitions submitted by
NGOs, but not from other types of petitioners, indicating that the Court finds NGOs to be a
particularly credible source of information. I demonstrate how litigant credibility works with
a qualitative description of a case in which a respected Islamic NGO filed a constitutional
challenge to a government plan to privatize the natural gas sector.
Finally, in Chapter VII, I conclude by discussing the major contributions and limita-
tions of this dissertation. Because this dissertation focuses exclusively on Indonesia, I spend
considerable time assessing the generalizability of my results. I also discuss the potential for
future research, both in Indonesia and elsewhere, to improve our understanding of the ways
in which non-state actors influence judicial behavior.
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CHAPTER II
Background
When Indonesia established a constitutional court in 2003, few observers expected it
to become a powerful political actor. Indonesia historically had a weak judiciary and no
experience with constitutional review. Moreover, on paper, the new court looked like a
weak institution. Yet, the Constitutional Court now regularly exercises its review powers
to strike down important pieces of legislation. Political elites have gone from ignoring the
Court to fearing it. In this chapter, I explain how this happened and why it makes Indonesia
an especially interesting country in which to study the influence of non-state actors on
judicial behavior. I begin in Section 2.1 by providing some background on Indonesia and
the country’s judicial system. Next, in Section 2.2, I introduce the Constitutional Court
and its institutional powers. I then explain why the Court presents such a puzzle to the
conventional literature on judicial behavior. Finally, in Section 2.3, I conclude by exploring
the Court’s relationship with non-state actors, focusing on how NGOs and public opinion
have influenced and strengthened the Court.
2.1 The Indonesian Judicial System
The Constitutional Court was in many ways a direct response to the failures of Indone-
sia’s courts under authoritarianism. The history of the judicial system is therefore relevant
both because it informed the creation of the Constitutional Court and because it serves as
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a baseline for any assessment of the Court’s performance. In this section, I briefly discuss
the state of Indonesia’s judiciary under the post-independence governments and the period
of democratic transition. As this history makes clear, Indonesian judicial institutions before
the formation of the Constitutional Court were at best weak and at worst corrupt. The
executive regularly exerted improper influence over judges. Moreover, the public had little
faith in the judiciary. With a few exceptions, NGOs did not view the judiciary as a viable
forum for policy negotiation. The transition to democracy in the early 2000s eventually led
to the creation of new good governance institutions, which encouraged NGOs to participate
more actively in public interest litigation.
2.1.1 Revolution & Guided Democracy (1945-1965)
Indonesia has a population of over 260 million people, around 87% of whom are Muslim.
However, the country is also very diverse and includes sizable religious and ethnic minority
groups spread throughout the 17,000-island archipelago. The majority of the country resides
on the island of Java. Indonesia inherited its current civil law system, including its civil and
criminal codes, from the Dutch colonial government. The country also inherited a weak
judicial system dominated by a strong executive. The colonial legislature controlled both
the funding and removal of judges, while the Ministry of Justice handled court administration
and the judiciary’s civil service (Pompe, 2005, 13). The Dutch governor-general possessed
a wide range of extraordinary powers (exorbitante rechten) not subject to judicial review,
particularly in cases involving native Indonesians.1
The country declared independence from the Netherlands in August 1945 and fought a
war against Dutch colonial forces until 1949. For several years, the country was a multiparty,
parliamentary democracy, but suffered from regional insurgencies and civil wars. Upon in-
dependence, Indonesia’s 1945 Constitution, or Undang-Undang Dasar (UUD), did not grant
the judiciary constitutional review powers. Although a member of the Constituent Assem-
1The colonial administration had separate judicial systems for Europeans and Indonesians, with the
Indonesian courts (landraad) under the direct control of colonial district officers.
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bly’s preparatory committee, Mohammad Yamin, suggested granting the Supreme Court, or
Mahkamah Agung (MA), review powers, the committee rejected his proposal (Pompe, 2005,
14). Indonesia’s political elites simply did not trust judges. During the revolution against
colonial rule (1945-49), many prominent judges publicly supported the Dutch and impris-
oned revolutionaries, undermining their credibility in the eyes of the nationalists. In return,
revolutionary armed forces and youth militias, the Pemuda, often pressured judges to rule
in favor of nationalist defendants. With the judiciary’s loyalty to the nationalist cause in
doubt, the constituent assembly refused to grant it power over major policy decisions.
Indonesia had a relatively liberal parliamentary democracy during the early 1950s, but
Parliament refused to empower the courts. In fact, although the judiciary was formally
independent, judges suffered repeated abuses to their integrity and autonomy. Members of
Parliament would accuse judges of being “absen dari revolusi” (“absent from the revolu-
tion”). Moreover, political leaders deliberately snubbed judges at official events (Pompe,
2005, 35-48). At one point, the Department of Justice proposed reducing judicial salaries
to the same level as prosecutors (jaksa). In response to these threats, judges began to or-
ganize under the Indonesian Judges Association, or Ikatan Hakim Indonesia (IKAHI). In
1956, IKAHI, backed by Supreme Court Chairman Wirjono Prodjodikoro, formally asked
Parliament to transfer court administration from the Ministry of Justice to the Court and
permit it to exercise constitutional review. While some legislators supported the proposal
as a means of checking the executive, President Sukarno short-circuited the debate in 1957
by declaring martial law and introducing Guided Democracy.
Guided Democracy meant the end of even the pretense of judicial autonomy. Sukarno
told judges that they should work to further the revolution. The executive and army sought
to influence judges in politically salient cases.2 In 1964, the government passed a law allowing
for direct government supervision over cases to promote “revolutionary interests, the state
2In one case, Sukarno asked the Supreme Court to confirm the dissolution of two rival political parties,
Masyumi and Indonesian Socialist Party, or Partai Sosialis Indonesia (PSI). When it did so, Sukarno claimed
the Court had effectively declared that the president could ignore any law at will (Pompe, 2005, 57).
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or national honor, or pressing public interest.”3 Sukarno even demanded that judges swear
an oath of personal allegiance to him. Some judges retired, but most remained (Lev, 2007).
To symbolize the judiciary’s new role, the government replaced the judges’ distinctive black
gowns with military-style uniforms.4 By the mid-1960s, the judiciary lost what little power
it had as an independent political actor.
2.1.2 The New Order (1965-1998)
Indonesia’s leftward tilt ended on September 30, 1965, when a group of leftist military
officers allegedly tried to overthrow the government and assassinated six generals. General
Suharto led a counterattack against the coup plotters. The military and Islamic groups
blamed the Indonesian Communist Party, or Partai Komunis Indonesia (PKI), for the at-
tempt, leading to a mass purge that resulted in the deaths of an estimated 500,000 people.5
Suharto established a right-wing authoritarian regime known as the New Order. He main-
tained power by using patronage to co-opt the country’s elites. He founded the Party of the
Functional Groups, or Partai Golongan Karya (Golkar), to act as his political party and
limited the number of other parties that could participate in elections. The New Order led
to a period of rapid economic growth; between 1967 to 1997, the economy grew at an average
of 7% per year (der Eng, 2010). This growth led to the formation of a new middle class,
although inequality and poverty remained chronic problems, especially outside Java.
Suharto initially promised that the New Order regime would reinstate the rule of
law (negara hukum), in contrast to the chaos of Guided Democracy (Gross, 2005, 950).
Judges abandoned their military uniforms and donned black robes once again (Lev, 1978,
51). IKAHI even believed it could persuade the new regime to grant the Supreme Court
control over court administration and the power of judicial review (Pompe, 2005). How-
3Law No. 19 of 1964, art. 19.
4It also replaced the traditional symbol of justice – a blindfolded lady justice bearing sward and scales –
with a stylized banyan tree under the word “pengayoman,” which means “protection” (Lev, 1965).
5There is still much confusion as to precisely what happened during the coup, known in Indonesia as
Thirtieth of September Movement, or Gerakan Satu Oktober (Gestapu). Some allege that the military
staged the coup in order to create an excuse to crack down on the PKI.
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ever, it soon become clear that the New Order’s version of negara hukum did not include
strong, autonomous courts. The legislature, the People’s Consultative Assembly, or Majelis
Permusyawaratan Rakyat (MPR), which was dominated by Golkar, did rescind the 1964
law, but also passed the Judicial Authority Law,6 which confirmed the Justice Department’s
control over court administration and finance.7
The New Order manipulated the judiciary through appointments to the Supreme
Court. Suharto asked nominees to promise to protect “political interests in cases arising
before the Court” (Pompe, 2005, 354-55). Although the president submitted a list of can-
didates to the MPR for approval, legislators never dared to reject the president’s nominees.
This allowed Suharto to appoint loyal allies to the bench and to select retired military officers
for leadership positions. These senior justices then aided the regime in holding subordinate
judges accountable by issuing Supreme Court circulars promoting the president’s interpreta-
tion of the law. The justices also took advantage of corruption to enforce discipline, assigning
the most lucrative cases to the most obedient judges. In exceptional circumstances, senior
justices would even overturn or “de-finalize” Supreme Court decisions that infringed upon
elite interests, even though no provision law allowed for such action.8
When IKAHI lobbied the government for judicial review in the late 1960s, Secretary
6Law No. 14 of 1970.
7I recommend Pompe (2005) for readers who wish to learn more about the Indonesian Supreme Court
during the New Order.
8The Supreme Court could “de-finalize” a final decision in two ways. The first involved a “special review”
in which a senior justice would review the case in response to a complaint. In the Kedung Ombo case in
the early 1990s, a Supreme Court chamber awarded villagers generous compensation for damages caused by
the Kedung Ombo dam in Central Java. The government had offered a mere Rp. 800 to the 5,268 families,
whereas the Court’s decision offered Rp. 80,000 per square meter. The government worried not just about
the financial impact of the decision, but also about the plaintiffs’ symbolic victory over a World Bank-funded
project (Aditjondro, 1998). After a personal request from Suharto to Chief Justice Purwoto to make “the
most just decision” (“putusan seadil-adilnya”), a special review overturned the chamber’s decision on the
dubious grounds that the Court could not award damages in excess of what the parties had claimed (Pompe,
2005, 149-50).
The second mechanism for “de-finalizing” decisions involved an indefinite stay of enforcement. In such
cases, a superior court would instruct the responsible district court to not enforce the decision. In 1992, in
the Ohee case, a Supreme Court chamber granted Papuan tribesmen Rp. 18.6 billion in damages for unlawful
occupation of their land by the provincial governor. Rather than retrying the case, Chief Justice Soerjono
simply instructed the district court judge to annul enforcement of the judgment since the provincial governor
of Irian Jaya was not a legal person. The order elicited much criticism and provoked unrest in Irian Jaya,
but also demonstrated the legal extremes the justices took to protect elite interests (Pompe, 2005, 159).
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of Justice Oemar Seno Adji responded that the MPR would serve as the arbiter of constitu-
tional interpretation and that Indonesia’s civil law heritage did not allow for judicial review.
By the early 1980s, political support for judicial review grew, in part because the growing
middle class demanded a check against the powerful bureaucracy. In 1986, the MPR passed
a law establishing a State Administrative Court, or Pengadilan Tata Usaha Negara (PTUN),
inspired by the Dutch model.9 The law granted these courts the power to suspend adminis-
trative decisions, but also urged judges to use this power with restraint (Bedner, 2001, 115).
As such, administrative courts exercised a low standard of review. Furthermore, noncom-
pliance with judgments posed a significant problem; in the 1990s, Jakarta Administrative
Court of Appeals Chairman Soebijanto claimed a noncompliance rate as high as 60% (Bed-
ner, 2001, 231). Judges also complained about the refusal of government officials to appear
before the court when summoned.
Despite these challenges, some NGOs found ways to use litigation to advance their
goals. The government generally tolerated public interest litigation related to environmental
issues, so long as it did not threaten the elite interests. In 1989, the Indonesian Forum for
the Environment, or Wahana Lingkungan Hidup Indonesia (WALHI), filed a lawsuit with
the Central Jakarta District Court against the PT Indorayon corporation for deforestation
and pollution in the Asahan River. Although WALHI ultimately lost the case, the court
did grant WALHI legal standing, which created an opening for other environmental NGOs
(Nicholson, 2009, 123).10 Even when they didn’t win, NGOs and political activists could use
the courts to generate attention for their cause. In 1994, an administrative court overturned
a government ban on the independent weekly magazine Tempo. This was the first time a
court had examined and overturned a ministerial decision (see Millie, 1999). Although the
9Law No. 5 of 1986.
10Administrative courts also expanded standing for NGOs, but imposed more procedural requirements.
In the 1994 IPTN (Reafforestation Funds) case, the Jakarta State Administrative Court found that environ-
mental NGOs have standing if they: 1) duly register with the government as legal organizations; 2) have an
official mission or goal of environmental protection; 3) demonstrate actual concern for the environment in
their activities; and 4) sufficiently represent the public (Nicholson, 2009, 104).This ruling was later codified
in Article 37 of the 1997 Environmental Management Act.
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Supreme Court subsequently overturned this decision, it inspired other plaintiffs to use to
the administrative courts to challenge government officials (Bourchier, 1999, 206).
Overall, NGOs could use litigation to raise awareness for a cause or embarrass the
regime, but they seldom managed – or expected – to actually influence policy. According
to Pompe (2005, 354-55), “all major political cases until political reforms (reformasi) were
decided by the Supreme Court in support of the government.” Despite this, public interest
litigation during the New Order led to two important innovations. First, it established
the principle that NGOs had standing to represent the public interest even without having
suffered a concrete harm. Second, after the creation of the administrative courts, public
interest litigation showed that a judicial body had the legal authority – if not the political
power – to strike down government actions. Ultimately, Suharto’s patrimonial influence over
the judiciary did not survive his downfall, but these legal innovations did.
2.1.3 Reformasi (1998-2002)
The New Order economic boom did not last, however, and the 1997-98 Asian Financial
Crisis led to a rapid devaluation of the Rupiah and a 13% contraction in GDP (Pepinsky,
2009). In May 1998, widespread protests forced Suharto out of office. His successor, B.J.
Habibie, agreed to new elections and an extensive reform program (known as Reformasi). As
part of the reforms, the legislature passed four constitutional amendment packages that over-
hauled the constitution. The amendments reduced the power of the president, decentralized
authority to the provinces, and strengthened civil rights. Reformasi essentially transformed
Indonesia into a multiparty, presidential democracy. In 2004, the country held its first direct
presidential election, and has since held hundreds of elections at the national and local levels.
The country regularly ranks as the most democratic in Southeast Asia (see Marshall, Gurr
and Jaggers, 2017) and has a vibrant media and civil society (Mietzner, 2012).
However, Reformasi was a highly managed transition to democracy, not a revolution.
Horowitz (2013) argues that Indonesian democratization succeeded in large part because
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reforms proceeded on the basis of consensus, ensuring that elites bought into the process.
After the June 1999 legislative elections, no party held a majority in the MPR. The largest
party, the Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle, or Partai Demokrasi Indonesia Perjuan-
gan (PDI-P), won around a third of the seats, while Golkar, Suharto’s party, won just 26%.
Eventually, the legislature chose Abdurrahman Wahid (“Gus Dur”) from the National Awak-
ening Party, or Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa (PKB) – which won just 11% of the seats – to
serve as president, while PDI-P leader Megawati Sukarnoputri was chosen as Vice-President.
Under this new leadership, the MPR adopted four amendment packages that essentially
rewrote the 1945 Constitution. The first package transferred power from the executive to the
legislature and limited the president to two five-year terms (Suharto had served for over three
decades). The second amendments inserted a bill of human rights and decentralized admin-
istrative power to the provinces (Ostwald, Tajima and Samphantharak, 2016). The third
amendments focused on institutional reforms and created several new “good governance”
institutions, including the Corruption Eradication Commission, or Komisi Pemberantasan
Korupsi (KPK), as a way to fight back against the corruption that had become so preva-
lent during the New Order. The fourth package dealt with the composition of the MPR,
presidential elections, and socioeconomic rights.
In 1999, the lower chamber of the legislature, the People’s Representative Chamber, or
Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat (DPR), enacted the Judicial Power (Satu Atap) Law11 in order
to make the judiciary truly independent of the executive. The law finally transferred court
administration and finances from the Department of Justice to the Supreme Court. It then
required the president to appoint the judicial candidates chosen by the DPR and allowed
the justices to choose their own chief and deputy chief justices. In 2000, the DPR appointed
several non-career judges to the Supreme Court in order to infuse the institution with new
talent untainted by the New Order (Lindsey, 2007, 14). Meanwhile, Chief Justice Bagir
Manan published a strategic plan for judicial reform (Fenwick, 2008, 342). The third package
11Law No. 35 of 1999.
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of constitutional amendments also established the Judicial Commission, or Komisi Yudisial
(KY), to help select candidates for the Supreme Court and monitor judicial conduct.12
IKAHI finally achieved its longtime goal of judicial review – to a certain extent. In
2004, the DPR passed amendments to the 1970 Judicial Power Law enabling courts to render
regulations null and void without any action on the part of the bureaucracy.13 However, even
after Reformasi, courts were still hesitant to exercise judicial review. For example, in 1999, a
group of NGOs sued the government for failing to provide migrants returning from Malaysia
with basic healthcare, sanitation, nutrition, and housing. Although the Court ordered the
government to provide the migrants with assistance, it refused to mandate any legal changes
to help migrant workers (Gauri and Brinks, 2015, 93). In short, although judges were more
willing to declare government actions illegal after Reformasi, they still hesitated to strike
down laws.
Despite these reforms, the judiciary still suffers from extensive corruption, collusion,
and nepotism, or korupsi, kolusi, dan nepotisme (KKN). Buehler (2009) and Ida (2010)
have detailed a complex network of patronage and favors in the judiciary that they call the
“judicial mafia.” Because the justices choose their own chief, it has been difficult to find truly
reformist leadership in the Supreme Court (USAID, 2008). Ironically, in protecting judicial
independence, the Satu Atap Law had the unintended effect of undermining anticorruption
efforts by limiting the ability of external institutions, such as the KY and KPK, to discipline
judicial misconduct.14 When a judge is accused of corruption, the other judges tend to
close ranks around their colleague rather than cooperate with investigations (Lindsey, 2002,
12Officially, the Judicial Commission has the authority to guard (menjaga) and enforce (menegakkan)
judicial ethics. However, The Commission has been unable to exercise the enforcement part of its mandate.
The Commissioners failed to gain the trust of judges, in part because they came from the the private sector
and NGOs rather than from the bench (USAID, 2008, 11). After a confrontation with the Supreme Court,
the Commission proposed sacking all of the justices (Davidsen, Juwono and Timberman, 2007, 40). In
return, the Supreme Court challenged the commission’s jurisdiction in the Constitutional Court. Ironically,
the Constitutional Court ruled that the Commission’s enforcement powers violated the independence of the
judiciary, leaving it unable to discipline misconduct (Fenwick, 2008, 347).
13Law No. 5 of 2004.
14Courts have also resisted audits. For example, litigants who win cases are entitled to their case fees,
but in practice they rarely receive the refund. When the State Audit Board tried to audit these funds, the
judiciary refused to comply (USAID, 2008, 10).
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14). Not surprisingly, public faith in the judiciary has suffered (see, e.g., World Bank, 2003;
Wardany, 2009; Indonesia, 2009; Parlina, 2013b). NGOs, such as Indonesia Corruption
Watch (ICW), regularly criticize judicial corruption and lobby for reforms, but it will likely
take decades to completely undo the legacy of the New Order.
2.2 The Constitutional Court (Mahkamah Konstitusi)
The previous section discussed the political context that led to the creation of the
Indonesian Constitutional Court, or Mahkamah Konstitusi (MK). In this section, I introduce
the Court, the primary focus of my dissertation. I begin by discussing why the MPR decided
to create a separate constitutional court to handle constitutional questions. I then summarize
the institutional design, powers, and jurisdiction of the Constitutional Court.
2.2.1 Why a Constitutional Court?
As noted in the previous section, IKAHI and other groups had been pushing for con-
stitutional review since independence. While Reformasi led to a considerable amount of
constitutional change, it was not inevitable that the MPR would establish a constitutional
court, much less a separate court with exclusive jurisdiction over constitutional claims. Be-
fore examining how the Constitutional Court has operated in practice, it is worth discussing
why Indonesian political elites decided upon the institutional design of the Mahkamah Kon-
stitusi as it exists today.
Although Indonesia did transition from the authoritarianism to democracy, the MPR
did not design the Constitutional Court as a insurance mechanism to protect the policy pref-
erences of New Order elites.15 The MPR passed the third amendment package on November
9, 2001, years after Golkar had lost its monopoly on power. However, Reformasi did not
entail an abrupt transfer of power from one political coalition to another so much as a disper-
sion of political power to accommodate a larger group of elites. Constitutional amendments
15For more about the use of constitutional review as a political insurance mechanism, see Ginsburg (2003).
21
required the consensus of all parties represented in the MPR (Horowitz, 2013). As such, New
Order elites did not fear or expect that the democracy would threaten their core interests,
much less that a future government would prosecute them for past crimes.
More importantly, the institutional design of the Mahkamah Konstitusi does not seem
well suited to protecting older policies. The nine Constitutional Court justices only serve for
five-year terms, indicating that the constitutional drafters had relatively short time horizons.
Even if New Order elites could have selected the first nine justices, a future government could
have replaced them just five years later. Had elites wanted political insurance, they could
have demanded longer terms for Constitutional Court justices, or even life tenure.16
Mietzner (2010) and Siregar (2015) argue that elites saw constitutional review as a
partial solution to the fragmentation of political power post-Reformasi . After the 1999
elections, no party held a majority in the MPR; PDI-P, the largest party, controlled less
than a third of the seats. Moreover, the new government soon became embroiled in a
constitutional crisis. On February 1, 2001, the MPR voted to impeach President Wahid
for gross corruption and incompetence. Growing desperate, Wahid ordered General Susilo
Bambang Yudhoyono, then the Coordinating Minister for Politics and Security, to declare a
state of emergency (he refused). Wahid was ultimately forced to step down on July 23 and
Vice-President Megawati succeeded him.
Although constitutional review had been raised in the MPR as early as 2000 (Hen-
drianto, 2010, 158), the impeachment crisis convinced elites of the urgent need for a mech-
anism to resolve intra-elite disputes (Indrayana, 2008). The constitutional drafters focused
largely on creating a court that could review DPR motions to impeach a president or vice-
president. In 2003, Yusril Ihza Mahendra, Minister of Justice under Megawati, even tried
to delay the creation of the court because he worried that the Constitution’s provisions
on impeachment were too vague, especially given that some politicians were calling for the
16Ironically, constitutional law professor Yusril Ihza Mahendra, who served as Justice Minister under Pres-
ident Megawati and was reluctant to establish the Constitutional Court, later used it as political insurance
when he was later prosecuted for corruption (Hendrianto, 2013).
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impeachment of Megawati (Hendrianto, 2013). Ironically, despite the fact that impeach-
ment spurred the creation of the Constitutional Court, no Indonesian president has been
impeached since Wahid.
Given the need for constitutional review, the MPR could have simply expanded the
Supreme Court’s jurisdiction. It did briefly consider this option, but ultimately concluded
that the Court had become too corrupt and incompetent under the New Order (Lindsey,
2002, 261). It already had a backlog of tens of thousands of cases on its docket. Moreover,
legislators worried that the Court would prove unwilling to exercise constitutional review.
After all, it already had the authority to review government regulations and presidential
decrees, but rarely did so; of the 26 petitions for review filed between 1992-99, only five
had received a final decision (Widjojanto, 2004, 40). Jimly Asshidiqie – a legal advisor to
the MPR and later first chief of the MK – presciently pointed out that the Supreme Court
itself could become a party to a constitutional dispute, and thus should not have the final
word on constitutional interpretation (Mahkamah Konstitusi, 2010, 495).17 Ultimately, the
MPR chose to sidestep these problems with the Supreme Court by creating an entirely new
constitutional court.18
The Constitutional Court was originally intended as a mechanism to resolve disputes
between political elites rather than against elites. The MPR pointedly did not view the Court
primarily as a means for individuals to check government power. According to Hendrianto
(2010, 165-66), “the issue of individual rights never featured during the debate on the forma-
tion of the Constitutional Court” and “there was no extensive discussion on how those rights
could be defended in the Constitutional Court.” Instead, the Court’s original jurisdiction
focuses on areas of potential elite contestation. In addition to constitutional review, it also
has jurisdiction over elections disputes, disputes between state institutions, impeachment
17As happened when the Supreme Court challenged the authority of the Judicial Commission to enforce
ethics rules against sitting justices in 2006 (see Butt, 2007).
18Activists and NGOs under the banner of NGO Coalition for a New Constitution pushed for the creation
of a democratically elected Constitutional Commission with review powers (Lindsey, 2002, 266), but failed
to convince the MPR.
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proceedings against the president, and the dissolution of political parties. Moreover, the
short five-year term for justices makes more sense if the MPR merely expected the Court to
resolve elite disputes that arose during a given legislative or presidential term (both serve
concurrent five-year terms).
2.2.2 Institution & Powers
According to Article 24 of the Indonesian Constitution, the Constitutional Court
(Mahkamah Konstitusi) is independent of the other branches of government and enjoys
full control over its budget. It has nine members, three each appointed by the president, the
DPR, and the Supreme Court.19 Each justice serves for five years, but can be reappointed
to a second five-year term.20 The justices elect a chief and deputy chief for a 30-month term,
both of whom can be reelected to additional terms.21 The Constitution itself says little
about the qualifications for MK justices other than that they must possess integrity “be-
yond reproach, be just, statesmanlike...” and not hold any other position in government.22
Article 16 of the 2003 Constitutional Court Law further stipulates that MK justices must be
at least 40 years old and no older than 67; never have been convicted of a crime punishable
by more than five years imprisonment; never have filed for bankruptcy; and possess at least
10 years of legal experience.23
Neither the Constitution nor the Constitutional Court Law created an external mech-
anism for investigating or disciplining justices accused of ethics violations. Instead, the MK
has discretion regarding the “establishment, composition and procedures” of the Court’s
Honour Council.24 Any justice accused of violating judicial ethics must be given an oppor-
tunity to defend him or herself before the Honour Council. If the Council finds that the
19Const., Art. 24C(3).
20All nine justices originally served concurrent terms, but because of retirements and resignations the
terms are now staggered.
21Const., Article 24C(4).
22Const., Article 24C(5).
23Law on the Constitutional Court, Law No. 24 of 2003, Art. 16.
24Article 23(5).
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complaint has merit, the president can then formally dismiss the justice. This procedure
has been criticized because it permits the justices to police themselves. In 2011 and 2013,
the DPR and the president tried to compel the appointment of external parties to the Hon-
our Council, but the MK struck down both attempts for unconstitutionally violating the
Court’s independence (Butt, 2015, 88-92). In 2014, after the KPK arrested Chief Justice
Akil Mochtar for corruption (see Chapter VII), the Court agreed to include a member of
the Judicial Commission on the Honour Council, although the MK still selects the other
four members – a current MK justice, a former MK justice, a prominent member of the
community, and a law professor – in a closed plenary meeting.25
According to Article 24C(1) and (2) of the Constitution, the Constitutional Court has
jurisdiction over the following types of cases:
1. constitutional review of statutes, or Pengujian Undang-Undang (PUU);
2. disputes over the authority of state institutions, or Sengketa Kewenangan Lembaga
Negara (SKLN);
3. disputes over general election results, or Perselisihan Hasil Pemilihan Umum (PHPU);26
4. the dissolution of political parties; and
5. investigate and adjudicate DPR motions to impeach the president or vice-president.
Elections disputes constitute the vast majority of the Court’s docket, particularly during
election years (2004, 2009, & 2014). As seen in Table 2.1, the Court received 636 PHPU
cases in 2009 alone.27 Most of these cases ask the Court to check that the votes were counted
correctly. The Court has declared that it can annul election results if it finds “massive and
systematic fraud,” but it seldom exercises this power (Butt, 2015). After the 2009 and 2014
presidential elections, the losing candidates claimed that the winners had stolen millions
25MK Regulation on the Honour Council, Reg. No. 2 of 2014, Art. 5.
26Horowitz (2013, footnote 125) believes that the MPR was inspired to grant the MK jurisdiction over elec-
tions disputes after members of the MPR drafting committee had visited South Korea, whose Constitutional
Court also has jurisdiction over election disputes.
27Data available from MK website at http://www.mahkamahkonstitusi.go.id/index.php?page=web.RekapPHPU.
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of votes. In both cases, the MK heard the complaints and concluded that the petitioners
had not presented sufficient evidence to support their claims (Warat, 2014). Dressel and
Mietzner (2012) and Butt (2015) credit the Court’s prompt and impartial adjudication of
these disputes with deescalating post-election tensions.
Granted Rejected Not accepted Withdrawn Aborted
Presidential 68 398 107 27 6
DPR 0 2 0 0 0
DPD 2 16 7 0 3
Total 70 416 114 27 9
Table 2.1: General Elections Cases (PHPU) in the Constitutional Court (2009)
Note: Includes all cases decided through December 1, 2017. Data available from MK website at
http://www.mahkamahkonstitusi.go.id/index.php?page=web.RekapPHPU.
In 2008, the DPR transferred cases dealing with disputes over regional election results,
or Perselisihan Hasil Pemilihan Umum Daerah (PHPUD) and regional executive elections,
or Pemilihan Kepala Daerah (Pilkada), from the Supreme Court to the Constitutional Court.
The decision came after the public lost confidence in the judiciary’s ability to handle elec-
tion cases. The courts faced widespread criticism for issuing poorly reasoned decisions and
exceeding their jurisdiction (Butt, 2015, 254-56).28 However, these cases, especially the
Pilkada, became a major irritant to the Constitutional Court. The Court received so many
petitions that they overwhelmed the docket and impeded the justices’ other work (see Ta-
ble 2.2).29 Regional elections cases also increased the risk of corruption as politicians tried
to bribe justices for favorable decisions (see Chapter VII). The Court has tried several times
to relinquish authority over PHPUD cases, but in the meantime has promised to continue
adjudicating regional elections disputes until the DPR decides upon an alternative (Parlina,
2016).
SKLN cases involve disputes between Indonesian government institutions about the
scope of their authority and powers. The constitutional drafters realized that Reformasi
28In the 2005 Depok case, the High Court of West Java decided to count the votes of individuals who
claimed that they could not vote, and also went beyond its jurisdiction to investigate allegations of vote
rigging.
29Data available from MK website at http://www.mahkamahkonstitusi.go.id/index.php?page=web.RekapPHPUD.
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Granted Rejected Not accepted Withdrawn
2008 3 12 3 0
2009 1 10 1 0
2010 26 149 45 4
2011 13 87 29 2
2012 11 57 27 8
2013 14 132 42 6
2014 0 9 4 0
2015 - - - -
2016 3 5 138 6
2017 3 7 50 0
Total 74 468 339 26
Table 2.2: Regional Elections Cases (PHPUD) in the Constitutional Court
(2008-2016)
Note: Includes all cases decided through December 1, 2017. Data available from MK website at
http://www.mahkamahkonstitusi.go.id/index.php?page=web.RekapPHPUD.
would lead to considerable institutional change, as well as the creation of several new in-
stitutions, all of which would lead to jurisdictional questions. Through the Constitutional
Court, government institutions can now check each other and hold each other accountable.
As seen in Table 2.3, the Court has received around two dozen SKLN cases, mostly during
the early 2000s in the immediate aftermath of Reformasi.30 The Court also has jurisdiction
over the impeachment of the president or vice-president and over the dissolution of political
parties, but it has yet to adjudicate any such cases as of late 2017.
Petitions for constitutional review comprise the second largest item on the docket,
consisting of over a thousand cases. The MK serves as the court of first and last instance
for constitutional interpretation. Its decisions are final and binding on other government
actors.31 Moreover, its decisions do not require legislative or executive action to implement
them, meaning that any laws declared unconstitutional by the Court are immediately ren-
dered null and void. The Court only handles actual legal disputes; it cannot issue advisory
opinions on draft legislation. It does not have discretion over its docket and must dispose of
all petitions it receives. As seen in Table 2.4, the number of PUU cases has steadily increased
30Data available from MK website at http://www.mahkamahkonstitusi.go.id/index.php?page=web.RekapSKLN.
31Const., Article 24C(1).
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Granted Rejected Not accepted Withdrawn
2003 0 0 0 0
2004 0 1 0 0
2005 0 0 0 0
2006 0 0 2 1
2007 0 1 1 0
2008 0 0 2 2
2009 0 0 1 0
2010 0 0 0 0
2011 0 0 4 0
2012 1 1 3 1
2013 0 0 2 0
2014 0 0 1 0
2015 0 0 1 0
Total 1 3 17 4
Table 2.3: Institutional Dispute Cases (SKLN) in the Constitutional Court
(2003-2015)
Note: Includes all cases decided through December 1, 2017. Data available from MK website at
http://www.mahkamahkonstitusi.go.id/index.php?page=web.RekapSKLN.
over time.32
The Constitutional Court only has jurisdiction over national statutes; challenges to
administrative regulations or local laws, as well as judicial decisions, must be brought to
the Supreme Court or to Administrative Courts. This can create confusion if and when
the Supreme Court and Constitutional Court disagree.33 In addition, the MK has held
that it lacks jurisdiction over how public officials exercise their discretion under a statute.34
Some scholars worried that the government could use this loophole to reinstate laws that the
Court had already declared unconstitutional through regulation (Butt and Lindsey, 2008).
Fortunately, Butt (2015, 6) concludes that this seldom occurs in practice.
Another limitation on the Constitutional Court’s review powers is that its decisions only
apply prospectively. Declaring a statute unconstitutional only prevents the government from
applying the law in the future; MK decisions cannot overturn or remedy past constitutional
32Data available from MK website at http://www.mahkamahkonstitusi.go.id/index.php?page=web.RekapPUU.
33For example, in a 2007 case, the Supreme Court interpreted an article of the 1999 Anti-Corruption Law
even though the MK had issued a binding interpretation of that provision a year before (Bedner, 2016).
34See Land and Building Tax case, MK Decision No. 77/PUU-VIII/2010.
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Granted Rejected Not accepted Withdrawn
2003 0 0 3 1
2004 11 8 12 4
2005 10 14 4 0
2006 8 8 11 2
2007 4 11 7 5
2008 10 12 7 5
2009 15 18 11 7
2010 18 22 16 5
2011 21 29 35 9
2012 30 31 28 5
2013 22 52 22 12
2014 29 41 37 17
2015 25 50 61 15
2016 19 34 30 9
2017 21 40 37 11
Total 243 370 321 107
Table 2.4: Constitutional Review Cases in the Mahkamah Konstitusi (2003-2017)
Note: Includes all cases decided through November 28, 2017. Data available from MK website at
http://www.mahkamahkonstitusi.go.id/index.php?page=web.RekapPUU.
harms. In the 2004 Bali Bombing case, the Court held that the government could not
prosecute terrorist suspects under a law that applied retroactively (ex post facto).35 However,
Chief Justice Jimly Asshiddiqie and Justice Minister Yusril Ihza Mahendra announced in a
press conference that the decision did not overturn the petitioner’s conviction because MK
decisions did not apply retroactively (Butt and Hansell, 2004, 181). In other words, the
Court can only address ongoing or anticipated harms. This doctrine could disincentivize
constitutional litigation because fewer potential petitioners would be willing to invest the
time and resources necessary to pursue constitutional claims if they cannot recover damages
for past harms. In effect, it increases the barriers to collective action for constitutional
change.
These constraints have not prevented the Constitutional Court from becoming involved
in major policy disputes. In fact, the Court has proven adept at expanding its jurisdiction
beyond statutory constraints. Initially, Article 50 of the Constitutional Court Law prevented
35MK Decision No. 13/PUU-I/2003.
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the Court from reviewing laws passed before October 19, 1999 (the date the constitutional
reform process began). However, in a 2004 decision, the Court declared this provision un-
constitutional because the Constitution itself contained no such limit on its jurisdiction.36
This exposed even more laws to constitutional challenge – likely against the wishes of the
politicians who created the Court in the first place. Since then, the Court has heard chal-
lenges to dozens of pre-Reformasi laws, including to New Order laws on censorship37 and
marriage.38
The Constitutional Court has also expanded standing and access to the court. Under
Article 51(1) of the Constitutional Court Law, standing is limited to Indonesian citizens,
customary law communities, public or private legal entities, and state institutions. In theory,
any party filing a petition before the MK must prove that:
1. the statute being challenged violates the constitution;
2. the petitioner’s rights or powers are impaired because of the violation;
3. the constitutional harm is specific or actual (or at least reasonably certain to occur);
4. there is a causal connection between the alleged harm and the statute; and
5. a favorable decision will prevent and/or redress the damage.
In practice, the Court seldom denies standing for individuals challenging a constitutional
harm. If the Court does deny standing, it almost invariably does so because the petitioner
did not suffer a constitutional harm, rendering the other prongs of the standing test moot
(see Butt, 2015, 49). In one of its earliest decisions, the Court declared that generalized
harm to the public welfare constituted a sufficient constitutional harm for the purpose of
standing.39 In subsequent cases, it expanded on this holding to grant standing based on the
36Chamber of Commerce & Industry case, MK Decision No. 66/PUU-II/2004
37Film Law case, MK Decision No. 29/PUU-V/2007.
38Marriage Law case, MK Decision No. 12/PUU-V/2007.
39Electricity Law case, MK Decision No. 1-21-22/PUU-I/2003, p. 327.
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petitioner’s interest in good governance40 and status as a taxpayer.41 In some cases, the MK
has even ignored standing completely in order to address the merits of the petition (Butt,
2015, 59).42
2.3 Embedded & Autonomous
When the Constitutional Court officially opened its doors on August 13, 2003, it seemed
destined to the margins of Indonesian politics. As noted above, Indonesia had no prior ex-
perience with constitutional review. Moreover, because of the appointment process and
jurisdictional limits, the Court appears relatively weak on paper. As such, the Court sur-
prised many when it not only exercised its review powers, but also become an important
political actor. The Court has even thwarted multiple government attempts to circumscribe
its independence. How did the MK succeed in challenging political elites while maintaining
its independence? In this section, I show how the Court’s relationships with NGOs helped
empower the institution. I begin by recounting the Court’s battles with political elites. I
then discuss possible alternative explanations for the Court’s political strength. Finally, I
argue that NGOs and public opinion helped mobilize support for the Court.
2.3.1 Defying Political Elites
According to Jimly Asshiddiqie, the first chief justice (see Table 2.5), the Mahkamah
Konstitusi started from scratch (“mulai dari nol”), with just the 1945 Constitution, the 2003
Constitutional Court Law, and almost no budget or staff (Asshiddiqie, 2008, 10). The Court
did not even have its own building. Eventually, the Court did receive more resources and
staff. In 2007, the justices moved into a new building equipped with modern IT facilities and
40KPK Law case, MK Decision No. 6/PUU-I/2003.
41“Every taxpaying citizen has the constitutional right to challenge every statute.” Police and Army
Voting case, MK Decision No. 22/PUU-XII/2014, p. 22.
42For example, in the Death Penalty case, the Court acknowledged that petitioners lacked standing because
they were foreign citizens, but proceeded to discuss the constitutionality of the death penalty. MK Decision
No. 2-3/PUU-V/2007.
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a large library.43 The Court’s budget also increased to the point where it could offer staff
and judges salaries larger than those at other judicial institutions (Mietzner, 2010, 405).44 In
short, the Constitutional Court went from “nol” to one of the most modern and professional
government institutions in the country.
Name Term Start Term End Reason for Departure
Jimly Asshiddiqie Aug. 22, 2003 Aug. 19, 2008 lost reelection for chief
Mohammad Mahfud Aug. 19, 2008 Apr. 3, 2013 run for president
Akil Mochtar Apr. 3, 2013 Oct. 5, 2013 arrested for corruption
Hamdan Zoelva Nov. 6, 2013 Jan. 7, 2015 term expired
Arief Hidayat Jan. 14, 2015 present n/a
Table 2.5: Chief Justices of the Constitutional Court
Despite its inauspicious beginnings, the Constitutional Court proved willing and able
to confront the other branches of government. During its first term, the MK revised 74
laws, annulled four completely, and nullified portions of another 23 (Mahfud, 2009). Overall,
the Court has granted around 26% of the petitions it received for constitutional review (see
Table 2.4),45 a rate comparable to courts in Western democracies. It has also intervened
in several highly controversial political disputes. In its very first decision, the justices in-
validated a major legislative program that would have partially privatized the electricity
sector.46 In subsequent decisions, the Court legalized the Communist Party,47 stripped the
Judicial Commission of its enforcement powers,48 mandated an open party-list election sys-
tem,49 and even invalidated government budgets when they failed to allocate sufficient funds
43The Court initially operated out of the same building as the Supreme Court. It then relocated to a
hotel, and, after obtaining funding from the Ministry of Finance, moved staff to an office complex. Even
at that point, it had to hold sessions in other government buildings, including the DPR building and the
National Police headquarters. Only in January 2004 did the Court move all of its operations into a single
building, one owned by the Ministry of Communications & Information. In mid-2005, work began on a new
building specifically for the Constitutional Court. Construction was finally completed in late 2007.
44Indeed, one former justice, believes the Supreme Court initially selected him to serve on the MK because
it saw him as troublesome and wanted to exile him from the judiciary. Now, judges view an appointment to
the MK as a reward. Subject #11, interview with former justice, Jakarta, Indonesia, July 17, 2012.
45Excluding cases that were withdrawn before the Court could issue a final decision.
46Electricity Law case, MK Decision No. 1-21-22/PUU-I/2003.
47PKI case, MK Decision No. 11-17/PUU-I/2003.
48Judicial Commission case, MK Decision No. 5/PUU-IV/2006.
49Open List case, MK Decision No. 22-24/PUU-VI/2008.
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for education (Rosser, 2015b; Susanti, 2008).50 Ironically, many lawyers believed that the
constitutional provision on education funding (Article 31) was merely aspirational (see Ellis,
2002, 146), so the Court’s decision to enforce it indicates just how expansively the justices
interpreted their powers.
The Constitutional Court’s boldness seems to have come as an unwelcome surprise
to political elites. Politicians soon began to view the Constitutional Court as a threat to
their policies and frequently complained that the justices had usurped the DPR’s legisla-
tive functions. Former Justice Harjono (2007) acknowledged that “the challenges of this
Court initially come from members of parliament who are unhappy [that its decisions have]
curtailed Parliament authority to make a law [sic].” As Butt (2012, 111) notes, DPR mem-
bers must now at least “flick through the Constitution” before voting on legislation. DPR
committees produce verbatim transcripts in order to preemptively defend laws against legal
challenges. Former DPR member Alvine Lie even claimed that the DPR is “frightened of
the Constitutional Court” (Sherlock, 2010, 172). In short, whatever their initial motivations
for creating the MK, elites now had an incentive to override or refuse to comply with its
decisions.
Some political elites tried to pressure the justices, but to little avail. When interviewing
Mukthie Fadjar for a position on the Court, President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (SBY)
(2004-2014) asked him to “coordinate” with the cabinet before promulgating decisions; Fad-
jar rebuked the president, but was appointed anyways (Mietzner, 2010, 416). Vice-President
Jusuf Kalla (2004-2009, 2014-) called justices to vent his anger over their decisions, but did
not succeed in having them overturned. After the Court legalized the Communist Party,
senior military commanders called the justices to lament that they had not “coordinated”
with the armed forces (Mietzner, 2010, 413). In some cases, elites seemed to threaten the
justices’ physical safety. After the 2004 election, Asshiddiqie claimed that thugs affiliated
with former general and failed presidential candidate Wiranto demanded that he be allowed
502008 Budget Law case, MK Decision No. 13/PUU-VI/2008. I discuss this case in greater detail in
Chapter IV of the dissertation.
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to compete in the runoff election (Mietzner, 2010, 407). Despite this subtle – and not-so-
subtle – intimidation, thus far no government institution or political actor has ever openly
attacked the justices.
Some observers worried that justices’ short terms would make them susceptible to
political pressures. In theory, judges who only serve five years and are eligible for reap-
pointment should have an incentive to behave like agents for the institution that appointed
them. Even amongst constitutional courts in new democracies, five years is a relatively short
term.51 However, reappointment has thus far played a surprisingly limited role in shaping
judicial behavior. Butt (2015, 38) finds no evidence that justices systematically exhibit par-
tiality or bias on behalf of their appointing institution. Mietzner (2010, 415) argues that
dividing appointment authority between the president, DPR, and Supreme Court mitigates
any political pressure; if a justice displeases one principal, he or she has two other avenues
for reappointment. For example, when President Yudhoyono refused to reappoint Justice
Harjono in 2008, he successfully petitioned the DPR to reappoint him.52
The president, DPR, and Supreme Court have tried to better screen Constitutional
Court nominees during the selection process. All candidates must undergo a “fit and proper”
test, which in theory ensures that they meet the minimum criteria set out in the 2003
Constitutional Court Law. In practice, lawmakers have used these sessions to ascertain the
ideological fitness of nominees – to mixed success.53 When the DPR interviewed former
cabinet minister and legislator Mohammad Mahfud in August 2008 for a vacancy on the
Court, DPR members asked him about the Court’s relationship with the legislature. Mahfud
initially campaigned as the anti-Jimly, and his disavowal of judicial activism helped convince
the DPR to appoint him (Hendrianto, 2016c, 525-27). However, once on the bench, Mahfud
51The modal term length for constitutional courts established between 1986-2002 is nine years (see Gins-
burg, 2003, Table 2.2). The possibility of reelection is not even permitted in most countries, with the
exception of Hungary and a few international tribunals (Vanberg, 2005, 85).
52Hendrianto (2015b) argues that a more important problem with the term length is that it has been
difficult to find qualified candidates to fill vacancies every five years. Indonesia has a relatively small pool
of constitutional law scholars qualified to serve on the Court.
53Later efforts to screen judicial nominees appear to have been more successful, especially when elites
select a known political ally or crony as opposed to an outsider (see Chapter VII).
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led the Constitutional Court in an increasingly activist direction.
Soon after his appointment, the other justices elected Mahfud as their next chief and
Jimly resigned. Under Mahfud’s leadership, the Court increasingly emphasized “substantive
justice” or policy outcomes over “procedural justice” (Budiarti, 2012, 83-84). The Mahfud
Court also proved more willing to use a controversial doctrine known as conditional consti-
tutionality. In civil law systems, constitutional courts generally act as “negative legislators”
in that their authority is restricted to annulling statutes that conflict with the constitution
(see Kelsen, 1945). However, under conditional constitutionality, the Court can defines the
conditions under which it considers a law unconstitutional without striking it down. For
example, in a 2007 case, the Court declared that a 1992 censorship law could only be consid-
ered constitutional if the Film Censorship Institute (LSF) enforced it in a manner consistent
with democratic principles.54 In effect, this allows the MK to act as a “positive legislator”
by rewriting statutes and issuing guidelines for how other branches of government should
interpret the law (Butt, 2012). Overall, 55% of the petitions the Mahfud Court granted
involved conditional constitutionality, compared to just 34% under Asshiddiqie (Roux and
Siregar, 2016, footnote 24). The Mahfud Court also began issuing ultra petita verdicts, which
issue relief beyond what the petitioners had requested in their briefs.
The DPR viewed conditional constitutionality and ultra petita verdicts as particularly
egregious forms of judicial activism because they encroached upon legislative functions. Both
the legislature and the president tried to restrict the Court’s powers and jurisdiction, but
failed each time. In 2011, the DPR passed amendments to the 2003 Constitutional Court
Law that would have forbidden the Court from using conditional constitutionality.55 In
2013, the President issued an Interim Emergency Law (Perpu) that would have mandated
outside participation in the MK Honour Council (see Section 2.2.2). The MK declared both
54Film Law case, MK Decision No. 29/PUU-V/2007.
55Article 57(2) of the amendments stated: “If the Constitutional Court declares that requirements, based
on the Constitution, for the enactment of the statute were not fulfilled, then that statute no longer has
binding force.”
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laws unconstitutional.56 The Court justified its decisions by arguing that “[i]f the Court is
prohibited from reviewing the statute governing the Court, then the Court will be an easy
target for paralysis by a statute enacted to further the interests of [political power], in which
the position of the President is strongly supported by the DPR or vice versa.”57 This led
some politicians to complain that the Court had become untouchable because it could strike
down any attempts to restrain the institution.
Despite the fact that the Constitutional Court has declared so many laws unconstitu-
tional, it has suffered from remarkably few instances of noncompliance or override. As noted
above, the Court can only review statutes, not administrative regulations or decisions, so in
theory the president could reenact some constitutionally voided policies via ministerial reg-
ulation (Butt and Lindsey, 2008). Indeed, when the MK declared a World Bank sponsored
electricity privatization program unconstitutional in 2003, the government revived parts of
the program through administrative action. The risk of noncompliance should have forced
the Court to take into account the president’s policy preferences before deciding cases. How-
ever, for the most part, it seems the government cannot or has not tried to avail itself of
this loophole. Moreover, the DPR seldom attempts to override MK decisions. In a review of
legislation passed by the DPR, Butt (2015, 73, footnote 71) found only one instance of new
legislation that directly responsed to a Constitutional Court decision.58 In theory, legislators
could also amend the Constitution. According to Article 37(4), amendments only require an
absolute majority in the MPR, or 50% plus 1 of at least 2/3 of all members. However, despite
the low amendment threshold, the Constitution has not been amended since Reformasi.
56See MK Law Amendment case 1, MK Decision No. 48/PUU-IX/2011; MK Law Amendment case 2, MK
Decision No. 49/PUU-IX/2011, and MK Perpu case, MK Decision No. 1-2/PUU-XII/2014.
57MK Decision No. 1-2/PUU-XII/2014, p. 97
58The preamble of the 2008 Amendment to 2004 Regional Government Law mentions that the purpose of
law is to respond to the Court’s ruling in the 2007 Independent Pimilukada Candidates case (MK Decision
No. 5/PUU-V/2007). For comparison, (Hettinger and Zorn, 2005) find that the U.S. Congress overrode
around 7% of Supreme Court decisions in matters of statutory interpretation between 1967-89.
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2.3.2 Alternative Explanations
The emergence of the Mahkamah Konstitusi as a powerful institution despite resistance
from political elites is surprising in the context of both Indonesian history and the academic
literature on judicial empowerment. Before attempting to explain why this happened, it
is worth confirming that the frustration of political elites seems genuine. In other words,
there is little evidence that elites simply rely on the Court to deflect blame for unpopular
decisions that they privately prefer.59 Not only have elites publicly denounced many of the
Court’s decisions, but, as recounted above, they have also attempted to restrict its juris-
diction several times. Moreover, many of the Court’s decisions, especially in the realm of
socioeconomic rights, have shifted policy away from conservative elites and towards progres-
sive/leftist groups.60
The Constitutional Court’s first two chief justices undoubtedly deserve much of the
credit for the Court’s success. Both Jimly Asshidiqie and Mohammad Mahfud were charis-
matic figures and savvy political operators with experience in government. Asshidiqie came
to the Court with deep ties to civil society groups (see Section 2.3.3) and firm convictions
about the role of constitutional review in a democratic Indonesia (e.g., Asshiddiqie, 2004).
He also played a key role in professionalizing the Court. He discouraged corruption and
insisted that all judges participate in professional development activities (Butt, 2015, 5).
Mahfud, as a former professor at the Islamic University of Indonesia and PKB politician,
had close ties to Islamic groups. By the end of his term, he also had presidential aspirations
(see Figure 2.1 for an example of how the media sometimes lionized Mahfud). Both chief
justices regularly spoke to the media and universities about legal and political issues, much
more so than their successors.
Hendrianto (2016c) cites the “visionary” leadership of these two justices as the primary
59Compare with Graber (1993), who claims that Congress sometimes prefers to let the U.S. Supreme Court
take responsibility for decisions on contentious issues like abortion.
60For more on how Indonesian elites have opposed democratic or progressive reforms, see (Sukma, 2010;
Mietzner, 2012).
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Figure 2.1: Cartoon of Chief Justice Mahfud as Superman
source: Kick Andy TV show.
reason for the Constitutional Court’s activism and ability to defy elites. However, while bold
leadership helps explain the Court’s initial willingness to exercise constitutional review, it
does not adequately explain why they succeeded over the long term. Had political elites
responded more forcefully to the Court’s earlier decisions, the justices might have been
forced to back down. Moreover, the chief justices’ leadership does not adequately explain
why the other branches of government so seldom attempted to override or avoid complying
with the Court’s decisions. In short, the leadership of Asshidiqie and Mahfud was a necessary
but not sufficient cause of the MK’s empowerment.
Butt (2012, 107-09) argues that the Court engages in strategic behavior in order to an-
ticipate or forestall a response from the government. He identifies four ways in which the MK
tries to “soften the effect of its decisions on the legislature.” First, the Court’s decisions only
apply prospectively, meaning that they do not undo past government actions. As discussed
above, this helped mitigate the political fallout from the Bali bombing decision. Second, the
Court does consider the practical effects of its decisions and has sometimes refused to declare
a law unconstitutional because the consequences of doing so would lead to an economic or
political crisis. For example, on several occasions, the Court instructed the DPR to allocate
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20% of the budget to education, but did not declare the existing budget null and void for fear
of shutting down the government. Third, the Court could declare a statute unconstitutional,
but set a deadline for the DPR to replace it. Finally, conditional constitutionality allows the
Court to air its constitutional objections without actually declaring a law null and void.
To the extent that the Constitutional Court does engage in strategic behavior, it has not
entirely succeeded in minimizing the risk of backlash. In fact, DPR members view conditional
constitutionality as especially egregious; as noted above, the DPR even tried to amend
the Constitutional Court Law to prevent the Court from using that doctrine. Moreover,
strategic behavior has not prevented the justices from issuing decisions with far-reaching
policy consequences. Even the Court’s pragmatism has limits. Although the justices refused
to declare the national budget null and void for not sufficiently funding education, they did
imply that their patience with the DPR would not last forever (discussed in Chapter IV).
Strategic behavior might have prevented constitutional conflicts from escalating, but does
not entirely account for the scope of the Court’s success.
The Constitutional Court’s institutional design does insulate justices from government
reprisals, at least in the short term. As noted above, neither the Judicial Commission nor the
other branches of government can remove justices, even for cause. The MK’s Honour Council
must first make a recommendation finding that a justice has violated judicial ethics.61 That
said, the justices are not completely free from concerns about job security. Each justice’s
term only lasts for five years, and justices undoubtedly have time horizons longer than five
years. Although the president, DPR, and Supreme cannot sack a justice immediately after
an adverse decision, the justices know that reappointment is not guaranteed. Even justices
serving in their second term will undoubtedly be concerned about career and patronage
opportunities after they leave the bench. As such, although the Court’s institutional design
61There are unconfirmed rumors that President Yudhoyono orchestrated Asshiddiqie’s ouster as chief
justice in August 2008 (Hendrianto, 2015b). Mahfud admitted that Vice-President Kalla asked him to run
against Asshiddiqie (Budiarti, 2010, 54). Ultimately, however, the justices themselves selected Mahfud, and
there is no evidence the government used promises or threats to coerce them to do so. Although Asshiddiqie
could have continued to serve on the Court, he chose to resign.
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protects the justices against immediate retaliation, it does not guarantee long-term protection
that would truly free judges from political constraints.
The fragmented nature of Indonesian politics after Reformasi has probably contributed
to the lack of a unified elite response against the Court. Since 1999, no single political leader
or party has come close to dominating Indonesian politics the way Suharto and Golkar did
during the New Order. Since 2004, the largest party in the DPR controlled between 13-22%
of the seats – far short of a governing majority. As such, even though the Constitution only
requires an absolute majority for amendments, no single party ever reached that threshold.
Horowitz (2013, 236-37) goes so far as to argue that:
The result [of Reformasi ] was a factional equilibrium, in which courts, especially
the newly created Constitutional Court, had room to operate with independence,
even thwarting government policy on constitutional grounds. No one considered
disobeying inconvenient judicial judgments.
However, it is important not to overstate the extent to which elite fragmentation protects
the Court. Elections results risk overstating fragmentation and do not always reflect clear
policy divisions. After each election almost all of the major parties in the DPR have formed
oversized governing coalitions, far larger than the minimum needed to pass legislation (Slater,
2014). Indeed, as noted above, both the DPR and president have shown that they could
overcome fragmentation and coordination obstacles to enact laws aimed at constraining the
Court, but still failed (see 2.3.1). Elite fragmentation makes coordination more difficult, but
not impossible.
Charismatic leadership, strategic behavior, institutional design, and political fragmen-
tation all contribute to our understanding of how the Constitutional Court managed to
become a powerful political actor. However, they are at best incomplete explanations. The
first two chief justices pushed the Court to take more risks, but a political backlash could
have deterred other justices. Elite fragmentation and the Court’s institutional design provide
some protection for justices, but cannot alone explain how the Court survived unscathed af-
ter ruling against so many elite interests. Nor can the Court’s success be attributed to elites’
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belief in good governance; in late 2009, a conspiracy between a former Attorney General,
members of the National Police, and a businessman attempted to bring down the Corruption
Eradication Commission (Platzdasch, 2011, 74), another one of the Reformasi good gover-
nance institutions. In the next section, I describe how the Court’s embeddedness in society,
particularly its relationships with NGOs, created a network of stakeholders that bolstered
the institution and defended it from political attacks.
2.3.3 Courting Interest Groups
Historically, Indonesian civil society has tended to distrust state institutions. During
the New Order, anti-Suharto, pro-poor NGOs preferred to stay out of party politics and
pursue their policy agendas outside of the legislature (Nordholt, 2005; Lane, 2008; Mietzner,
2013). This was especially true for leftists, such as former members of the Communist
Party, who pursued their goals through NGOs after the 1965 crackdown (Lane, 2008). Even
after Reformasi, many NGOs have refused to align with any of the major political parties.62
Civil society generally has a strong commitment to democratic ideals,63 but many left-
leaning NGOs view the current system as hopelessly corrupt and captured by elite interests
(Mietzner, 2013; Rosser and van Diermen, 2016). Instead, they have tended to focus their
efforts to influence policy and government behavior on the Reformasi “good governance”
institutions, including the Corruption Eradication Commission, the Judicial Commission,
and the Constitutional Court (Bedner, 2014, 565).64
Indonesia’s civil society sector is relatively strong for a developing democracy, especially
given its resource constraints. Although progressive/leftist NGOs lack direct influence in the
legislature, they have been effective at generating awareness for their causes and preventing
elites from enacting policies detrimental to their goals. The media greatly amplifies their
62Although they might lobby individual DPR members (Mietzner, 2013).
63With some notable exceptions like the Islamic Defenders Front, or Front Pembela Islam (FPI), a hardline
Islamic group that has incited religious-related violence.
64As well as the National Commission on Human Rights, or Komisi Nasional Hak Asasi Manusia
(Komnas HAM), which was established by the Suharto regime in 1993.
41
political power by giving activists a platform to voice their grievances (Aspinall, 2004).
Newspaper articles about politics often feature commentary from NGO experts. Mietzner
(2012, 209) goes so far as to call Indonesian civil society “democracy’s most important
defender.”
The Constitutional Court is one of the more accessible state institutions for non-elite
actors, especially progressive interest groups, that want to influence policy. Bedner (2014,
565) argues that Indonesian NGOs are more comfortable framing their arguments in terms of
legal rights than as political tradeoffs, which better fits the mode of policy debate in a court
of law than a legislature. Moreover, the Reformasi constitutional amendments dramatically
expanded the scope of topics covered by the 1945 Constitution, meaning that access to
the Court lets NGOs challenge the government on a wide range of policy issues. NGOs
have succeeded in invalidating government policies on everything from wiretapping65 to the
composition of the General Elections Commission, or Komisi Pemilihan Umum (KPU).66
Soon after its establishment in 2003, the Constitutional Court gained the respect of
civil society groups and the broader public. While most Indonesians do not follow the Court
closely, 68% of those who had at least heard of it in 2005 were satisfied with its performance
(International Foundation for Election Systems, 2005). In addition to helping legitimize the
institution, civil society has rewarded justices for popular decisions. After the Court helped
protect Anticorruption Commissioners Chandra Hamzah and Bibit Samad from a conspiracy
to oust them in 2009,67 several NGOs and universities presented Chief Justice Mohammad
Mahfud with awards for bravery (Mietzner, 2010, 416). Meanwhile, a 2011 Jakarta Post
editorial described Mahfud as “one of the most popular figures in the country” (The Jakarta
Post, 2011). He even polled well as a candidate for president before the 2014 election and was
later elected chair of the influential Islamic Students Alumni Association, or Korps Alumni
65Wire-Tapping case, MK Decision No. 5/PUU-VIII/2010 (finding constitutional right to privacy).
66KPU case, MK Decision No. 81/PUU-IX/2011 (prohibiting political party members from joining the
KPU for at least five years after leaving the party).
67Bibit and Chandra case, MK Decision No. 133/PUU-VII/2009
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Himpunan Mahasiswa Islam (KAHMI).68
NGOs have played an important role in expanding the Constitutional Court’s policy-
making role by filing petitions for constitutional review (Rosser, 2015a; Rosser and Curnow,
2014; Rosser and van Diermen, 2016; Curnow, 2015). Because the justices cannot initiate
cases on their own initiative, there is a real risk that they will not have the opportunity to
rule on many constitutional violations because Indonesian citizens do not know how or can-
not afford to engage in constitutional litigation. This problem was especially acute during
the Court’s first few years when it received few petitions because relatively few Indonesians
were even aware of the Court (see Table 2.4). The willingness of NGOs to use constitutional
litigation expanded the range of policy issues that reached the Court.
NGOs also help solve the problems imposed by the prospectivity doctrine. As noted in
Section 2.2.2, it will be more difficult to find litigants willing to invest the resources necessary
to challenge constitutional violations if they can only prevent future violations rather than
remedy past harms (see Butt, 2012, 107-08). Instead, people will be tempted to free ride on
the efforts of others. Fortunately, NGOs help overcome this collective action problem. Many
Indonesian NGOs were founded to pursue a set of policy goals, such as religious education
or environmental protection. As such, they have an interest in the application of policy in
the future. Indeed, NGOs regularly engage in public interest litigation despite the fact that
the NGO itself has not suffered a specific harm; for NGOs, litigation is simply one means to
pursue policy change.69
The Constitutional Court did not wait passively for NGOs to submit cases. Chief
Justice Asshiddiqie took several steps to encourage NGOs to file constitutional claims (Hen-
drianto, 2016c, 518). First, through his personal network he invited the Indonesian Legal
68Although popular, Mahfud was not nominated by any other major parties. He eventually became a
campaign manager for Prabowo Subianto of the Gerindra Party.
69Butt (2012, 107-08) raises the possibility that the DPR might take advantage of the Court’s prospectivity
doctrine by passing laws that violate rights constitutional rights, knowing that any actions committed under
the law would not be reversed by a subsequent MK decision striking the law down. One of the reasons this
has not happened is that the government knows NGO watchdogs would promptly challenge any such law in
Court.
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Aid Organization, or Lembaga Bantuan Hukum (LBH), and other NGOs to check new leg-
islation for constitutional defects, and then to file challenges with the Court.70 Second, the
Court abolished filing and other fees to reduce the costs of litigation.71 Third, and most
important, the Court lowered barriers to standing for NGOs engaged in public interest lit-
igation (Hendrianto, 2015a, 35). The Court expanded its already liberal standing doctrine
(see Section 2.2.2) to allow NGOs to file constitutional claims so long as their charters or
articles of association have some connection to the substance of their petition.72 In short,
the justices saw NGO litigation as beneficial and strategically facilitated access to the court.
The Constitutional Court’s relationship with NGOs goes beyond its role as a receptacle
for constitutional petitions. During its first year, when the Court lacked funding to hire
full-time research staff, Jimly Asshidiqie appealed to lawyers and activists from NGOs to
volunteer at the Court, sometimes going several months without a salary.73 Many of them
ended up working at the Court for years and influenced its jurisprudence from the inside.
The early Court’s close relationship with civil society had the added benefit of reducing its
dependence on political elites. When the Court could not rely upon the government for
resources, civil society actors provided an alternate option. Had the justices not had access
to these resources, they might have felt more compelled to become more subservient to the
government in exchange for funding and patronage.74
Public support for the Constitutional Court increased the audience cost to the gov-
ernment for defying its judgments or retaliating against the justices. According to Horowitz
(2013, 243), the MK “built up a stock of political capital because of its apparent integrity
and good faith...” For example, when the DPR attempted to amend the 2003 Constitutional
70Subject #19, Interview with attorney at Indonesian NGO, Jakarta, Indonesia, July 20, 2012.
71Art. 6(7) of MK Reg 06/PMK/2005 on Procedural Guidelines in Judicial Review Cases.
72Migas Law case, MK Decision No. 2/PUU-I/2003 (finding that a human rights NGO had standing to
challenge the privatization of the state oil company because its mission was to advocate on behalf of the
public interest).
73Subject #15, interview with former justice, Jakarta, Indonesia, November 21, 2013.
74The KPK has also found itself the beneficiary of close relationships with NGOs. For example, in 2012,
when the DPR sought to block funds for the construction of a new KPK headquarters, the commission
turned to NGOs and ordinary citizens for donations and support (Schonhardt, 2012).
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Court Law in order circumscribe the Court’s jurisdiction in 2011, a coalition of NGOs lobbied
the DPR against the changes.75 Moreover, a group of activists and law professors promptly
challenged the amendments by filing a petition with the MK.76 The case received significant
media coverage, letting other interest groups know about the threat to the Court.77 Without
the mobilization of the Court’s external stakeholders, the DPR and president might have
had more success in constraining the justices.
Overall, civil society and public opinion helped the Constitutional Court in three ways.
First, the willingness and ability of NGOs to file constitutional claims expanded the scope
of constitutional disputes that reached the Court. Second, activist lawyers provided an al-
ternate source of legal resources when the justices could not rely upon government funding.
Third, public opinion and NGO mobilization increased the audience cost of government
attempts to retaliate against the justices. The MK was able to take advantage of these
developments in large part because both the Court as an institution and individual justices
had developed relationships with civil society. Moreover, public outreach was part of a delib-
erate strategy to empower and protect the Court as an institution. In becoming embedded
in Indonesian society, the Court became autonomous and empowered.
2.4 Concluding Remarks
In this chapter, I explained the historical context and institutional powers of the In-
donesian Constitutional Court. Reformasi led to political liberalization and the creation of
the Mahkamah Konstitusi, but did not guarantee the institution’s success. The justices only
served for five-year terms and the Court initially lacked sufficient funding to cover operating
costs. Political elites have vigorously opposed some of the Court’s decisions. Despite these
75Subject #2, Interview with staff at Indonesian NGO, Jakarta, Indonesia, July 5, 2012. On the other
hand, civil society opinions about the 2013 Perpu were mixed. Some believed the president’s attempt to
impose stronger ethics requirements on the MK was necessary to combat corruption. Subject #13, Interview
with attorney at Indonesian NGO, Jakarta, Indonesia, November 6, 2013.
76MK Law Amendment case 2, MK Decision No. 49/PUU-IX/2011.
77Subject #33, Interview with attorney at Indonesian NGO, Jakarta, Indonesia, November 1, 2013.
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constraints, the Court has become an important actor in Indonesia’s political landscape. I
ascribe much of the Court’s success to its relationship with civil society. NGOs pursued con-
stitutional litigation and helped the justices realize their policy goals. They also mobilized
to deter government retaliation against the justices.
This multifaceted relationship between judges and civil society makes the Indonesian
Constitutional Court ideal for the purposes of my dissertation. In the next chapter of
this dissertation (Chapter III), I review the academic literature on judicial behavior and
explain my embedded autonomy model of judicial behavior. In the subsequent chapters,
I conduct empirical tests of three specific mechanisms through which Indonesian interest
groups influence the Constitutional Court: setting the agenda (Chapters IV); sending signals
about public opinion (Chapters V); and providing information in briefs (Chapters VI).
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CHAPTER III
Theory
Judges generally try to depict themselves as neutral arbiters of the law, weighing the
legal merits of each petition on a case by case basis. They claim that political and ideological
factors do not enter into their decisions. Yet, decades of political science research suggests
that this is at best an oversimplification. We have considerable evidence that judges take the
preferences of other government actors into account, especially when adjudicating politically
controversial claims. Even judicial independence cannot completely insulate judges from
political and societal pressures. In short, judges are political actors who often respond
strategically to external opportunities and threats.
In this chapter, I review the political science scholarship on judicial behavior. I begin in
Section 3.1 by looking at the extent to which legal and political institutions constrain judges.
Although this debate has tended to dominate the literature on judicial behavior, I point out
several important limitations. In Section 3.2, I propose an alternative theoretical framework
for understanding judicial behavior that I call “embedded autonomy.” This model focuses
on the role of interest groups and the general public in influencing courts.
3.1 Legal-Political Models
In this section, I summarize the literature on the formalist, attitudinal, historical-
institutionalist, and strategic-institutionalist models of judicial behavior. Each of these
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theories focuses on the extent to which legal and political factors constrain constitutional
courts. Although these models have improved our overall understanding of judicial behavior,
I focus on several important limitations that reduce their generalizability. Scholars generally
developed these theories while studying the U.S. Supreme Court, and as such make implicit
assumptions that do not always hold true for new constitutional courts in developing democ-
racies like Indonesia’s Constitutional Court. Moreover, these studies tend to overlook the
role of litigants and other nongovernmental stakeholders in the judicial system.
3.1.1 Formalist Model
The formalist model of judicial behavior argues that the law itself has meaning and
prevents judges from simply deciding cases based on their policy preferences. The plain text
of a constitution limits the scope of plausible or permissible legal interpretations because
judges must frame their arguments in reference to the text. In common law systems, where
judicial precedent (stare decisis) constitutes a source of law, judges must explain why their
current decisions are consistent with previous ones, or alternatively why they decided to
overturn binding precedent. In some civil law systems, judges will even cite scholarship on
legal norms as a source of law (see Shapiro, 1986).
Judges themselves seem to view adjudication primarily through a formalist framework.
They invest considerable time and effort in crafting legal arguments, suggesting that they
believe legal doctrine has inherent value. Judges publicly promote the formalist model as the
most appropriate way to understand the judiciary’s role – or lack thereof – in politics. During
his confirmation hearings, U.S. Chief Justice John Roberts famously compared judges to
umpires, implying that judges should adjudicate cases impartially and not push their policy
preferences (Rosen, 2015). There is also empirical evidence that standards of review matter;
judges are less likely to rule against the government if the law requires a more deferential
standard (Bartels, 2009; Hazelton, Hickman and Tiller, 2011).
In the 1930s, political scientists and legal realists began to question the extent to
48
which law could constrain judges, especially when legal text and judicial precedent are often
indeterminate. If law limits judicial discretion, then why do judges interpreting the same
law frequently reach different conclusions? For example, the U.S. Supreme Court regularly
decides cases on a 5-4 vote in large part because different justices utilize different methods of
constitutional interpretation. Originalists look to the intent of the Founding Fathers (Scalia,
1998), whereas adherents of active liberty “update” the constitution to account for changes
in social and political norms (Breyer, 2006).
The release of documents from several U.S. Supreme Court justices’ personal archives
– often posthumously – has helped reshape our view of judicial behavior. Several justices
have admitted in private diaries that non-legal factors, such as the effect of the law on
marginalized groups, influenced their decisions (see, e.g., Greenhouse, 2005; Urofsky, 2009).
Internal memos also reveal that the justices would rewrite draft opinions in order to appease
their colleagues and obtain a majority of votes (see, e.g., Woodward and Armstrong, 1979;
Stern and Wermiel, 2010; Toobin, 2008). In short, while most judges profess a belief in
formalism, in practice they seem to accept that legal doctrine is malleable, at least to a
certain extent.
The recent increase in comparative judicial scholarship, especially on courts in develop-
ing countries, presents another challenge to formalism. Formalism assumes both a preexisting
body of law and political institutions that respect the law, as has generally been the case
throughout U.S. history. However, newer constitutional courts often operate without any
precedent, much less the U.S. Supreme Court’s extensive body of jurisprudence. Moreover,
not all governments respect judicial independence. In such situations, it is easier to observe
judges issuing decisions that achieve policy or political goals, but do not necessarily adhere
to the letter of the law.
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3.1.2 Attitudinal Model
The attitudinal model, one of the earlier strains of legal realism, posits that judges
adjudicate cases based on their policy preferences, not the law (e.g., Segal and Cover, 1989;
Segal and Spaeth, 1996). This model treats judges as insulated and unaccountable political
actors able to decide cases however they see fit. In other words, judges are not constrained
by stare decisis, popular opinion, or other government institutions. The attitudinal model
has performed better at predicting the votes of U.S. Supreme Court justices than formalist
models (Ruger et al., 2004). Judges appointed by Republican presidents tend to support
conservative policies, whereas Democratic appointees support liberal policies, especially in
politically controversial cases.
Many of the assumptions built into the attitudinal model are unique to the U.S. and
thus do not translate well to other countries. First, the model assumes a high level of
judicial independence. U.S. Supreme Court justices possess life tenure, and as such can
afford to ignore political and social pressures. By contrast, judges in most other countries
are appointed for a limited term or face a mandatory retirement age (see Ginsburg, 2003,
Table 2.2, for a table of constitutional court terms). The obstacles to attitudinal voting
become even more serious in countries with weak courts and no respect for the rule of law
(see section 3.1.4 below). None but the bravest of judges will decide cases based on their
policy preferences if doing so would risk retaliation from the government (see Helmke, 2002).
Second, the social and political cleavages that arise in constitutional cases might not
necessarily reflect those of the country. The distribution of policy preferences on the bench
depends upon the appointment mechanism and the types of political disputes that have
become constitutionalized.1 In the U.S., the president initiates appointments to the federal
judiciary, so potential candidates have an incentive to advertise their ideological preferences
in order to win appointment (Black and Owens, 2016). Moreover, political debates tend to
1This is analogous to the literature on how electoral institutions and social cleavages affect the number
and diversity of political parties in a country (Clark and Golder, 2006).
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be framed exclusively along a unidimensional left-right/liberal-conservative spectrum. By
contrast, a different appointment mechanism, such as selection by independent judicial com-
missions (see Garoupa and Ginsburg, 2009), might favor non-partisan judges. Meanwhile,
higher standing thresholds might prevent politically salient disputes from reaching the court.
Scholars have found little evidence for regular ideological voting outside the U.S., even
in other common law countries, such as Canada (Ostberg and Wetstein, 2008), the United
Kingdom (Hanretty, 2013a), and Australia (Robinson, 2011). Carroll and Tiede (2012) find
some ideological voting on the Chilean Constitutional Tribunal, but qualify their findings by
noting that the justices had not formed firm “political” blocs. In exceptional cases dealing
with core interests, courts do issue clearly partisan decisions, such as the Thai Constitutional
Court’s rulings against populist politicians (Ginsburg, 2009; Me´rieau, 2016). However, over-
all, clear and consistent ideological voting seems to be the exception rather than the rule.
3.1.3 Historical-Institutionalist Model
Historical institutionalists posit that constitutional courts are embedded in and con-
strained by the political context in which they operate. The elected branches of government
pass laws affecting courts and appoint judges, effectively ensuring that their views shape
constitutional interpretation. For example, New Deal/Great Society liberals dominated U.S.
politics between 1932 to 1968, allowing them to appoint and confirm liberal justices to the
Supreme Court (Gillman, Graber and Whittington, 2013, 17-18). Indeed, as Dahl (1957,
285) argues, “the policy views dominant on the [Supreme] Court are never for long out of
line with the policy views dominant among the lawmaking majorities of the United States”
(see also Bergara, Richman and Spiller, 2003; Harvey and Friedman, 2006).
Historical institutionalism depends upon several assumptions rooted in U.S. history.
First, the model takes a cyclical view of U.S. politics, in which distinct ideological factions
gain power for limited periods of time (see Schlesinger, 1986). That theory of political
change, debatable for the U.S., probably does not hold true for other countries. Political
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parties in many developing democracies form around charismatic leaders or ethnic identities,
not ideology (Hicken and Kuhonta, 2011). In such circumstances, politicians will use judicial
appointments as patronage opportunities to satisfy key constituencies rather than to pursue
ideological goals (Gatmaytan and Magno, 2011).
Moreover, institutional design matters. Dahl (1957, 285) notes that the U.S. Supreme
Court’s policy preferences have historically converged with those of lawmakers because a
vacancy on the bench opened up on average once every two years. Almost every governing
majority had a chance to appoint at least one justice and shape the Court’s ideological com-
position. However, some constitutions provide courts with more insulation from historical
cycles by having all judges serve long, concurrent terms (see Ginsburg, 2003, Table 2.2).
Governing majorities might rise and fall before the judges’ terms expire. Other countries es-
tablish independent judicial commissions to appoint judges with minimal input from elected
lawmakers (see Garoupa and Ginsburg, 2009). In short, historical institutionalism only
explains judicial behavior under a certain set of political and institutional circumstances.
3.1.4 Strategic-Institutionalist Model
The strategic-institutionalist model argues that the institutional power of the executive
and legislature prevent judges from deciding cases based solely on either their policy prefer-
ences or interpretations of the law (e.g., Maltzman, Spriggs and Wahlbeck, 1999; Wahlbeck,
1997). As Alexander Hamilton warned, the judiciary has “no influence over either the sword
or the purse” (Hamilton, 1788), and thus cannot reshape policy in the face of aggressive
opposition from the government. Courts rely upon the other branches to enforce their de-
cisions. As Rosenberg (1991) points out, Southern states avoided complying with the U.S.
Supreme Court’s Brown v. Board of Education decision for years until the federal govern-
ment sent marshals to forcibly integrate schools. Meanwhile, if the legislature disagrees with
the court’s ruling, it could attempt to simply amend the constitution or impeach the judges.
As such, judges must moderate their decisions in order to preempt legislative override or
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executive noncompliance.
Scholars of judicial politics have found considerable evidence that judges behave strate-
gically. U.S. Supreme Court opinions tend to fall in between the ideal points of Congress
and the president, which suggests that the justices avoid issuing decisions that will provoke
a backlash from either branch (Bergara, Richman and Spiller, 2003; Harvey and Friedman,
2006). The model also fares well as an explanation of judicial behavior in other countries,
partly because it accounts for the types of de facto and de jure restrictions on judicial inde-
pendence common in authoritarian regimes and developing democracies (see VonDoepp and
Ellet, 2011; Carroll and Tiede, 2011). In an extreme case, Helmke (2004) finds that Argen-
tine judges are more likely to rule against the incumbent government if they believe that it
will lose the next election because they wish to avoid reprisals from the next administration.
The strategic-institutionalist model is most relevant in countries where judges face clear
strategic threats or opportunities from other government actors. As judicial independence
increases, judges should respond less to strategic considerations. Indeed, as the number
of veto players in a political system increases, the government’s ability to act decreases,
and judges become more empowered and activist (Santoni and Zucchini, 2004; Cooter and
Ginsburg, 1996). As Tushnet (2006, 915) says, “in periods of divided government, courts
can do whatever they want.”
The strategic-institutionalist model is limited less by what it includes and more by
what it omits. Too often, scholars only consider the executive and legislative branches as
potential factors shaping judges’ strategic environment. Even when they do consider non-
state actors, such as NGOs or the general public, they model them as influencing judges
indirectly through government institutions. For example, Vanberg (2005) finds that amicus
curiae briefs influence the German Constitutional Court because they act as signals of public
opinion, but concludes that judges heed public opinion because it influences elected officials.
In other words, Vanberg does not explore alternative means through which public opinion
might have influenced the court. As discussed in the next section, courts do have incentives
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to engage directly with non-state actors.
3.2 Embedded Judicial Autonomy
In this section, I build upon the existing literature to argue that non-state actors, par-
ticularly organized interest groups or NGOs, play an important role in influencing judicial
behavior. I argue that, under certain conditions, judges have an incentive to engage strate-
gically with interest groups and to cultivate public opinion. I begin by presenting a typology
of judicial institutions and a game theoretic model in order to explain how “embedded au-
tonomy” differs from other models of judicial behavior. I then focus on the role of NGOs as
one of the most important types of nongovernmental actors involved in litigation. Finally, I
discuss why this theoretical framework is especially appropriate for explaining the behavior
of new constitutional courts in civil law systems.
3.2.1 Typology
The logic of embedded judicial autonomy comes in part from the literature on bu-
reaucracies. Evans (1995) argues that in order for bureaucracies in developmentalist states
to achieve transformative policy outcomes, they must be both autonomous from the state
apparatus and embedded within society. The literature on principal-agent relationships has
convincingly explained why politicians delegate authority to independent bureaucrats (e.g.,
McCubbins, Noll and Weingast, 1987; Ferejohn and Shipan, 1990; Huber and Lupia, 2001).
Scholars have paid far less attention to Evans’ concept of embeddedness, which he defines
as having “institutionalized channels for the continual negotiation and renegotiation of poli-
cies” with society (Evans, 1995, 59). In other words, the most empowered and effective
bureaucracies are not completely insulated from society, but rather interact with non-state
actors in order to receive information about the implementation of policies. Doing so reduces
resistance from interest groups and recruits them as stakeholders.
Building off Evans’ work, I present a typology for the relationship between judicial
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autonomy and embeddedness in Table 3.1.2 Without control over their budget and without
the means to enforce their judgements, courts face two broad threats to their institutional
authority: retaliation and noncompliance. A government that disagrees with the court’s
decision might try to retaliate against the judges, either through formal mechanisms, such
as impeachment, or informal mechanisms, such as removing patronage opportunities. Alter-
natively, the losing party might simply refuse to comply with the decision in the belief that
no other government actor will enforce it in the face of active resistance.
Judicial Independence
Low High
Low I. Subservience II. Autonomy
Public
Support
High III. Embeddedness IV. Embedded Autonomy
Table 3.1: Typology of Public Support and Constitutional Court Strength
One equilibrium for judges is to insulate themselves from society and become sub-
servient to the government, exchanging institutional power for patronage (I). However, in
order to extract meaningful concessions from the government, the court must have the abil-
ity to bargain with a mixture of threats and rewards. Judges cannot credibly threaten to
rule against the government if the government could simply replace them at will. As such,
subservient courts have extremely limited influence over policy. Moreover, in many develop-
ing countries, courts find themselves subject to benign – or malign – neglect because they
cannot pressure the government to fulfill the judiciary’s budgetary and staffing needs.
Judicial independence (II) is a necessary but not sufficient condition for judicial em-
powerment. Institutional mechanisms such as life tenure for judges and high barriers to
impeachment can protect judges from retaliation by other government actors. However, in-
2I loosely adapted this table from Deinla (2014, 150). However, where Deinla compares public support for
a court with levels of democratization, I use judicial independence, which is more relevant to judicial behavior
than democratization. Although democracy and judicial independence are correlated, one can find examples
of relatively independent courts in authoritarian regimes (e.g., Toharia, 1975; Brown, 1997; Shapiro, 2008),
as well as subservient courts in democracies (e.g., Helmke, 2004).
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dependence does not guarantee that other branches of government will respect and comply
with judicial decisions. At the opposite extreme, an embedded court (III) engages with the
public, but lacks independence. Courts in this situation might try to gain public support
through popular rulings in nonpolitical or less controversial cases (Toharia, 1975; Haynie,
1994). However, judges risk backlash if their policy preferences do not align with those of the
public. If the court supports the government in an unpopular decision, it risks losing public
support. On the other hand, if the court issues an unpopular ruling against the government,
the public itself might call for restrictions on the court. Over the long run, this type of court
is unstable; the court will either lose public support and become subservient, or it will gain
independence.
Embedded autonomy (IV) is a solution to both the noncompliance and retaliation
problems. An embedded and autonomous court can cultivate non-state actors so that they
have an incentive to defend the judiciary against the government. If the public holds the
court in sufficiently high esteem, it will have an incentive to monitor and punish government
noncompliance with court orders (see Epp, 1998; Vanberg, 2001). In democracies, members of
the public can also use their power as voters and lobbyists to directly pressure the government
to respect the court’s decision. On the other hand, if the judges decide to issue an unpopular
decision, their institutional independence will protect them from public backlash. Over time,
the court can build an independent base of political support, which gives it more leverage in
bargaining with the government.
The literature has developed several theories for why governments tolerate and even
protect judicial autonomy. One branch of the literature focuses on how courts serve as a
credible commitment that the government will adhere to its stated policies. This reassures
economic elites that the government will respect their property rights, which in turn encour-
ages investment (see, e.g., North and Weingast, 1989; Feld and Voigt, 2003; Wang, 2015).
Another prominent theory posits that constitutional courts act as political insurance for
elites who expect to lose power, insulating their policy preferences against future attempts
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to overturn them (see, e.g., Ginsburg, 2003; Hirschl, 2004; Finkel, 2008; Stephenson, 2004).
In any case, because the literature has extensively explored both the causes and effects of
judicial independence (see, e.g., Knight and Epstein, 1996; Friedman, 2005; Helmke and
Rosenbluth, 2009), I do not focus on this aspect of embedded autonomy in my dissertation.
Instead, I focus on how embeddedness affects the court’s strategic behavior.
Courts can open institutionalized channels to society in several ways. First, the court
can signal its willingness to receive legal claims from the public, providing non-state actors
with a forum through which to influence policy. This is especially important for political
minorities or marginalized members of society, who cannot otherwise affect policy through
the majoritarian branches of government. Second, the court must demonstrate a willingness
to rule against the government in at least enough cases to persuade the public that the
court’s ability to check the government credible.3
For their part, non-state actors can utilize these channels to engage with the court and
influence policy. First, because courts cannot initiate cases sua sponte, they must wait for
external parties to submit cases for adjudication. This gives non-state actors considerable
power to set the court’s agenda. Non-state litigants can also attempt to send signals to the
court about public opinion as it relates to their legal claims. Moreover, because most courts
do not possess the capability to investigate the facts of a case or evaluate policy, they rely
heavily upon the information presented to them in briefs. In short, embeddedness allows
non-state actors to both influence the types of policy disputes the court addresses and the
information it uses to adjudicate those disputes.
3.2.2 Game Theoretic Model
In Figure 3.1, I present a game theoretic model to illustrate the implications of the
embedded autonomy model. The game has three actors, each with its own ideal point: the
3It is worth noting that embeddedness is not an unadulterated good. In fact, close ties between the court
and society can lead to corruption, improper bias, and a lack of accountability (see Voigt, 2008). I discuss
several examples of these problems later in the dissertation, especially in Chapter VII.
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judiciary (xJ), the legislature (xL), and the executive (xE) (the public also has an ideal
point, xP , but it does not make any strategic moves). I start the game by allowing Nature
to set policy at some status quo point xSQ. I make no assumptions about the status quo
except that all parties know its location and have a complete set of preferences relative
to it. Each actor maximizes ideological utility Ii, with i ∈ [J, L,E] when the final policy
outcome is equal to its ideal point (max{Ii} when −|xi − x| = 0). Importantly, I assume
that the executive and legislature had attempted to shift policy as close to their ideal points
as possible before the game begins, but fail because they face institutional and/or resource
constraints.
Following Vanberg (2001) and Carrubba and Zorn (2010), public support can modify
the payoffs to each player. Nature sets the political environment as one in which popular
mobilization is either costless or costly, with prior probabilities of p and 1− p, respectively.
In a “costless” environment (τ), transparency is high, the public can readily evaluate court
rulings and detect evasions, and barriers collective action are low. By contrast, in a “costly”
environment (¬τ), citizens cannot mobilize and cannot detect the impact of government
evasion. None of the actors know with certainty ex ante whether any particular evasion
attempt will succeed. The beliefs at each information node are captured by the parameter
qi ∈ (0, 1), with i ∈ [J, L,E].
I account for the direction of public support by making it a function of whether or not
the court’s ruling moved policy closer to the public’s ideal. If the court shifts policy towards
the public’s ideal point (|xE − xJ | < |xE − xSQ|), then the public will support the judiciary
and oppose any government evasion (βJ > 0, βL, βE < 0). On the other hand, if the public
preferred the status quo (|xE − xJ | > |xE − xSQ|), it will oppose the court and acquiesce to
government evasion (βJ < 0, βL, βE > 0). If the public is indifferent between the the status
quo and the court’s ideal point (|xE − xJ | = |xE − xSQ|), then there is no public reaction
and the game is the same as in a “costly” environment (¬τ). Here I assume that all players
know the direction of the public’s ideal point, if not its exact location, because the public
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provides information about itself through polls, elections, and amicus briefs to the court.4
The court’s overall utility consists of four variables: ideological preferences, institu-
tional integrity, patronage concerns, and popularity. The court’s ideological preferences are
represented by IJ , the distance between the court’s ideal point and the final policy outcome.
When the final outcome is the status quo, IJ = −|xJ − xSQ|. By contrast, when the court
succeeds in exercising review, its utility becomes I∗J = −|xJ − xJ | = 0. The court’s institu-
tional concerns are represented by a payoff C > 0, which represents the reputation cost of
being unable to prevent the government from reverting policy back to the status quo. As
discussed above, the public response to the court (βJ) can either be positive or negative.
If the government disagrees with the court’s decision, it can attempt to impose sanctions
(S) on the judges. Because I am primarily interested in independent courts, I assume the
government can only impose sanctions if both the executive and legislature agree to do so.
For both the executive and legislature, ideological utility is conditioned upon the dis-
tance between the final policy outcome and their ideal point.5 If the court succeeds in its exer-
cise of constitutional review, the utilities for the legislature and executive are IL = −|xL−xJ |
and IE = −|xE − xJ |, respectively. By contrast, if either branch succeeds in reversing the
court’s decision, policy reverts back to the status quo and utilities are calculated with respect
xSQ (IL = −|xL − xSQ|, IE = −|xE − xSQ|). If, however, there is public response, then the
legislature suffers βL while the executive suffers βE. I assume the court has complete infor-
mation about the government’s preferences through its briefs or other sources of information
(Helmke, 2004, 35).
In the game, the court moves first and can either exercise review and strike the law
down (review) or refrain from exercising review (¬review). In the latter case, the game
4Note that in Figure 3.1 I portray βJ as positive and βL, βE as negative. I do this simply to emphasize
that these variables go in opposite directions. If there is negative public reaction to the court’s decision,
the public response is calculated using −(βJ), −(−βL), and −(−βE), respectively. Moreover, because of the
nature of the threshold equations below, β 6= 0 in this model.
5I assume that both the executive and legislature know the court’s type. First, governments can learn
much about judges during the appointment and confirmation process. Second, governments have teams of
lawyers scouring judicial opinions in order to learn the court’s preferences on certain issues. Finally, in this
model the legislature and executive only move after the court.
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simply ends as each player receives the same utility as under the status quo. Next, the
legislature can either accept the decision (¬override) or attempt to override it with new
legislation (override), reinstating the status quo.6 Overriding the decision entails some cost
α (α > 0) that reflects the legislature’s internal coordination problem and opportunity costs.
In either case, the executive moves. If the legislature overrode the court’s decision, the
executive can either join the legislature (evade) or refuse to implement the legislature’s new
law (support). On the other hand, if the legislature did not override the court’s decision,
the executive can decide to evade it (evade) or accept it (support).
When the legislature and executive disagree, I follow Carrubba and Zorn (2010) in
finding that the executive has an effective veto over legislative action, but for different rea-
sons. First, while relatively few countries grant their executives formal veto power (Watson,
1988), Tsebelis and Aleman (2005) show that presidents can significantly influence the policy
agenda even when they can only remit comments back to the legislature. Second, executive
evasion is harder to detect and punish than legislative override. Third, the executive possess
resources, such as control over patronage, that enable it to influence legislators (Helmke,
2004, 28). As such, when the executive supports the court’s decision, the final policy will
reflect the court’s ideal point, whereas executive evasion reverts policy back to the status
quo. However, after any evasion attempt, the court still suffers the institutional cost C, even
when its policy is ultimately implemented.7
6I allow the legislature to move first for several reasons. First, legislative override will likely occur soon
after the court issues the decision. Such attempts are relatively easy to detect. By contrast, the executive can
openly promise to adhere to the court’s decision, but delay or obfuscate implementation, making detection
of noncompliance more difficult. Moreover, executive noncompliance can occur over an indefinite timeline,
whereas a legislative override is a discrete event.
7This assumption is debatable as an ultimate victory for the court might enhance its reputation. However,
I count any evasion attempt as imposing a cost because it exposes the court’s relative impotence. Further
research should be done to determine exactly when courts suffer institutional damage due to noncompliance.
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I solve this game for eight unique political environments, varying the direction of the
court’s decision and the direction of public support. Without a loss of generality, I specify
that the court can move in four directions. A court sympathetic to the legislature moves
policy towards the legislature’s ideal point and away from the executive’s (|xL − xJ | >
|xL−xSQ| ∩ |xE−xJ | < |xE−xSQ|). Second, a court sympathetic to the executive shifts policy
towards the executive’s ideal point and away from the legislature’s (|xE − xJ | < |xE − xSQ|
∩ |xL − xJ | > |xL − xSQ|). In a one-dimensional policy space, these scenarios only occur
when the status quo is located between the other two branches. Third, a court sympathetic
to both branches moves policy closer to both the legislature and executive’s ideal points
(|xL − xJ | < |xL − xSQ| ∩ |xE − xJ | < |xE − xSQ|). Finally, a court sympathetic to
neither branch can move policy away from their ideal points (|xL − xJ | > |xL − xSQ| ∩
|xE − xJ | > |xE − xSQ|). These last two occur when the status quo is to either the left or
right of both branches. In each scenario, the public can either support the court (βJ > 0 ∩
βL, βE < 0) or oppose it (βJ < 0 ∩ βL, βE > 0).
Because the legislature’s decision to override a court’s decision is not determinative and
subject to executive “veto,” I condense these eight political environments into four scenarios.
The Perfect Bayesian Equilibria (PBE) solutions to the game are provided below, where I
compare the beliefs at each information set (qi) with the common prior (p).
3.2.2.1 Subservience
In this scenario, the court moves policy away from the executive’s ideal point (|xE −
xJ | > |xE−xSQ|), while its effect on the legislature is irrelevant. Public opinion does not sup-
port the court (βJ < 0 ∩ βL, βE > 0). The following represent PBE strategies for each player:
Legislature: SL = [(override; p ≥ αβL ); (¬override; p < αβL )]
Executive: SE = [(evade; p ≥ |xE−xSQ|−|xE−xJ |βE )]
Judiciary: SJ = [(¬review; p ≥ max{−C+SβJ ,− CβJ })]
62
The court is at its weakest when confronted with both a hostile executive and public.
The court faces a serious risk of sanctions in addition to any institutional cost of legislative
override (p > −C+S
βJ
). Even if the legislature does not override the court, the executive will
attempt to evade the court’s policy decision. In such cases, judges conclude that judicial
review would always be detrimental to their interests (p > − C
βJ
) and never exercise review.
Judges will sometimes develop legal doctrines, such as political question doctrine in U.S.
constitutional law, to discourage petitioners from even bringing such cases to the courts.
This equilibrium helps explain why courts that lack independence tend to be so sub-
servient. However, it also explains situations in which judges collectively have policy prefer-
ences outside of the country’s mainstream. During wartime or national emergencies, courts
tend to grant the government more deference as popular support for restricting civil rights
increases. For example, during World War II, the U.S. Supreme Court did not declare the
internment of Japanese-Americans8 or military tribunals to prosecute German-American
saboteurs unconstitutional.9
3.2.2.2 Autonomy
In this scenario, the court moves policy towards the executive’s ideal point (|xE−xJ | <
|xE − xSQ|), while its effect on the legislature is irrelevant. In theory, the court’s opinion
could benefit both branches. However, public opinion does not support the court (βJ < 0 ∩
βL, βE > 0). The following represent PBE strategies for each player:
Legislature: SL = [(override; p ≥ αβL ); (¬override; p < αβL )]
Executive: SE = [(evade; p ≥ |xE−xSQ|−|xE−xJ |βE ); (¬evade; p <
|xE−xSQ|−|xE−xJ |
βE
)]
8In its infamous Korematsu v. U.S., the Court agreed with the government’s proposition that it had a
necessary and compelling interest in interning Japanese-Americans.
9In his memoirs, Justice William O. Douglas claims that the Court did not rule against the government in
Ex part Quirin because Attorney General told the justice that “the Army is going to go ahead and execute
the [saboteurs] whatever the Court did” (Douglas, 1980, 138-39).
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Judiciary: SJ = [(review; p ≤ |xJ−xSQ|βJ and p ≤ min{ αβL ,
|xE−xSQ|−|xE−xJ |
βE
});
(mix review,¬review; |xJ−xSQ|−C
βJ
< p <
|xJ−xSQ|
βJ
and α
βL
< p <
|xE−xSQ|−|xE−xJ |
βE
});
(¬review; p > |xJ−xSQ|−C
βJ
and p >
|xE−xSQ|−|xE−xJ |
βE
})]
Despite the fact that the decision might benefit the legislature, the legislature attempts
to override the decision in order to appease the public so long as the cost of legislating is
small. Likewise, if the public backlash against the court is large relative to the decision’s
policy benefits, the executive might feel compelled to evade the court’s opinion. The court’s
response depends primarily upon the extent to which it believes the executive will attempt
to evade its decision (p <
|xE−xSQ|−|xE−xJ |
βE
). When this condition is not satisfied, the court
will never exercise review. Next, the court must balance the policy gains from judicial review
against the threat of public backlash and institutional damage (p <
|xJ−xSQ|−C
βJ
). If the court
believes that neither branch will evade the decision and it is faced only with public backlash,
the court will exercise review if the backlash and institutional costs are sufficiently low. The
court will feel less constrained when it believes it is in a low transparency environment (p is
low).
This equilibrium allows political elites to blame courts for unpopular or anti-majoritarian
policies. Because the government selects judges, it can screen for candidates who share its
preferences (Salzberger, 1993, 361-64). In Western democracies, this equilibrium has proven
useful in resolving controversial policy disputes, such as abortion, flag burning, hate speech,
and busing (Whittington, 2009). In former socialist countries, neoliberal elites have encour-
aged judges to dismantle popular social welfare polices (Moustafa, 2007; Hirschl, 2004). As
shown in the model, judges reap all of the political backlash for their policy decision while
the other branches of government can gain public support by posturing against the court.
For its part, when the executive decides to support an unpopular court decision, it often
does so by emphasizing its lack of discretion and duty to uphold the “law of the land.”10
10For example, in 1957, President Dwight Eisenhower justified his decision to send federal troops to
integrate Little Rock public schools by claiming he had a duty to enforce Brown v. Board, even though
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3.2.2.3 Embeddedness
In this scenario, the court moves policy towards the executive’s ideal point (|xE−xJ | <
|xE−xSQ|), while its effect on the legislature is irrelevant. Moreover, public opinion does sup-
port the court (βJ > 0 ∩ βL, βE < 0). The following represent PBE strategies for each player:
Legislature: SL = [(¬override; p ≥ − αβL )]
Executive: SE = [(¬evade; p > |xE−xJ |−|xE−xSQ|βE )]
Judiciary: SJ = [(review; p > − |xJ−xSQ|βJ )]
With the executive and public on its side, the court is in one sense at its strongest. As
expected, the legislature will never contradict the popular will by attempting an override.
More importantly, the executive will never evade the court’s decision because in doing so it
gains the policy benefit and avoids public backlash. Not only can the court exercise review
under these circumstances, but it will always exercise review (p > − |xJ−xSQ|
βJ
). There is no
risk of either sanctions or institutional costs because neither branch will evade the decision.
The only question is how much added benefit public support will provide the court.
This equilibrium describes situations in which the government cannot achieve its policy
objectives without the aid of judicial review. For example, governments can allow citizens
to file lawsuits against bureaucrats who violate their rights (Shapiro, 1986; Staton, 2010).
Likewise, governments seeking to stimulate economic growth will often empower courts with
the power to enforce property and contract rights (LaPorta, 2004; Feld and Voigt, 2003;
Smith and Farrales, 2010). These outcomes tend to be popular, yet beyond the capacity of
the government alone to effectuate. The national government cannot effectively supervise
the entire bureaucracy, and it cannot credibly commit to protect the economic interests of
investors. Thus, the court can exercise review, but in the service of the government and
public’s policy preferences.
historians now believe Eisenhower supported desegregation (Nichols, 2008).
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3.2.2.4 Embedded Autonomy
In this scenario, the court moves policy away from the executive’s ideal point (|xE −
xJ | > |xE − xSQ|), while its effect on the legislature is irrelevant. However, public opinion
does support the court (βJ > 0 ∩ βL, βE < 0). The following represent PBE strategies for
each player:
Legislature: SL = [(¬override; p ≥ − αβL )]
Executive: SE = [(evade; p <
|xE−xJ |−|xE−xSQ|
βE
); (¬evade; p > |xE−xJ |−|xE−xSQ|
βE
)]
Judiciary: SJ = [(review; p > min{ CβJ ;
|xE−xJ |−|xE−xSQ|
βE
});
(¬review; p < min{ C
βJ
;
|xE−xJ |−|xE−xSQ|
βE
})]
Even though the executive dislikes the court’s opinion, public support affords the court
far greater discretion. In line with Stephenson (2004), the public supports the court when
its ideal point is closer to the court’s than to that of the elected government. The legislature
always follows public opinion and never attempts to override the decision, thus removing the
threat of sanctions against the justices. The executive will again base its decision on the gap
between the court’s decision and the status quo, but must also consider the cost of public
backlash for evading the court. Under these circumstances, the court can exercise review in
either of two circumstances. First, if it believes that the executive will not evade its decisions
(p >
|xE−xJ |−|xE−xSQ|
βE
), it will always exercise review. Second, if the court believes that the
institutional costs due to executive evasion will be low and public support sufficiently high
(p < C
βJ
), then the court will exercise review. In the latter case, it is important to emphasize
that the ideological benefit the court receives does not factor into its decision.
In moving policy far from the executive’s ideal point, the court must realize that there is
a chance the decision will never be implemented. In orienting its decision towards the public,
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the court effectively bargains that public support for its decision in the short-term it will
translate into support for the institution over the longer-term. This strategy can be especially
appealing to courts that lack legitimacy or institutional stature, such as courts in countries
that have just emerged from under authoritarian rule. The court can signal its sympathy with
and value to the public by issuing bold decisions early on that match the preferences of key
interest groups. Indeed, Dahl (1957) expects most new courts in democracies to issue their
boldest decision within a few years of their establishment. For example, the Supreme Courts
of India and the Philippines both issued several radical decisions championing environmental
protection, women’s rights, and other progressive causes soon after the martial law ended
in their respective countries (Gatmaytan, 2003; Rosencranz and Nardi, 2011). After the
transition from apartheid, the new Constitutional Court of South Africa enforced the 1996
Constitution’s right to health, which many observers had assumed was merely hortatory
(Sunstein, 2001). These decisions had significant financial and distributive impacts (Brinks
and Gauri, 2008), prompting opposition from the government. However, the decisions also
bolstered the reputation of these courts both domestically and internationally.
3.2.3 Nongovernmental Organizations
Nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) are especially important actors in the embed-
ded autonomy model. NGOs are nonprofit, formally constituted organizations with the goal
of pursuing some collective good or policy change. They serve as vehicles for segments of
the public to mobilize and coordinate around policy change. In forming an organization,
members can pool resources and develop institutional expertise in a policy area. They can
also file lawsuits on behalf of the organization.
NGOs have an interest in an independent and effective judiciary. Compared to the
average citizen, NGOs are more likely to be repeat players who use the courts regularly to
advance policy goals. However, most NGOs have less political power than governments or
corporations, and thus have fewer opportunities to change policy through the executive or
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legislative branches. For example, NGOs in developing countries find constitutional litigation
a useful way to challenge neoliberal economic policies because, unlike with traditionally
conservative executive or legislative branches, they can force such policy questions onto the
court’s agenda (Rosser, 2015c, 190). Courts can prove especially useful for organizations
that focus on protecting the rights of political minorities who cannot advance their goals
through majoritarian political institutions.
NGOs not only have a stake in judicial independence, but also have the means to defend
it. NGOs can use their policy expertise and network of members to monitor the enforcement
of judicial decisions more closely than the judges themselves. They can file a lawsuit to
alert the court if the executive attempts noncompliance (see Epp, 1998; Vanberg, 2001). As
repeat players, NGOs know the rules of litigation and can file such cases relatively quickly.
Moreover, interest groups can mobilize supporters in order to lobby the government or protest
violations of judicial autonomy. For example, when Pakistan’s military government sacked
Chief Justice Iftikhar Muhammad Chaudhry in September 2007, the Pakistan Bar Council
mobilized thousands of lawyers to protest in the streets (International Crisis Group, 2008).
Judges themselves rarely have the capacity to mobilize large groups of people.
3.2.4 Centralization of Review
The embedded autonomy model is useful for understanding judicial behavior in legal
systems with centralized mechanisms of constitutional review. Common law systems, such
as the U.S., decentralize constitutional review powers, granting any court jurisdiction over
constitutional issues (Rubin, 1977).11 Common law judges tend to be lawyers, often senior
members of the bar, and treat constitutional claims like any other legal dispute. By con-
trast, civil law systems frequently adopt the Kelsenian model, in which a single court has
exclusive jurisdiction over constitutional questions (Shapiro, 1986; Garoupa and Ginsburg,
2011). Judges on Kelsenian courts are tend to be former politicians or prestigious scholars.
11With the notable exception of Great Britain, where the common law system originated. Great Britain
does not have a written constitution and only recently created a supreme court.
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Not surprisingly, they treat constitutional disputes as inherently political and are more likely
to openly assess the policy or ethical implications of constitutional claims.
The Kelsenian system potentially increases embeddedness by making it less costly for
NGOs and interest groups to pursue constitutional claims than in common law systems.
NGOs can focus their resources on a single court and do not have to worry about exhausting
an appellate process before receiving a final decision. NGO staff attorneys only need to
master a single set of procedural rules and a single body of jurisprudence. Moreover, NGOs
have an opportunity to build a positive reputation before the judges through repeated ap-
pearances, more difficult to accomplish in a court of general jurisdiction with a much larger
docket. In short, the Kelsenian system gives NGOs greater opportunities to engage in policy
debates and be recognized by the judges as credible policy experts.12
The Kelsenian system can also increase embeddedness by giving judges a greater in-
centive to cultivate public opinion. In common law systems, judges can influence policy
by adjudicating disputes between private parties or by ruling against local governments,
while avoiding confrontation with the national government.13 By contrast, because Kelse-
nian courts only adjudicate constitutional claims, they do not have that option. If Kelsenian
courts want to influence policy, they need to declare some government actions unconstitu-
tional. Judges will have more latitude to do so if the public agrees with the court’s ruling.
Thus, judges in Kelsenian court systems should be more likely to seek out signals of public
opinion in controversial cases.
3.2.5 New Courts
New constitutional courts face a different strategic environment than older courts,
and thus have greater incentives to become embedded in society. Whereas older courts in
12On the other hand, Kelsenian constitutional courts tend to be based in the nation’s capital, which
disadvantages smaller regional NGOs.
13Indeed, during the nineteenth century, the U.S. Supreme Court frequently struck down state laws, but
rarely invalidated federal statutes. The first instance was in the famous Marbury v. Madison decision. The
second came 50 years later in the infamous Dred Scott decision.
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developed democracies have typically already established their legitimacy, younger courts
have not (Gibson, Caldeira and Baird, 1998). Older courts have relatively less incentive
to respond strategically to public opinion because they already benefit from diffuse public
support, i.e. support for the institution more broadly. The public values the court’s indepen-
dence even if it disagrees with the outcome of a given case. By contrast, public support for
new courts tends to be more specific and contingent upon the outcome of individual cases.
Building diffuse support for the judiciary requires not just that potential stakeholders agree
with the court’s policy preferences, but also that they have an incentive to mobilize against
government attempts to retaliate, even when they disagree with the court’s decision.
Constitutional courts in new democracies face unique political dilemmas. If the court
had existed under an authoritarian regime, the judges will need to demonstrate their inde-
pendence and distance themselves from the previous regime (see Helmke, 2002). If the court
was established at the onset of democracy, it will need to establish its relevance. Newer
courts often do not receive a budget sufficient to cover operating costs and staffing needs.
Moreover, many citizens might not even be aware of the new institution, much less realize
that the court has the power to declare laws unconstitutional. Not surprisingly, courts tend
to receive relatively few petitions during their first few years. Ironically, some new judges
might find themselves more worried about their relevance than about political threats.
In such circumstances, ruling strictly in favor of the government is not an effective
strategy because the government has no incentive to provide the court with more resources.
In line with Haynie (1994), if the judges want to become relevant and convince non-state
actors to file petitions for constitutional review, they must avoid the appearance of favoring
elites. They can do this by ruling against the government in high-profile cases. Doing so
demonstrates that it is possible for non-state actors to win against the government. This
in turn gives interest groups a greater stake in defending the court’s independence so as to
preserve their ability to influence policy in the future. Ultimately, the court ends up with
greater leverage against the executive and legislative branches, and non-state actors have a
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forum through which to influence in policy debates.
3.3 Concluding Remarks
In this chapter, I discussed the limitations of existing models of judicial behavior in the
political science literature. Formalist and attitudinal models might appropriately describe
the U.S. Supreme Court, but do not translate as well to countries. Historical-institutionalist
and strategic-institutionalist models better account for political constraints on judicial be-
havior, but, in focusing primarily on the other branches of government, they tend to overlook
non-state actors. I presented the embedded autonomy model as a corrective to this oversight.
I looked at the incentives that constitutional courts have to engage strategically with non-
state actors, particularly NGOs. I then explained why newer Kelsenian courts in developing
democracies should be more responsive to public opinion and pressure from interest groups
than common law courts.
The rest of this dissertation attempts to further explore the implications of the em-
bedded autonomy model and the role of non-state actors in constitutional litigation. In
Chapter IV, I find that Indonesian NGOs do play a unique agenda-setting role in constitu-
tional litigation, thereby expanding the range of policy issues that the Constitutional Court
can adjudicate. In Chapter V, I find that the justices are more likely to grant a petition
that is supported by a larger number of petitioners, suggesting that public opinion matters.
In Chapter VI, I find that the justices are more likely to cite text from petitions submitted
by NGOs than by other types of petitioners, indicating that they view those briefs as par-
ticularly valuable. In each of these chapters, I also discuss additional literature relevant to
the embedded autonomy model before testing a set of specific hypotheses.
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CHAPTER IV
Agenda Setting
As mentioned in the last chapter (Chapter III), scholars of comparative judicial politics
have tended to focus on explaining judicial voting behavior. We know much less about how
and why certain disputes reach courts in the first place. Unlike the executive and legislature,
courts cannot issue policy decisions sua sponte; judges can only rule on claims brought by
external parties. In this chapter, I build upon the theoretical discussion in Epp’s The Rights
Revolution. Epp argues that NGOs help protect legal rights by mobilizing resources to ensure
that constitutional claims reach the court’s agenda. I conduct an empirical test of this theory
using data from petitions to the Indonesian Constitutional Court.
My approach differs from the existing literature in three crucial ways. First, I treat
the topics on the court’s docket as an approximation of the judicial agenda. I use a latent
topic model in order to obtain a quantitative measure of the distribution of topics. Thus,
I measure agenda-setting as the ability to change the distribution of topics on the docket.
Second, compared to traditional hand-coding, the latent topic model allows for a more refined
and less biased measure of topics in legal documents. Instead of limiting my analysis to broad
categories of rights cases, the topic model yielded 22 distinct topics. This matters insofar
as NGOs do not have the same agenda-setting power for different types of topics. Finally, I
do not treat NGOs as a homogenous group. Instead, I look at how different types of NGOs
engage in agenda-setting.
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In Section 4.1 of this chapter, I briefly review the literature on agenda-setting and
develop a set of hypotheses about the types of claims Indonesian NGOs file with the Consti-
tutional Court. In Section 4.2, I explain my data and my empirical strategy. I also explain
the methodology underlying the Structural Topic Model. In Section 4.3, I present my re-
sults, including the 22 topics derived from the topic model. I find evidence that NGOs do
act as agenda setters, but only certain types of NGOs. Moreover, I find that the effect is
strongest for socioeconomic topics. In Section 4.4, I discuss several cases involving the ed-
ucation system that help illustrate how NGOs proved critical in challenging constitutional
violations. Finally, in Sections 4.5 and 4.6, I discuss my results and implications for the
broader literature.
4.1 Theory
Although some courts, such as the U.S. Supreme Court, have discretion over their
dockets, most courts, including the Indonesian Constitutional Court, must dispose of any
petition they receive that falls within their jurisdiction. In Indonesia, a petition to the Con-
stitutional Court containing a constitutional complaint initiates the process of constitutional
litigation.1 This means that petitioners essentially set the court’s agenda, which in turn can
affect its jurisprudence. Grossmann and Swedlow (2014) finds that the agenda has a greater
effect on U.S. Supreme Court policy decisions than ideological or partisan factors. In other
words, courts issue a greater number of decisions about a policy issue when they receive
more petitions related to that issue. By contrast, if a particular subject is not raised in a
petition, the court cannot adjudicate the issue sua sponte.2 In this section, I review the
literature on NGOs and agenda-setting in constitutional litigation. I then present a set of
hypotheses about how Indonesian NGOs influence the Constitutional Court’s agenda.
1Note that this differs from a petition for certiorari to the U.S. Supreme Court, which asks the justices
to review the decision of a lower court. Granting certiorari only means that the Court will hear the case,
not that it will rule in favor of the petitioner on the merits.
2Pakistan’s Supreme Court has occasionally initiated public interest cases sua sponte (Nardi, 2008a), but
this is the exception.
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4.1.1 Literature Review
In The Rights Revolution, Epp (1998) argues that agenda-setting is one of the most
powerful tools rights activists possess to influence judicial policymaking. He considers a
support structure for legal mobilization (SSLM) – advocacy organizations with a staff of
expert lawyers and private sources of funding – to be a necessary condition for a judicial
“rights revolution.” A support structure ensures that constitutional rights remain on the
court’s agenda and that the court will be informed about violations of its previous decisions.
By contrast, rights revolutions fail in the absence of a support structure, even when judges
would prefer to protect constitutional rights. For example, although India’s Supreme Court
has issued several high-profile decisions designed to protect human and environmental rights,
Epp notes that the rights situation in India did not appreciably improve because NGOs lacked
the capacity to build upon their successes.3 As such, simply having sympathetic judges is
neither necessary nor sufficient to protect constitutional rights.
Litigation is costly and potential litigants will only file a claim if the benefits of doing
so outweigh the costs. In most types of litigation, individuals bring a lawsuit because they
have a selective incentive to do so. Victory will remedy a past harm or yield a future benefit.
Thus, individuals will have an incentive to pursue the case if:
p(win)x− c > h (4.1)
, where p(win) is the probability of a favorable decision, x is the selective benefit of winning,
h is the constitutional harm suffered, and c is the cost of litigation. When this condition
is satisfied, there is no collective action problem as the individual has enough incentive to
pursue legal change him or herself (see Olson, 1971, regarding collective action).
By contrast, several collective action problems arise with public interest litigation.
3Most Indian NGOs lack the resources for sustained litigation and depend heavily on a handful of social
entrepreneurs. Indeed, a majority of environmental petitions during the late 20th century were filed by a
single lawyer, M.C. Mehta (Divan and Rosencranz, 2002).
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First, public interest litigation typically seeks to remedy harms to society rather than in-
dividuals. Although society as a whole might suffer from a constitutional violation, each
individual only endures a fraction of that harm. This means that there exist fewer indi-
viduals for whom the benefits of a favorable victory outweigh the costs of litigation. For
example, if a government illegally spies on its citizens, that action violates the rights of each
citizen, but the average individual only suffers de minimis harm. Second, public interest
litigation typically deals with broad policy questions, which require technical expertise and
proof beyond the average citizen’s knowledge or resources. Finally, when individuals chal-
lenge the constitutionality of a law, the government will generally attempt to defend that
law. Given that government actors possess considerable advantages in litigation (McGuire,
1998; Farole, 1999; Flemming and Krutz, 2002; Hanretty, 2013b, see), this makes litigation
even more costly and further decreases the probability of victory.
Epp’s support structure theory provides one solution to the collective action problem.
NGOs help by coordinating the actions and resources of individuals who value policy change
highly (increasing x). NGOs can and do file constitutional cases even if none of their members
are directly harmed by the government’s action. Moreover, NGOs essentially internalize the
costs of constitutional litigation. By pooling resources and developing internal legal expertise,
NGOs reduce the average costs of litigation per case (reducing c). NGOs also have the
capacity to conduct policy research and hire expert witnesses, improving the chances that
they will obtain a favorable decision (increasing p). Thus, NGOs will often find themselves
in a position to pursue constitutional claims that would not otherwise have reached the
court. This affords NGOs significant agenda-setting power because they can draw the court’s
attention to the issues most important to them.
Other scholars contend that political opportunities, such as new rights legislation, not
support structures, create the conditions that lead to rights revolutions. Urribarri et al.
(2011a) test this theory by creating an ordinal variable to rank support structures for a
time series analysis of judicial voting behavior the U.S., U.K., and Canada. They find that
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support structures have no impact on the likelihood that judges will vote in favor of rights
claimants, and that rights victories increase in response to political opportunities. They also
find that the number of rights cases in dockets in South Africa, Australia, and the Philippines
is not correlated with the number of NGOs that had filed petitions before the court.
There have been few other attempts to empirically test Epp’s support-structure theory,
perhaps due to several methodological challenges inherent in this type of research. First,
scholars have tended to select cases based on the availability of data, which in practice means
English-language judicial decisions, often from common law systems. This inevitably limits
the ability of these studies to isolate the effect of support structures as a causal variable and
generalize findings to other countries. For example, Epp (1998) does not completely account
for potential confounding variables that might explain why a rights revolution failed in India
but not in the U.S., U.K., or Canada (e.g., India is obviously poorer and less politically
stable).
Second, although Epp (1998) utilizes a rich combination of historical accounts, inter-
views, financial information, and jurisprudence in order to conduct a qualitative analysis of
rights litigation, he does not provide an objective method for measuring SSLMs. What is
considered a weak or small NGO in a wealthy Western country might prove sufficiently large
and powerful in a developing country. This problem is exemplified by a debate in the pages
of The Journal of Politics about about the Philippines. Urribarri et al. (2011b) note that
the Philippine Supreme Court’s docket contains a high proportion of rights cases despite the
fact that NGOs submitted only 0.2% of the petitions. Epp (2011, 408) responds that the
high number of rights cases in the court’s docket could be explained by the fact that “the
Philippine human rights movement remains among the most dynamic and influential in the
developing world.” In short, the literature has not even reached a consensus on how to assess
support structures in a specific country, much less compare them across countries.
Third, the literature tends to treat NGOs as homogenous. For example, Urribarri
et al. (2011a) focus on the aggregate number of NGOs rather than the actions of specific
76
types of NGOs. Yet, most NGOs are mission-driven, pursuing relatively narrow policy goals
as opposed to all possible rights claims. In some countries, NGOs might have particular
ideological preferences or resource constraints that drive them to pursue certain types of
rights claims. Moreover, NGOs might prove more effective agenda setters for some types of
rights claims than for others.4
In addition, the literature tends to treat rights claims as homogenous. Schorpp, Songer
and Urribarri (2008) do challenge Epp on the grounds that judges do not necessarily treat
all rights cases equally and might be more sympathetic to particular types of rights claims.
Using data from the U.S., U.K., Canada, and Australia, they find no correlation between
judicial outcomes in civil liberties and criminal rights. In other words, a revolution in civil
rights jurisprudence does not necessarily lead to a revolution for criminal rights. However,
even this study overlooks important distinctions between different types of civil and criminal
rights (and completely ignores the unique challenges associated with socioeconomic rights).
In short, the literature has not adequately accounted for the heterogeneity of NGOs or the
constitutional claims they bring.
There is a small but growing literature arguing that Indonesian NGOs do indeed act as
SSLMs in constitutional litigation (Rosser and Curnow, 2014; Rosser, 2015b; Curnow, 2015).
Rosser (2015b) argues that Epp’s support-structures theory should be even more relevant to
countries like Indonesia, where litigation is relatively costly and ordinary citizens have less
access to legal resources. Rosser (2015c, 187) goes so far as to claim that:
[I]t is difficult to imagine individuals successfully pursuing their rights in court
without the financial, organisational and technical assistance provided by NGOs
such as [the Legal Aid Organization of] Jakarta, PEKKA and Indonesia Cor-
ruption Watch... [S]uccessful citizen efforts to defend rights [...] in Indonesia
have only occurred when citizens have had access to an effective SSLM that has
enabled them to mobilise the resources required to launch and sustain expensive
and time-consuming court cases.
4Vanhala (2017) claims that opportunity structures do not influence the decisions of NGOs to pursue their
policy goals in courts in the first place. However, my dissertation focuses on the effect of agenda-setting on
courts, not the initial decision to file. Moreover, her data come from Europe, where NGOs are more likely
to succeed in lobbying legislatures for policy change than in a developing democracy like Indonesia.
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This literature is extremely useful for understanding how individual SSLMs help Indonesian
citizens, but relies on a handful of qualitative case studies. It cannot tell us the overall extent
to which Indonesian NGOs actively set the Constitutional Court’s agenda.
SSLMs are especially important in Indonesia because the Constitutional Court’s deci-
sions only apply prospectively (see Chapter II). Prospectivity increases the collective action
problem litigants face; it will be more difficult to find litigants willing to invest the resources
necessary to challenge constitutional violations if they can only prevent future violations
rather than remedy past harms. Indonesian NGOs help solve this problem pooling resources
and internalizing the costs of litigation. Moreover, NGOs with specific policy goals are willing
to invest resources to pursue policy change for its own sake, not just to remedy past harms.
Thus, prospectivity should not deter NGOs as much as it does other potential petitioners.
4.1.2 Hypotheses
In this section, I propose a set of specific hypotheses about the Indonesian Constitu-
tional Court (Mahkamah Konstitusi) and role of NGOs as agenda setters. As discussed in
Chapter II, Indonesia is a particularly useful context in which to explore SSLMs. First, the
Court has lowered standing requirements for petitioners pursuing public interest litigation,
meaning that the institution is accessible to NGOs. Second, the Court has exercised its
review powers against the government vigorously, making it an appealing policy forum for
NGOs. Third, Indonesia has an active civil society and NGOs that have the resources to
pursue constitutional litigation. Finally, my dataset of Indonesian petitioners allows me to
obtain more refined information about different types of NGOs involved in constitutional
litigation and different types of laws challenged.
A key obstacle to previous research on agenda-setting has been the difficulty of mea-
suring the judicial agenda. Although agenda-setting could refer to a variety of ways that
petitions influence which issues and legal arguments reach judges, in this chapter I focus on
the distribution of topics on the docket. To obtain information on the relationship between
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petitions and the agenda, I measure the percentage of text in each petition associated with
each topic present in the docket (see Section 4.2.3 regarding measurement). To test Epp’s
support structure theory, we can leverage the fact that, despite their claims to represent the
broader public interest, the distribution and intensity of NGOs’ policy preferences differs
from those of other potential litigants, such as local governments or corporations. Many
NGOs focus on unique or niche issues that do not receive widespread attention from the
public at large but are important to that group and its members. This implies that petitions
filed by NGOs should cover topics different from those of petitions filed by other types of
petitioners. This leads to the following:
Hypothesis 4.1 (Topic Prevalence): The distribution of topics in petitions
filed by NGOs should on average be significantly different from the distribution of
topics in petitions filed by all other types of petitioners.
If we observe a significant relationship between NGOs and certain topics, then that would
indicate an agenda-setting power because NGOs are dictating the docket with respect to
those topics. In effect, NGOs are increasing the proportion of the Court’s docket dealing
with the legal issues of greatest concern to them.
We can also predict the topics for which NGOs will have the strongest agenda-setting
powers. Given limited time and resources, NGOs will choose to focus their efforts on the
issues of greatest concern to their staff and members. For example, an environmental NGO
like WALHI will be more likely to file a petition challenging the constitutionality of a forestry
law than a random petitioner, or even other NGOs. This leads to the following:
Hypothesis 4.2 (NGO Identity): NGOs whose organizational charter con-
tains a specific policy focus will be more likely to file petitions on topics related
to that policy focus.
In other words, not all NGOs act as SSLMs for all topics. NGOs are more likely to act as
agenda setters for topics related to their policy goals. One important implication of this
hypothesis is that some topics traditionally affiliated with progressive politics might not be
associated with SSLMs if Indonesian NGOs do not focus on that issue.
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Finally, Indonesian NGOs should be more likely than other petitioners to file petitions
related to socioeconomic issues, such as rights to health or education. Socioeconomic rights
are relatively new constitutional innovations. Indeed, until recently, there was considerable
skepticism as to whether or not courts could enforce socioeconomic rights (see Sunstein,
2001). There are also unique collective action problems associated with litigating socioeco-
nomic rights. Violations of socioeconomic rights tend to affect groups rather than individuals
because they generally confer public goods (Brinks and Gauri, 2008). Moreover, monitoring
and litigating socioeconomic rights violations requires considerable technical and policy ex-
pertise, whereas civil and criminal rights violations are much easier to detect because they
affect individuals directly. As policy entrepreneurs, NGOs provide the resources to litigate
socioeconomic rights. They also possess policy expertise and can draw upon a network of
expert witnesses during litigation. This leads to the following:
Hypothesis 4.3 (Socioeconomic): Petitions dealing with socioeconomic top-
ics are more likely to be filed by NGOs than other types of petitioners.
In other words, NGOs are more likely to act as agenda setters in cases involving socioeco-
nomic rights, even compared to civil or criminal rights.
4.2 Methodology & Data
As noted above, one reason for the lack of research on agenda-setting in litigation
has been the difficulty of quantifying information about legal issues on a court’s docket. I
solve this problem by using a Structural Topic Model to derive information about topics in
petitions to the Indonesian Constitutional Court. The topic model creates clusters of topics
based on the frequency and distribution of words across the documents. In this section, I
describe my data and how I processed the petitions to make them machine-readable. I then
explain the statistics underlying the Structural Topic Model and the process for selecting
the number of topics.
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4.2.1 Data & Measurement
The primary data for this chapter are the petitions for constitutional review that the
Constitutional Court received from August 13, 2003 (the date the Court began hearing cases)
to October 2, 2013 (the date Chief Justice Akil Mochtar resigned). I use petitions instead of
the Court’s decisions because those are the documents that set the Court’s agenda. Overall,
the Constitutional Court received 560 individual petitions during that time period (several
were later withdrawn).5
In order to capture information about petitioners, I hired Indonesian law students to
code the identity of all petitioners. Around half of the petitions had more than one petitioner,
in which case each petitioner was coded separately. Moreover, I only counted organizations
once, even if multiple individual represented that organization before the Court. For example,
if the CEO and COO both signed a petition on behalf of a corporation, I counted the
corporation as a single petitioner.6 Overall, there were 3,002 individual petitioners, with an
average of 5.36 petitioners per case. The mean is much larger than the median because of a
small number of outliers; less than 14% of the petitions had more than 29 petitioners (the
mean plus the standard deviation).
All petitioners were grouped into one of the following six categories: 1) national gov-
ernment institution;7 2) local government institution; 3) private business/corporation;8 4)
nongovernmental organization (NGO); 5) political party/candidate; or 6) individual unaffili-
ated with any organization. These petitioner identity categories are based loosely on Haynie
et al. (2007) and Carrubba et al. (2013), two of the largest cross-national databases of ju-
519 petitions are missing from the case files, so the corpus only includes 541 documents. I was unable
to ascertain why certain documents were missing, but missingness does not seem correlated with topics. It
does appear that missingness occurs more frequently in cases that were withdrawn before the Court reached
a final judgment.
6Some Indonesian organizations have internal rules requiring at least two people from the governing board
to support a legal petition in order to prevent abuse.
7Most of the national government institutions that filed petitions were independent commissions, such as
the KPU. The president and the DPR did not file petitions and often submitted statements defending the
constitutionality of the challenged legislation.
8This does not include petitioners who listed their profession as “entrepreneur,” which typically means
that the individual ran the equivalent of a sole proprietorship.
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dicial decisions. Categories were treated as mutually exclusive in that petitioners could not
be more than one type. For the most part, identifying each petitioner type was relatively
straightforward because each petition lists all petitioners involved in the case and also lists
their profession (see Appendix A for more on coding rules).
Petitioner Type Number of Cases Number of Petitioners Example
Individual 312 1389 Refly Harun
Political party 125 863 Gerindra
NGOs 144 497 Indonesian Farmer’s Union
Private business 37 108 PT. Gudang Garam
Local gov. 45 134 Papua DPRD
National gov. 11 11 Election Commission
Table 4.1: Summary Statistics of Petitioners in Constitutional Review Cases (Aug.
2003 - Oct. 2013)
Table 4.1 provides summary statistics of the types of petitioners in the dataset. Almost
half were individuals not affiliated with or representing an organization. NGOs constituted
around 21% of the total number of petitioners and appear in 144 cases, around a quarter of
the total. In other words, NGOs were the largest category of petitioner aside from individu-
als.9 On its face, the data suggest that NGOs file constitutional petitions regularly enough
to influence the Constitutional Court’s agenda.
I then disaggregated the NGO category to obtain more information about the different
types of NGOs involved in constitutional litigation. Coders were asked to read the NGO’s
mission statement or organizational charter in order to classify them. Again, all categories
were treated as mutually exclusive; if the NGO covered more than one issue area, coders
were asked to select the category that best described its activities. Table 4.2 provides
summary statistics of the types of NGOs in the dataset. Note that in this dissertation I use
“NGO” broadly to refer to all nonprofit, formally constituted organizations. This includes
many diverse types of organizations, including chambers of commerce, labor unions, and
indigenous groups.10
Human rights, good governance, and labor NGOs were amongst the most frequent
9Political parties and politicians also comprise a large class of petitioners, but this is largely due to the
fact that over 500 party activists joined the petition in the Parliamentary Threshold case (MK Decision No.
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Type of NGO # of Cases # of NGOs Example
Commercial 7 8 Chamber of Commerce and Industry
Consumer 3 3 Indonesia Insurance Consumers Foundation
Development 12 14 Urban Poor Community
Education 12 65 Teacher’s Union of the Republic of Indonesia
Environment 11 20 Indonesian Center for Environmental Law
Environment 17 44 Indonesian Center for Environmental Law
Gender 12 19 Women’s Solidarity Union
Governance 30 59 Indonesia Corruption Watch
Health 4 4 Indonesian Medical Association
Human rights 40 60 Commission for Disappeared and Victims of Violence
Indigenous 11 16 Indigenous Peoples Alliance of the Archipelago
Labor union 33 107 Indonesian Federation of Labor Unions
Lawyers 8 10 Congress of Indonesian Advocates
Legal aid 19 26 Lembaga Bantuan Hukum
Media/Journalism 7 15 Indonesian Television Journalists Association
Religion 10 24 Nahdlatul Ulama
Youth 3 6 Indonesian National Student Movement
Table 4.2: Summary Statistics of Organized Interest Group Petitioners in
Constitutional Review Cases (Aug. 2003 - Oct. 2013)
NGOs to appear before the Constitutional Court (in 40, 30, and 33 cases, respectively).
Indeed, the dominance of labor and rights NGOs, as well as the relatively large number
education and gender NGOs, suggests that the Court is a more attractive venue to left-
ist/progressive NGOs. The more conservative or traditional NGOs, such as religious foun-
dations and chambers of commerce, do participate in constitutional litigation, but not in
numbers commensurate to their influence on Indonesian politics. This suggests a substi-
tution effect; NGOs use the Constitutional Court to advance their policy aims when they
cannot do so through the legislative or executive branches.
4.2.2 Processing the Petitions
In this section, I describe the steps I took to make the petitions machine-readable and to
extract information about word frequency counts across documents. All of the petitions are
in Indonesian (bahasa Indonesia), so I modified standard natural language processing (NLP)
3/PUU-VII/2009). Political parties were only involved in 125 cases.
10That said, excluding NGOs associated with private sector actors, such as chambers of commerce, from
the NGO category does not significantly change any of the results in Section 4.3.
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techniques to account for differences in Indonesian grammar. First, I used Tesseract11 to run
Indonesian-language optical character recognition (OCR) on the documents, which converted
the pdf image files to text. Second, I stripped the texts of all numbers, punctuation, and
extra whitespace. I then removed 359 Indonesian stop words, such as “and” (Tala, 2003,
Appendix D), as well as words with fewer than three characters, on the assumption that
these tend not to be associated with or relevant to topics.12 I then converted all words to
lowercase.
In NLP, stemming is often used to stem words to their roots by removing declensions
or conjugations so that the topic model can recognize different forms of the same word, e.g.,
“decide” versus “deciding” (Grimmer, 2010). Indonesian relies heavily on adding prefixes
and suffixes to root words in order to change the part of speech. Prefixes starting with “me-
,” “be-,” or “di-” indicate verbs, while prefixes with “pe-” or “ke-” indicate nouns. Suffixes
ending in “-an” indicate nouns, while other suffixes (“-kan” and “-i”) indicate different
verb forms. Sometimes the prefix or suffix changes the meaning or sense of the word. For
example, the root word “pilih” means “select,” whereas “pemilihan” in political documents
means “election.”
According to Asian, Williams and Tahaghoghi (2005) and Widjaja and Hansun (2015),
the Nazief and Adriani (1996) stemming algorithm performs best in correctly stemming
Indonesian word occurrences to the correct root. Nazief-Adriani is a rule-based stemmer
that use a confix-stripping approach that groups affixes into into three categories:
1. Inflection particle suffixes (P), which do not alter the root word and add a particle to
a verb (e.g., “pilihlah,” the imperative form of “to vote”);
2. Inflection possessive pronoun suffixes (PP), which do not alter the root word and add
a possessive pronoun to a noun (e.g., “pilihannya” or the noun “his vote”);
3. Derivation suffixes (DS), which are applied directly to the root word (e.g., “pilihan”
or “a vote”);
11Available at https://github.com/tesseract-ocr.
12Although I do not remove proper nouns, such as names.
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4. Derivation prefixes (DP), which are applied directly to the root word (e.g., “memilih”
or “to vote”);
At the start of each step, the confix stripping stemmer checks the current word against the
root word dictionary. If it finds a match, the result is accepted and processing stops. If not,
words are the stemmed according to the rule precedence:
[DP + [DP + [DP+]]] root word [[+DS][+PP ][+P ]] (4.2)
The stemmer begins by removing the particle, possessive pronoun, and derivation suffixes,
and then removes prefixes, with a maximum of three iterations. If the root word still has
not been found after those steps, the stemmer attempts to recode the word by replacing
or adding to the first letter of the word because prefixes in Indonesian sometimes change
the first letter of the word (e.g., the verb form of “pilih” is “memilih,” not “mempilih”). If
stemming still fails, the stemmer returns the original unstemmed word (see Adriani et al.,
2007, for additional details).13
The Nazief & Adriani stemmer does have some drawbacks (see Asian, Williams and
Tahaghoghi, 2005, Table 7). It cannot properly stem compound words, in which the true
root is the compound form rather than the disaggregated components. For example, the
Indonesian word for “to notify” (“memberitahu”) is a combination of the root words “to
give” (“memberi) and “to know” (“tahu), but the stemmer will not find the prefix-less root
“beritahu” in the root word dictionary, and so will reject it. The stemmer also does not
unpack and stem acronyms. For example, “pemilu” is a common acronym for “general
election,” but the stemmer would return “pemilu” rather than “pemilihan” (“election”)
and “umum” (“general”). This limitation is important because Indonesian relies heavily
on acronyms (see the List of Abbreviations at the beginning of this dissertation). However,
after reviewing a sample of petitions, I decided not to remove or disaggregate these acronyms
13I use the Sastrawi implementation of the Nazief and Adriani (1996) stemmer, which is a PHP script
developed by Librian (2015) available at https://github.com/sastrawi. This version includes minor en-
hancements from Asian (2007).
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because most are more informative than the stemmed roots of the full words.
Finally, because topic models utilize information about the frequency and distribution
of words in a corpus, I removed both very frequent and very sparse terms. Extremely common
words are less likely to indicate a unique topic and more likely to represent boilerplate legal
language (e.g., “petition” or permohonan). By contrast, extremely sparse words are more
likely to be associated with the specific facts of a case (e.g., personal names). I set a low
threshold for sparse terms in the belief that even relatively rare terms can be informative
about topics. Moreover, Indonesian is a relatively sparse language compared to English. As
such, I removed any term that does not appear in at least 2.5% of documents, or 14 petitions,
as well as words that appear in over 92.5%, or 500 petitions.14
4.2.3 Structural Topic Model
Traditionally, scholars have hand-coded judicial decisions in order to obtain information
about topics in a court’s docket. In recent years, advances in NLP have made it possible
to use probabilistic models to connect words in a corpus to latent topics (see Grimmer
and Stewart, 2013). Meanwhile, hand-coding has come under increased criticism on both
substantive and methodological grounds. With hand-coding, the researcher must select the
topics for which to code a priori, a process that is necessarily influenced by the coder’s own
experiences and expectations (McGuire and Vanberg, 2005). Researchers might mistakenly
include more or fewer topics than would be appropriate for the corpus in question. For
example, some researchers might decide to divide criminal law into “murder,” “narcotics,”
etc., while others might only use an overarching “criminal law” category.
Hand-coding also imposes the assumption that judges adjudicate cases along the same
dimensions that the coder used to classify the cases. Shapiro (2009) warns that scholars
using the hand-coded U.S. Supreme Court Database (Spaeth et al., 2012) risk confirmation
bias by conflating policy and legal issues. For example, Harvey and Woodruff (2011) find
14By contrast, topic models for English corpora typically remove words that do not appear in at least 5%
of documents (Grimmer, 2010).
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that issue areas in the SCD generally align to expectations of how cases would fall along
a liberal-conservative political spectrum, leading scholars to overstate the effect of policy
preferences on judicial outcomes. In short, hand-coding risks forcing cases into politically
salient or controversial dimensions that might not conform to actual judicial voting behavior.
Hand-coding also has trouble handling multidimensionality. Many coding schemes ask
coders to fit each case into a single category, which risks misidentification. For example,
in the SCD, an election crime would be forced into “election” or “crime,” neither of which
alone captures the full dimensions of an “election crime” case. Shapiro (2009, 515) finds that
only six out of a sample of 95 cases from the SCD involved just a single issue. By contrast,
automated topic models can detect the percentage of text within each document that is
associated with each topic cluster (e.g., 40% for Topic 1, 25% for Topic 2, ... 10% for Topic
i). This allows for more refined analysis of the distribution of topics on the docket. These
methodological challenges are especially relevant to studying agenda-setting in constitutional
courts. The coding scheme determines the scope of the judicial agenda, but defining the issue
space too narrowly or too expansively might lead to incorrect inferences (see the discussion
of Schorpp, Songer and Urribarri, 2008, above).
Because there is no direct means of measuring the topics in a corpus, the terms in each
topic, or the distribution of topics within each document, they must be treated as latent
variables. Topic models utilize a Bayesian approach in order to determine complex posteriors
for the probability that a particular document falls within a particular topic cluster. The
primary observed data with which topic models infer topics are word counts, particularly
the frequency and distribution of words within each document and across the corpus.
The most common topic model in the social sciences, Latent Dirichlet Allocation
(LDA), assumes a generative process that relies upon a Dirichlet distribution for the topic
distribution θ and the term distribution β for each topic (Blei, Ng and Jordan, 2003; Ger-
rish and Blei, 2011; Wallach, Mimno and McCallum, 2009). LDA suffers from two critical
limitations. First, it only uses word counts, but researchers often possess additional infor-
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mation about documents that could be useful in understanding the distribution of topics.
Incorporating additional covariates into the topic model could improve estimation of the
topics (Roberts et al., 2014). In addition, researchers are generally more interested in the
relationships between observed covariates – such as petitioner identity – and latent topics
than in the topics themselves.
Second, LDA assumes independence between topics (Grimmer, 2010, footnote 6). This
condition might not hold if the generative processes of some topici and topicj are correlated.
For example, if a document contains a significant block of text associated with a “presidential
elections” topic, it seems more likely that it will also contain text associated with a “leg-
islative elections” topic than a “financial” topic. Thus, the independence assumption would
undermine our ability to make reliable inferences about the relationship between topics and
covariates. One alternative to LDA, the Correlated Topic Model (CTM), does not assume
independence (Blei and Lafferty, 2007; Grimmer and Stewart, 2013), but like LDA it does
not incorporate information about covariates.15
In order to overcome both of these limitations, I use a Structural Topic Model (STM)
from Roberts, Stewart and Airoldi (2016). STM leverages generalized linear models to
introduce information about covariates into the model. The observed covariates are allowed
to affect topic prevalence in a document (i.e., the proportion of words in a document assigned
to a topic). STM replaces the Dirichlet distribution that governs topic prevalence with a
Logistic Normal distribution with a mean vector parametrized as a linear function of observed
covariates. Roberts, Stewart and Airoldi (2016) show that introducing covariates results in a
very mild bias compared to LDA topic models, but far less variance across model simulations.
STM begins like the LDA model, with an index of documents d ∈ {1...D} and an index
of words in documents n ∈ {1...Nd}. The primary observable data are the words ωd,n, which
are instances of unique terms from a vocabulary V , indexed by v ∈ {1...V }. The researcher
must set the parameter K, which is the number of topics as indexed by k ∈ {1...K} (see
15In the absence of covariates, STM reduces to a version of CTM (Roberts et al., 2014).
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Section 4.2.4). Moreover, mv is the marginal log frequency of term v in the vocabulary V ,
which is estimated from the total word counts (Roberts, Stewart and Airoldi, 2016, 7).
The model utilizes additional observed information from a design matrix X with D×P
dimensions and with rows xd, in which each row defines a vector of covariates for each
document. In my model, X is a matrix with dummy variables for petitioner identity, such
that {x = 1} if the the petition includes a petitioner of type x, and 0 else (see Figure 4.1). In
addition, I include a spline of the log of the number of days since the Constitutional Court
was established (August 13, 2003) to control for the fact that the distribution of topics on
the Court’s docket might change over time.
words {wd,n}, the design matrices for topic prevalence X and topical content Y, scalar
hyper-parameters s, r, ⇢, and K-dimensional hyper-parameter vector  , is as follows:
 k ⇠ NormalP (0,  2k IP ), for k = 1 . . . K   1, (1)
✓d ⇠ LogisticNormalK 1( 0x0d,⌃), (2)
zd,n ⇠ MultinomialK(✓d), for n = 1 . . . Nd, (3)
wd,n ⇠ MultinomialV (Bzd,n), for n = 1 . . . Nd, (4)
 d,k,v =
exp(mv + 
(t)
k,v + 
(c)
yd,v
+ 
(i)
yd,k,v
)P
v exp(mv + 
(t)
k,v + 
(c)
yd,v
+ 
(i)
yd,k,v
)
, for v = 1 . . . V and k = 1 . . . K, (5)
where   = [ 1| . . . | K ] is a P ⇥ (K  1) matrix of coe cients for the topic prevalence model
specified by Equations 1–2, and {(t).,. ,(c).,. ,(i).,. } is a collection of coe cients for the topical
content model specified by Equation 5 and further discussed below. Equations 3–4 denote
the core language model.
The core language model allows for correlations in the topic proportions using the Logistic
Normal distribution (Aitchison and Shen 1980; Aitchison 1982). For a model with K topics,
we can represent the Logistic Normal by drawing ⌘d ⇠ NormalK 1(µd,⌃) and mapping to
the simplex, by specifying ✓d,k =exp(⌘d,k)/(
PK
i=1exp(⌘d,i)), where ⌘d,K is fixed to zero in order
to render the model identifiable. Given the topic proportion vector, ✓d, for each word within
document d a topic is sampled from a multinomial distribution zd,n ⇠ Multinomial(✓d), and
Figure 1: A graphical illustration of the structural topic model.
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Figure 4.1: Graphical Illustration of the Structural Topic Model
Reproduced from (Roberts, Stewart and Airoldi, 2016). Note: the Y matrix is for topical content, an additional feature I do
not include in my model.
The data generating process for document d given K topics, observed words {ωd,n}, the
design matrix for topic prevalence X, scalar hyper-parameters s, r, ρ, and K-dimensional
hyper-parameter vector σ, is as follows:
γk ∼ NormalP (0, σ2kIP ), for k = 1...K − 1, (4.3)
θd ∼ LogisticNormalK−1(Γ′x′dΣ), (4.4)
zd,n ∼ MultinomialK(θd), for n = 1...Nd, (4.5)
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wd,n ∼ MultinomialV (βzd,n), for n = 1...Nd, (4.6)
, where Γ = |γ1|...|γK | is a P × (K − 1) matrix of coefficients for the topic prevalence
model specified by Equations 4.3-4.4. Equations 4.5-4.6 contain the core language model
(Roberts, Stewart and Airoldi, 2016, 8), which allows for correlations in the topic proportions
using the Logistic Normal distribution. For a model with K topics, the Logistic Normal
can be represented by ηd ∼ NormalK−1(µd,Σ) and mapping to a simplex by specifying
θd,k =
exp(ηd,k)∑K
i=1 exp(ηd,i)
(where ηd,K is fixed to zero to render the model identifiable). Given
the topic proportion vector θd for each word within document d, a topic is sampled from a
multinomial distribution zd,n ∼ Multinomial(θd), and, conditional on such topic, a word is
chosen from the appropriate distribution over terms Bzd,n . B and µ are a function of the
document-level covariates.
The topic prevalence component of the model allows the expected document-topic
proportions to vary as a function of the matrix of observed document-level covariates (X),
as opposed to arising from a single prior shared by all documents. I model the mean vector
of the Logistic Normal as a simple linear model such that µd = Γ
′x′d, with an additional
regularizing prior on the elements of Γ to avoid overfitting. The inclusion of covariates
allows the model to borrow strength from documents with similar covariate values when
estimating the document-topic proportions (analogous to partial pooling in other Bayesian
hierarchical models). The prior specification for the topic prevalence parameters is a zero-
mean Gaussian distribution with shared variance parameter such that γp,k ∼ Normal(0, σ2k),
and σ2k ∼ Inverse-Gamma(a, b), where p indexes the covariates, k indexes the topics, and a,
b are fixed hyper-parameters (Roberts, Stewart and Airoldi, 2016, 10).
The posterior of interest, p(η, z,K, γ,Σ|w,X, Y ), or the posterior probability for each
topic given a document in the corpus, is proportional to:
(
D∏
d=1
Normal(ηd|Xdγ,Σ)
( N∏
n=1
Multinomial(zn,d|θd)Multinomial(wn)|βd,k=zd,n
))
×
∏
p(K)
∏
p(Γ)
(4.7)
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, with θd,k =
exp(ηd,k∑K
i=1 exp(ηd,i
and βd,k,v ∝ exp(mv + K(t)k,v + K(c)yd,v + K(i)yd,k,v), as well as the priors
on the prevalence coefficients Γ and K topics (see 4.2.4).
As with LDA, the exact posterior for the model is intractable (Blei, Ng and Jordan,
2003; Grimmer, 2010). Moreover, using a Logistic Normal with the multinominal likeli-
hood introduces a non-conjugacy. As such, STM relies upon a variational Expectation-
Maximization (EM) algorithm that uses a Laplace approximation for the non-conjugate
portion (Roberts, Stewart and Airoldi, 2016, 4).16 This makes the model computationally
tractable and efficient. Following Roberts, Stewart and Airoldi (2016), the STM model I
use also integrates out the word-level topic indicator z while estimating the variational pa-
rameters for the logistic normal latent variable, and then reintroduces z when maximizing
the topic-word distributions β. Thus, inference consists in optimizing the variational pos-
terior for each document’s topic proportions in the E-step, and then estimating the topical
prevalence coefficients in the M-step.
The goal of variational EM in STM is to find the approximate posterior
∏
d q(ηd)q(zd)
in order to maximize the Laplace approximation of the Evidence Lower Bound such that:
LELBO =
D∑
d=1
(( B∑
i=1
wd,vlog(θdβd,v)
)
− .5log|Σ|
−.5(λd − µd)TΣ−1(λd − µd) + .5log(|vd|)
) (4.8)
, where q(ηd) is fixed to be Gaussian with mean λd and covariance νd and q(zd) is a vari-
ational multinomial with parameter φd. H(q) indicates the entropies of the approximating
distributions (Roberts, Stewart and Airoldi, 2016, 12-13).17
In the expectation step (E-step) of EM, the model iterates through each document
while updating the variational posteriors q(ηD), q(φd). Because the Logistic Normal is not
conjugate with the multinomial, q(ηD) does not have a closed form update. To account for
16As opposed to GIbbs sampling or mean-field variational Bayes as in LDA.
17The model is not the true bound on the marginal likelihood because of the Laplace approximation, and
is not directly maximized by the updates.
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this, I adopt the Laplace approximation based on Roberts, Stewart and Airoldi (2016), which
involves estimating ηˆd and approximating the posterior with a quadratic Taylor expansion.
This results in a Gaussian form for the variational posterior q(ηd) ≈ N(ηˆd,− 52 f(ηˆd)−1),
where 52f(ηˆd) is the Hessian of f(ηd) evaluated at the mode.18 Solving for ηˆd for a given
document amounts to optimizing:
f(ηˆd) ∝ −1
2
(ηd − µd)TΣ−1(ηd − µd) +
(∑
v
cd,vlog
∑
k
βk,ve
ηd,k −Wdlog
∑
k
eηd,k
)
(4.9)
, where cd,v is the count of the v
th term in the vocabulary within the dth document and Wd is
the total count of words in the document. The model is then optimized using the gradient:
5f(ηd)k =
(∑
v
cd,v〈φd,v,k〉
)
−Wdθd,k −
(
Σ−1(ηd − µd)
)
k
(4.10)
, where θd is the simplex mapped version of ηd and we define the expected probability of
observing a given topic-word as 〈φd,v,k〉 =
(
exp(ηd,k)βd,v,k∑
k exp(ηd,k)βd,v,k
)
. This leads to variational prior
q(ηd) = N(λd = ηˆd, vd = 52f(ηˆd)−1). Solving for q(zd) in closed form yields:
φd,n,k ∝ exp(λd,k)βd,k,wn (4.11)
In the maximization step (M-step) of EM, the prior on document-topic proportions
maximizes the approximate ELBO with respect to the model parameters Γ, topic covariance
matrix Σ, topics K, and document specific mean µd,k = Xdγk. Updates for γk correspond to
linear regressions for each topic under the specified prior with λk as the outcome variable.
By default, γk is given a Normal(o, σ
2
k) in STM, where σ
2
k is given a broad inverse-gamma
prior.
The topic covariance matrix Σ is then estimated as the convex combination of the
18In standard variational approximation algorithms for CTM, inference iterates between the word-level
latent variables q(zd) and the document-level variables q(ηd) until local convergence.
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maximum-likelihood estimation and a diagonalized form of the MLE:
Σˆ = wΣ(diag(ΣˆMLE)) + (1− wΣ)(ΣˆMLE) (4.12)
, where the weight wΣ ∈ [0, 1] is 0. Updates for the topic-word distributions correspond
to estimation of the coefficients (K) in a multinomial logistic regression model where the
observed words are the output, and the design matrix X includes the expectations of the
word-level topic assignments E[q(zd)] = φd (Roberts, Stewart and Airoldi, 2016).
4.2.4 Selecting the Number of Topics
As noted above, the number of topics k must be set a priori in topic models. Unfor-
tunately, there is no method that completely eliminates human discretion (Grimmer, 2010;
Grimmer and Stewart, 2013). Following Blei, Ng and Jordan (2003), Wallach, Mimno and
McCallum (2009), and Rosen-Zvi et al. (2004), I use perplexity scores to guide my choice.
The topic model assumes a generative process that treats documents as a collection of terms
ω = (ω1, ..., ωN) from corpus D containing N words from a vocabulary of V different terms
(ωi ∈ {1, ..., V } for all i = 1, ..., N) (Gru¨n and Hornik, 2011). Perplexity equals the geometric
mean per-word likelihood, as follows:
Perplexity(ω) = E
− log(p(ω))∑D
d−1
∑V
j−1 n
(jd)
(4.13)
, where n(jd) indicates how often the jth term occurs in dth document (Gru¨n and Hornik,
2011). Intuitively, perplexity is a measure of how well the model can predict the distribution
of topics in a test document after having analyzed the terms in a training portion. The
better the prediction, the less “perplexed” the model. However, perplexity is monotonically
decreasing in the number of topics, so researchers cannot simply select a global or local
minimum. Rather, Blei, Ng and Jordan (2003) recommend selecting k based on the rate
of change. If the marginal decrease in perplexity at k < k∗ is relatively large but remains
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consistently small for every k > k∗, then k∗ provides the best improvement in perplexity.
I used R to calculate perplexity scores at 2-50 topics. First, 80% of texts were randomly
assigned to a training set, while the remaining 20% were used for testing. I then used the
first half of each document to estimate the topic distribution within that document based on
the parameters derived from the training data. Finally, I estimated the number of equally
probable word choices for the second half of the document. Figure 4.2 plots the results. I
focus on locations with a relatively steep marginal rate of increase followed by a gradual
decrease in change (see Goutte et al., 1999, Figure 6 for more on the the “elbow test”). The
marginal increase in perplexity for each additional increase in topics is steep until around
k = 18-24 topics, at which point it becomes more gradual. This suggests that the true value
of k falls in between this range.
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Figure 4.2: Perplexity Analysis of Structural Topic Model Results
Perplexity provides a “best fit” for the model, but does not always produce substan-
tively interpretable results. Chang et al. (2009) claim that topic models selected only using
to perplexity scores tend to suffer word intrusion (i.e., words that do not appear related to
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the topic) and topic intrusion (i.e., topics that do not appear related to the corpus). They
recommend conducting a visual inspection of the top topic terms in order to check that each
topic has a substantively interpretable meaning.
I devised several rules for visual inspection. First, the top 10 terms for any topic should
not contain non-informative personal, institutional, or geographic names, which would indi-
cate that the model was forced to create too many unique topics without enough informative
terms. Second, the top 5 terms should suffer no more than a single instance word intrusion.
Finally, I rejected a model if it combined two or more conceptually distinct areas of law
into a single topic. If there are too few topics such that k < k∗, then the topic model will
clump otherwise distinct topics. I inspected the top ten terms for each topic at k = 18-24.
I consistently observed less word intrusion and topic intrusion at 22 topics. The additional
topic clusters in models with more than 22 topics did not appear conceptually distinct from
clusters in previous models. Models with less than 22 topics omitted conceptually distinct
topic clusters. Thus, I set k = 22.
4.3 Results
In this section, I present the results of my topic model. I begin by discussing the 22
topic clusters identified by the topic model. Next, I test the effect of petitioner identity
on the prevalence of topics in petitions. Then, I run the same test for different types of
NGOs. Ultimately, the findings confirm that at least some NGOs play a significant agenda-
setting role when they file petitions before the Indonesian Constitutional Court, but there
is considerable heterogeneity in the results.
4.3.1 Topics
Table 4.3 shows the 22 topics derived from the Structural Topic Model. I use two sets
of terms to summarize the topics. The first row contains the most frequent terms within each
topic based on Grimmer (2010). The second row utilizes the Frequency-Exclusivity (FREX)
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score, which combines information about the frequency of a term in a topic with information
about the exclusivity of that term to that topic (Bischof and Airoldi, 2012). With a K × V
matrix of topic-conditional term probabilities (B), the FREX statistic is:
FREXk,v =
(
w
ECDF(βk,v/
∑K
j=1 βj,v)
+
1− w
ECDF(βk,v)
)−1
(4.14)
, where w is a weight which balances the influence of frequency and exclusivity, and w is set
to 0.5 based on Roberts, Stewart and Airoldi (2016, 15-16). This calculates the harmonic
mean of the empirical cumulative distribution function of a term’s frequency under a topic
with the empirical CDF of exclusivity to that topic.
The Indonesian words for both the highest probability and FREX terms are stemmed
root words. Below each Indonesian term is an English translation. If multiple translations
were available, I chose the sense most appropriate to constitutional litigation. For example,
the most common dictionary translation of the word pilih in Topic 12 is “select,” but it can
also be translated as “elect,” which is more appropriate in this context. The topic model
does not automatically create labels for each topic cluster, so I assigned names to each topic
based on the first five terms.
The 22 topics that the model derived from the corpus generally correspond to the types
of topics one would expect to find in petitions to the Constitutional Court. However, the
results differ from what hand-coding might have yielded in a few important ways. First, the
topic model managed to capture information about niche topics that are often not considered
of interest to political scientists. For example, Topic 11 covers “advertising,” even though
relatively few petitions focus on advertising law. Second, there is a unique topic for “judicial”
issues (Topic 3), which covers not just judicial institutions, but also text related to the process
of litigation. Third, in Topic 15, the model captured information about the address of each
petitioner, which is listed at the top of each petition (in documents with many petitioners,
this can constitute a significant proportion of the text).
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To demonstrate how the topic model classifies documents, I selected five random peti-
tions from the corpus and plotted the distribution of topics in each (see Figure 4.3). As noted
above, the topic model assigns a posterior probability for each topic to each document, mean-
ing that each petition will contain some nonzero amount of each topic. The largest topic
assigned to each petition adequately describes the law challenged. For example, Petition
No. 39/PUU-XI/2013 challenged the 2008 Law on Political Parties and the largest topic
is about “political parties” (Topic 12). The results for Petition No. 4/PUU-XI/2013 show
how the topic model handles multidimensionality. The petition challenged the 2008 Law on
Presidential and Vice Presidential Elections, and, not surprisingly, the model assigned the
highest probability to the “executive elections” topic (04). However, it also assigned high
probabilities to the “legislative” (18) and “political parties” (12) topics, both of which were
discussed in the petition.19 Overall, the topic model results accurately reflect the legal issues
discussed in the petitions.
19Indonesian parties must win a certain percentage of seats in the DPR, in order to nominate a presidential
candidate.
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Topic 1 Frequency: hutan tambang kawasan daerah tetap
Environment (forest) (mining) (area) (region) (remain)
FREX: hutan tambang kawasan mineral batubara
(forest) (mining) (area) (mineral) (coal)
Topic 2 Frequency: kerja buruh serikat usaha alamat
Labor (work) (labor) (union) (business) (address)
FREX: buruh serikat kerja ketenagakerjaan umur
(labor) (union) (work) (employment) (age)
Topic 3 Frequency: hakim agung perkara gugat kuasa
Judicial (judge) (supreme) (court case) (lawsuit) (power)
FREX: agung gugat tinjau hakim sengketa
(supreme) (lawsuit) (review) (judge) (dispute)
Topic 4 Frequency: presiden pilih wakil calon politik
General (president) (elect) (representative) (candidate) (political)
Elections FREX: presiden calon pilpres pasang gabung
(president) (candidate) (pres. election) (pair) (join)
Topic 5 Frequency: didik selenggara guru yayasan anggar
Education (students) (implement) (teacher) (foundation) (budget)
FREX: didik guru yayasan sekolah dosen
(student) (teacher) (foundation) (school) (lecturer)
Topic 6 Frequency: tanah tani usaha rakyat ikan
Agriculture (land) (farm) (business) (people) (fish)
FREX: ikan advokasi prapatan tani laut
(fish) (advocacy) (Prapatan) (farm) (marine)
Topic 7 Frequency: advokat profesi organisasi publik bentuk
Lawyers (lawyer) (profession) (organization) (public) (form)
FREX: advokat profesi akuntan etik kode
(advocate) (profession) (accountant) (ethics) (code)
Topic 8 Frequency: kabupaten daerah provinsi Papua bentuk
Regional (district) (region) (province) (Papua) (shape)
FREX: Papua distrik Riau Mekar Irian
(Papua) (district) (Riau) (Mekar) (Irian)
Topic 9 Frequency: pailit bayar wajib utang tunda
Finance (bankruptcy) (pay) (compulsory) (debt) (postpone)
FREX: pailit tunda utang bank bayar
(bankruptcy) (postpone) (debt) (bank) (pay)
Topic 10 Frequency: pajak alat kena bea berat
Tax (tax ) (tool) (taxable) (duty) (weight)
FREX: motor kendara pajak bea pungut
(motor) (vehicle) (taxes) (duties) (collect)
Topic 11 Frequency: anak siar rokok bukti hidup
Advertising (child) (broadcast) (television) (proof ) (living)
FREX: siar rokok iklan anak pers
(broadcast) (television) (advertise) (child) (press)
Topic 12 Frequency: partai pilih politik anggota pemilu
Political (party) (elect) (politics) (member) (election)
Parties FREX: kursi partai DPRD pemilu suara
(seat) (party) (DPRD) (election) (popular will)
Topic 13 Frequency: agama islam umat kawin bangsa
Religion (religion) (islam) (congregation) (married) (nation)
FREX: islam kawin umat agama syariah
(islam) (wedding) (congregation) (religion) (Sharia)
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Topic 14 Frequency: daerah kepala pilih calon KPU
Regional (region) (chief ) (elect) (candidate) (KPU )
Elections FREX: sumpah kepala KPU saksi bupati
(oath) (chief ) (KPU ) (witness) (regent)
Topic 15 Frequency: alamat camat kabupaten desa Jawa
Addresses (address) (district) (county) (village) (Java)
FREX: identitas dusun Jawa desa Batang
(identity) (hamlet) (Java) (village) (Batang)
Topic 16 Frequency: manusia asasi lindung bebas bentuk
Human (human) (right) (protect) (free) (form)
Rights FREX: perempuan HAM bahasa asasi informasi
(female) (human rights) (language) (right) (information)
Topic 17 Frequency: sehat jamin sosial anggar tembakau
Welfare (health) (guarantee) (social) (budget) (tobacco)
FREX: sehat tembakau belanja BBM iur
(health) (tobacco) (shop) (fuel) (dues)
Topic 18 Frequency: DPR rakyat dewan anggota wakil
Legislative (DPR) (people) (chamber) (member) (vice)
FREX: MPR koperasi DPD ruu dpr
(MPR) (cooperative) (DPD) (bill) (DPD)
Topic 19 Frequency: jabat uang masa badan pegawai
Government (officeholder) (money) (term) (agency) (employee)
FREX: jabat pegawai BPK masa sipil
(officeholder) (employee) (Audit Board) (term) (civil)
Topic 20 Frequency: pidana tindak korupsi jaksa berantas
Criminal (criminal) (act) (corrupt) (prosecute) (eradicate)
FREX: jaksa sidi berantas pidana korupsi
(prosecute) (confirmation) (eradicate) (crime) (corrupt)
Topic 21 Frequency: rumah usaha modal ekonomi listrik
Economic (home) (business) (capital) (economy) (electricity)
FREX: listrik modal rumah Matraman PLN
(electricity) (capital) (house) (Matraman) (PLN )
Topic 22 Frequency: air usaha sumber daya guna
Natural (water) (business) (resource) (power) (use)
Resources FREX: air migas bumi minyak gas
(water) (oil) (earth) (oil) (gas)
Table 4.3: Topics 1-22 from Structural Topic Model of Petitions
The top five stemmed Indonesian words are listed in the first row of each topic, with translations below. The first row
contains the highest probability word associated with each topic, whereas the second row contains the words derived using
FREX scores, which accounts for the exclusivity of the word to the topic.
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Figure 4.3: Histogram of Topic Results for Constitutional Court Petitions
The laws challenged in each petition and largest topics are: Law No. 2 of 2008 on Political Parties (12); Law No. 31 of 1999 on the Eradication of the Crime of Corruption
(20); Law No. 37 of 2004 on Bankruptcy and Debt Payment Suspension (09); Law No. 42 of 2008 on the Presidential and Vice Presidential Elections (04); and Law No. 20 of
2003 on the National Education System (05).
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Figure 4.4 shows the expected posterior probability for the average document in the
corpus of petitions for each of the 22 topics. The most frequent topic is Topic 20 (“criminal”),
which accounts for around 12% of the text in the petitions, whereas the least frequent topic
is Topic 15 (“addresses”), which accounts for just 1% of the text. Given that Topic 3 also
covers language frequently used to describe the process of litigation, it is not surprising that
it is the second largest topic in the corpus (around 10%). The results also confirm that much
of the Court’s work involves challenges to election laws. The three topics most closely related
to elections – Topics 12, 4, 18, and 14 – combined have an expected posterior probability of
approximately 22.5%, or almost a quarter of the text in the corpus.
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Top Topics
Expected Topic Proportions
Topic 15: identitas, dusun, jawa
Topic 11: siar, rokok, iklan
Topic 1: hutan, tambang, kawasan
Topic 6: ikan, advokasi, prapatan
Topic 21: listrik, modal, rumah
Topic 22: air, migas, bumi
Topic 13: islam, kawin, umat
Topic 7: advokat, profesi, akuntan
Topic 2: buruh, serikat, kerja
Topic 17: sehat, tembakau, belanja
Topic 5: didik, guru, yayasan
Topic 9: pailit, tunda, utang
Topic 10: motor, kendara, pajak
Topic 14: sumpah, kepala, kpu
Topic 18: mpr, koperasi, dpd
Topic 19: jabat, pegawai, bpk
Topic 8: papua, distrik, riau
Topic 4: presiden, calon, pilpres
Topic 12: kursi, partai, dprd
Topic 16: perempuan, ham, bahasa
Topic 3: agung, gugat, tinjau
Topic 20: jaksa, sidi, berantas
Figure 4.4: Expected Posterior Probability for Topics
Roberts et al. (2014) propose a quantitative test for topic quality relying on the fact
that semantically interpretable topics are: 1) cohesive, i.e., high-probability words for a given
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Figure 4.5: Exclusivity & Semantic Coherence for Structural Topic Model Topic
topic tend to co-occur within documents, and 2) exclusive, i.e., the top words for a given topic
are unlikely to appear within top words of other topics. The former is a measure of internal
consistency within documents associated with the topic, whereas the latter measures how
distinct the topic is from other topics. A topic that possess both cohesion and exclusivity is
more likely to be semantically useful. I plot the semantic coherence and exclusivity scores for
the topics in my model in Figure 4.5. Topics in the upper right corner score higher on both
measures. At k = 22, most of the topics score relatively high on both measures, while only
five – Topics 9, 10, 11, 15, and 16 – score poorly on one or both. It should not be surprising
that Topic 16 lacks exclusivity because it covers “human rights,” which includes general legal
terms such as “right” or “free” that are also used frequently in other types of constitutional
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cases. Topics 9 (“finance”) and 11 (“advertising”) occur relatively infrequently within the
corpus, possibly explaining their low semantic coherence scores. The low scores for Topic
15 are easily explained in that topic covers petitioners’ contact information; there is little
reason to expect terms associated with one petitioner to appear in a different petition for a
different petitioner.20
I also conducted a qualitative tests to ensure that the model yielded topics that conform
to the contents of the documents in the corpus. First, I found the document with the highest
posterior probability associated with each topic. I then read through the 22 documents to
see the extent to which the words in the topic cluster accurately reflected the issues discussed
in the petitions. In Figure 4.6, I list a representative paragraph from each petition. In each,
the legal issues discussed in the petition are clearly related to the topic clusters. Moreover,
the law challenged in each case was often associated with that topic.
As noted above, STM allows topics to be correlated. I show these correlations in
Figure 4.7, with dashed lines indicating significant correlations and distance between each
topic cluster indicating the strength of that correlation. The cluster of five topics at the
top of the plot includes all of the topics related to elections and government functions,
which is not surprising given that these issues do overlap. The cluster of topics in the
bottom of the plot all focus on socioeconomic issues, such as welfare and taxes. Although
these topics are conceptually distinct from each other, they do use many of the same terms,
especially economic jargon.21 Finally, the “human rights” and “advertising” topics (11 &
16) are closely correlated. At first, this might seem counterintuitive, but many of these
“advertising” petitions challenged restrictions on corporate advertising as a violation of the
right to free speech.22
20I also measured semantic coherence and exclusivity for k = 18, 20, 24, 26 topics (not shown), but did not
find any appreciable improvement in how those models performed.
21The topics for “regional” and “addresses” (8 & 15) are obviously related because both often use the names
of geographic locations, but it is not immediately clear why the topic about judicial issues is correlated with
addresses.
22E.g., Cigarette Advertising case, MK Decision No. 6/PUU-VII/2009.
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Topic 1: Environment
Whereas the provisions of the 
articles of the Minerba a quo 
Law, which norms are centralistic 
and authorizes the central 
government to establish Mining 
Areas (WP), Mining Business 
Areas (WUP), and determines 
the extent and boundaries of 
Mineral Mining Business License 
(WIUP ) of Metals and Coal in the 
territory of the regional 
government, has reduced, 
obstructed, ignored and/or 
derogated the Petitioner's 
constitutional authority granted 
by UUD 1945, because 
previously the central 
government decided on a WP, 
the WUP, and specified the 
extent and limits of the WIUP a 
quo, the Petitioner has not yet 
been able to exercise 
constitutional authority in the 
form of regulating and managing 
government affairs in the field of 
energy and mineral resources in 
the Petitioner's own territory;
(Petition No. 10/PUU-X/2012)
Topic 2: Labor
The petitioner considers that 
legislation should not restrict the 
mechanisms and procedures for 
membership verification based on 
membership cards, only that the 
membership verification process 
should be conducted in an open/
transparent manner through 
public announcements to all 
workers within the company, the 
occurrence of checks and 
controls over all workers 
concerned, and eliminate the 
potential inflation of membership 
data by certain unions through 
the manipulation of the number of 
photocopies of membership card.
(Petition No. 115/PUU-VII/2009)
Topic 3: Judicial
As the result, the Administrative 
Court in Palembang claims that they 
have the right to investigate and 
bring claims of Freehold Title 
cancellation of the land to justice by 
saying that the dispute about rights 
of the land, where the ownership is 
proven by Freehold Title, is included 
in the jurisdiction of the 
Administrative Court, inter alia , 
Chief Justice Decision of 
Administrative Court in Palembang 
No. 27/G/2010/PTUN-PLG.
(Petition No. 17/PUU-IX/2011)
Topic 4: General Elections
The Petitioners acknowledge 
that the 1945 Constitution grants 
constitutional rights to political 
parties or coalitions of political 
parties to propose candidate 
pairs of President and Vice 
President before the General 
Election is held. There is no 
intention of the Petitioners to 
question this right. What matters 
is the that the law that regulates 
the general election of the 
President and Vice President, or 
the Presidential Election Act 
[PILPRES Act], in fact deviates 
from and exceeds the intent and 
guarantees of the Constitution. 
The PILPRES Act has also been 
discriminatory because it grants 
exclusive rights to political 
parties on the one hand and on 
the other hand prevents citizens' 
rights to choose not to use 
political parties as the vehicle of 
their hopes for democracy.
(Petition No. 56/PUU-VI/2008)
Topic 5: Education
That it turns out in Budget Year 
2005, the education budget, 
regulated based on Law No. 36 of 
2004 concerning State Budget 
Year of Fiscal Year 2005, is less 
than 20%, so through Decision of 
Constitutional Court No. 012/
PUU-111/2005 dated October 13, 
2005, stating that Law No. 36 of 
2004 on the State Budget of the 
2005 Budget Year insofar as it 
concerns the education sector is 
contradictory to Article 31 
Paragraph (4) of the 1945 
Constitution and therefore 
declared to have no binding legal 
force.
(Petition No. 9/PUU-VI/2008)
Topic 6: Agriculture
That the existence of Law No. 12 of 
1992 about the Plant Cultivation 
System inhibits the development of 
ecological agriculture cultivation, 
weaken the cultivation skills of 
farmers, and hamper the 
establishment of farmers' 
organizations, so that the goal of the 
Petitioner VIII's organization will be 
blocked, and the seed breeders will 
continue to be criminalized and 
discriminated against, especially the 
community that is the basis of 
PETITIONER VIII's organization 
[Perkumpulan Sawit Watch].
(Petition No. 99/PUU-X/2012)
Topic 7: Lawyers
Therefore, the best solution in 
overcoming the conflict about 
single bar association is by 
admitting that the single 
association as mentioned in 
Law on Lawyers is not 
appropriate to Indonesia. It 
also contrasts with the concept 
of pluralism (Unity in Diversity), 
which is guaranteed in and has 
become the soul of the 1945 
Constitution, so forming a 
single bar association system 
should not be required. The 
choice of the right form of bar 
association should be given to 
the lawyers through the 
mechanism of lawyers’ 
democratic national 
consensus, where the election 
for member of organization is 
held fairly and attended by 
lawyers from all over Indonesia 
to choose their own members 
by using the one-person, one-
vote rule. 
(Petition No. 66/PUU-VIII/2010)
Topic 8: Regional
Besides, another fact has 
proved that the “lighthouse” 
guard in Berhala island came 
from Tanjung Pinang Navigation 
in Riau Province, and not from 
Navigation Department of 
another province. That is the 
good intentions from the Riau 
government (including Lingga 
Regency government) that has 
for a long time dominated the 
area physically, and the 
recognition from the 
government of Berhala Region 
by Riau Province - it was 
previously in the territory of 
Riau Province. 
(Petition No. 47/PUU-X/2012)
Topic 9: Finance
Whereas with the enactment of 
Article 2, Paragraph (2a), Point 1 
and Article 6, Paragraph (2a) of 
Law No. 21 of 1997 as amended by 
Law. No. 20 of 2000 concerning 
Acquisition of Land and Building 
Rights (BPHTB) in the process of 
bankruptcy management and 
determination No. 12/Pailit/2007/
PN.Niaga Sby., especially 
regarding the application of the 
taxable property sale value to the 
estate of the insolvent property 
mentioned above, is clearly 
eliminating or negating the specific/
specificity of Law No. 37 Year 2004 
Concerning Bankruptcy and 
Postponement of Debt Payment 
Obligations, whereas one aspect of 
Law No. 37 of 2004 referred to that 
is very important and constitutes 
the highest State interest is the 
fulfillment of the obligations of 
bankrupt debtors to the State 
without exception.
(Petition No. 68/PUU-VIII/2010)
Topic 10: Tax
Bahwa meski pun Pemohon telah
taat hukum dengan memenuhi
Whereas despite the fact that the 
Petitioner has obeyed the law by 
complying with the provisions of the 
applicable law at the time of the 
establishment of PT SINAR ABADI, 
the petitioner did not receive any 
recognition, guarantee, protection 
and legal certainty that met the 
standards for equal treatment 
before the law by applying 
Elucidation of Article 6, paragraph 
(3), subparagraph (a) of Law No. 
15 on Brands stating that "That 
which is included in the name of 
the legal entity that uses the brand 
and is included on the General 
Register of Brands," as well as the 
formulation of the words "are equal 
in essence..." in Article 6, 
paragraph (I), subparagraph (a), 
Article 91 of Law Number 15 of 
2001 concerning Brands, 
ALTHOUGH pursuant to Act 
Number 1 of 1995 on Limited 
Liability Companies and 
Government Regulation No. 
26/1998 on Limited Public 
Expenditure and Act No. 3 of 1982 
about Mandatory Company Lists 
were enacted to guarantee 
business certainty.
(Petitioner No. 118/PUU-VII/2009)
Topic 11: Advertising
That there are incorrect or 
misleading advertisements about 
cigarettes (as a form of information 
or art products), where the 
scientific truth and the reality is 
that cigarettes contain 4000 
poisonous chemical substances, 
and 69 substances are 
carcinogenic and addictive. Both 
the reality and under the official 
juristic definition of broadcasting, 
cigarette advertisement is aimed to 
persuade consumers to use 
addictive and carcinogenic 
cigarettes, the content and 
messages contained in cigarette 
advertising has metamorphosed in 
various forms and unconsciously 
go deep into consumer life 
(especially children and 
teenagers), where the 
advertisement portrays smoking as 
a normal thing. Therefore, it will 
not be viewed as a dangerous 
substance for health and life. 
Moreover, smoking is described 
fraudulently and unjustly as an 
image of “masculinity”, 
“friendship”, “exclusivity”, “cool”, 
etc.
(Petition No. 6/PUU-VII/2009)
serta Pasal 208 UU Pemilu
Topic 12: Political Parties
Whereas the provision of Article 
8, Paragraph (1) through the 
phrase "which meets the 
threshold of the number of valid 
votes nationally" and paragraph 
(2) through the phrase "political
parties that do not meet the vote
threshold in the previous 
election" in Article 208 of 
General Election Law, or not 
least Article 208 of the General 
Election Law through the 
phrase: "The Provincial DPRD 
and Regency DPR", the General 
Election Law will certainly harm 
or at least potentially harm the 
Petitioners. This is because it 
regulates a very unjust and 
discriminatory provision that 
applies to the Petitioners as 
political parties that contested in 
the last election (Election 2009) 
which did not meet the national 
threshold of valid votes 
(commonly called: parliamentary 
threshold/PT) in the election to 
be eligible for the next election 
(2014), because of the very 
rigorous factual verification 
required by the General Election 
Commission (KPU).
(Petition No. 52/PUU-X/2012)
104
Topic 13: Religion
That Islamic Religious Law 
(Shari'at) should in fact be upheld 
in the Indonesian Religious Courts 
completely (kaffah), because the 
Petitioners did not find any 
indication that the enforcement of 
Shari'a of Islamic Law (kaffah) was 
absolutely prohibited by the 1945 
Constitution and Pancasila. Even 
those that are based on some 
articles of the 1945 Constitution, 
may actually be possible to enforce 
through Islamic Religious Law 
(Shari'at) as a whole (kaffah). Of 
course it is intended only for the 
adherents of the Muslim 
community.
(Petition No. 19/PUU-VI/2008)
Topic 14: Regional Elections
That the pair of Regent and Vice 
Regent Candidates No. 2 (Dr. H. 
Ujang lskandar, ST. Msi and 
Bambang Purwanto, S. ST), did 
not accept the Decision of the 
General Elections Commission of 
Kotawaringin Barat Regency 
Number: 62/Kpts-
KPU-020.436792/2010, dated 
June 12, 201O and Minutes 
Number: 367/BA/VI/2010 dated 
June 12, 2010 concerning the 
Stipulation of Selected Candidate 
Pair in the Regent and Vice 
Regent Election of Kotawaringin 
Barat 2016; they subsequently 
submitted an Application for 
Dispute regarding the Election 
Result for Head of District of 
Kotawaringin Barat to the 
Constitutional Court of the 
Republic of Indonesia as 
registered in case Number 45/
PHPU.D-VIII/2010. (Exhibit P.5).
(Petition No. 75/PUU-VIII/2010)
Topic 15: Addresses
121.  
Name: Marsini. 
ID Number : 11.0213.690771.0001
Address : Pencar sub-village,   
Kaliputi village, 
District of Singorojo,
Kendal Regency,
Central Java Province. 
122.   
Name: Sakimin 
ID Number : 11.0213.170868.0002
Address : Pencar sub-village, 
Kaliputi village, 
District of Singorojo, 
Kendal Regency,
Central Java Province. 
123. 
Name: Amin
ID Number : 11.0213.311245.0009
Address : Kalidapu sub-village, 
Kaliputi village, 
District of Singorojo, 
Kendal Regency,
Central Java Province. 
Topic 16: Human Rights
A Commission of Truth and 
Reconciliation requires the process 
of searching for the truth supported 
by relevant facts which are later 
used as the “official history” of the 
nation. For that reason, all 
confessions from this commission 
should be fully given or “full truth” 
and there should be an opportunity 
to verify and investigate to get the 
real facts. The Commission of 
Truth and Reconciliation also 
requires a guarantee of victims’ 
rights fairly and without 
discrimination. The victims also 
should not be put at a 
disadvantageous position and 
under pressure. The Commission 
also requires the fulfillment of 
human rights principles, so the 
purpose of this commission is to 
solve the violation of human rights 
in the past, and should be done in 
the framework of universal 
principles of law. 
(Petition No. 6/PUU-IV/2006)(Petition No. 8/PUU-III/2005)
Topic 17: Welfare
That the social security system 
can get more victims from the 
majority of people who work in 
informal sector, farmers, 
fishermen, laborers in informal 
sector, Indonesian migrant 
workers, women workers, cultural 
observer, etc. who cannot pay a 
contribution, and do not have 
someone else to pay for her/him. 
Automatically, they will not get the 
benefits from that social security 
system, although they do 
contribute much to provide for the 
main needs of Indonesian people 
and support Indonesian economic 
system. For example, a farmer 
plants the rice, and at the harvest 
time he sells it at a price of Rp ± 
2.500,- per kilogram. However, 
the world price is Rp ± 5.000 – if 
there is rice crop failure, they are 
responsible for themselves. 
Indonesian migrant workers, 
women workers are the source of 
foreign exchange, and farmers as 
the protein producers, etc.
(Petition No. 9/PUU-X/2012)
Topic 18: Legislative
This determination contrasts with 
Article 20, Section 2 of the 1945 
Constitution of the Republic of 
Indonesia since every Bill should 
be discussed by the House of 
Representative and the 
President, not by a Faction of 
the House of Representatives 
and the President. A Faction 
according to Article 80, Section 1 
of the Law for the People’s 
Consultative Assembly (MPR), 
House of People’s 
Representative (DPR), 
Leadership of Political Party at 
Provincial (DPD), and Assembly 
at Provincial (DPRD) is not tool 
of the DPR. Therefore, this mini-
opinion is not from the Faction, 
but from the DPR. 
(Petition No. 92/PUU-X/2012)
Topic 19: Government Officials
The definition of "Functional 
Position" is also mentioned in 
Article 1, Number 1 of the 
Government Regulation of the 
Republic of Indonesia Number 
16 of 1994 concerning the 
Functional Position of Civil 
Servants [hereinafter referred to 
as PP 16/1994, Exhibit P-6), 
namely:
"Functional Position of Civil 
Servants which further in this 
Government Regulation is called 
"functional position" is a position 
that indicates duty, 
responsibility, authority and 
rights of a civil servant in an 
organizational unit in the 
execution of its duties based on 
justice and/or certain skills and 
is independent."
(Petition No. 34/PUU-X/2012)
Topic 20: Criminal
As a good citizen, the appellant 
obeys the law as long as the 
implementation and the norm or 
law used does not contradict with 
the law itself and is based on legal 
principles and law and justice. In 
fact, because of the interpretation 
of Assistant Attorney General for 
Special Crimes and Violations and 
the Attorney General for 
Enforcement of Article 65, Section 
116, Subsection (3) and (4) of 
Indonesian Law Number 8 of 1981, 
about Criminal Procedure Code 
(KUHAP), which does not provide 
for protection and legal certainty, 
has caused constitutional harm to 
the appellant.
(Petition No. 65/PUU-VIII/2010)
Topic 21: Economic
Housing policies should be 
consistent with state policies and 
economically feasible for the 
purchasing power of the MBR 
group. However, the provisions of 
Article 22m paragraph (3) of Law 
Number 11 of 2011 as legal norms 
are irrational and have no financial 
justification because they are not 
applicable and not feasible with the 
size of the housing economy if 
objectively reviewed and analyzed 
in accordance with the provisions 
of Regulation of the Minister of 
Finance (PMK) No. 31/
PMK.03/2011 (revising PMK No. 
36/PMK.03/2007).
(Petition No. 14/PUU-X/2012)
Topic 22: Natural Resources
Law No. 7 of 2004 on Water 
Resources also provides a vast 
space for the private sector to 
control water resources, including 
groundwater, all surface water 
forms, and some river bodies. 
Legal Instruments for Usufruct 
Rights take two forms: Right to 
Use for Consumption and Right to 
Use for Business, as stipulated in 
Articles 7, 8, 9 and 10 of Act 
Number 7 of 2004 regarding 
Water Resources, which shall be 
the basis of allocation and control 
of the sources water for 
individuals, business entities and 
communities.
(Petition No. 59/PUU-II/2004)
Figure 4.6: Thoughts for Topics 1-22
Each box contains a representative paragraph from the petition with the largest proportion of text associated with the topic listed above.
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01) Environment
02) Labor
03) Judicial
04) Executive Elections
05) Education
06) Agriculture
07) Lawyers
08) Regional
09) Finance
10) Tax
11) Advertising
12) Political Parties 13) Religion14) Regional Elections
15) Addresses
16) Human Rights
17) Welfare
18) Legislative19) Government Officials
20) Criminal
21) Economic
22) Natural Resources
Figure 4.7: Structural Topic Model Topic Correlations
Dashed lines indicate significant correlations, while the distance between each topic cluster indicates the strength of that
correlation.
4.3.2 Type of Petitioner
In order to test the agenda-setting power of NGOs, I measured how the expected
distribution of topics in a petition changed with different types of petitioners. I used a
dummy variable to indicate whether or not a particular type of petitioner supported the
petition. I then found the difference between the mean topic proportions associated with a
given type of petitioner and the mean topic proportions associated with all other petitioners
106
(i.e., petitioner typei=1 − petitioner typei=0).23
The results for petitioner identity are shown in Figure 4.8 (I omit “national govern-
ment” and “individual” petitioners because there were no significant relationships). Fig-
ure 4.8 provides evidence for Hypothesis 4.1, which posits that the distribution of topics in
petitions filed by NGOs differs from those filed by other types of petitioners. NGOs do help
set the Constitutional Court’s agenda role for “labor,” “education,” “agriculture,” “human
rights,” “welfare,” and “economic” topics (2, 5, 6, 16, 17, & 21). There is no overlap between
these topics and the topics strongly associated with other types of petitioners. Moreover,
NGOs are associated with a greater number of different topics (six) than other types of
petitioners, suggesting that NGOs act as agenda setters across a wide range of issues.
Other types of petitioners also appear to have agenda-setting powers. Not surprisingly,
local government petitioners – including governors, district chiefs, and local legislatures –
were far more likely to file petitions associated with the “regional” topic (8). On average, a
petition filed by a regional government was around 25% more likely to contain text associated
with the “region” topic, indicating that regional governments played a significant agenda-
setting role for this topic. Reformasi entailed a massive devolution of power from Jakarta
to the provinces, which led to much confusion about the jurisdiction and powers of regional
governments. Moreover, the central government reorganized the borders of several provinces,
which led to legal challenges from local chieftains.24
Politicians and political parties were more likely to file petitions related to the “execu-
tive elections,” “political parties,” “regional elections,” and “legislative” topics (4, 12, 14, &
18). The agenda-setting effect is strongest for the first two topics; petitions filed by political
parties were around 10% and 20% more likely to contain text associated with these topics,
respectively. While the model did find a significant relationship between electoral topics
23One concern about STM is that by including covariates in the modeling stage the relationship between
the topics and petitioner identity is “baked in” to the results. To check this, I ran a permutation test, which
replaces the covariate with a placebo. The results are in Appendix B. Ultimately, I only accepted results
for a covariate if the placebo did not significantly differ from zero.
24E.g., Jambi Province Borders case, MK Decision No. 47/PUU-X/2012.
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Figure 4.8: Estimated Effects of Petitioners on Topic Proportions
The plot shows the expected difference in topic posterior probability for when the petitioner is of the type listed below versus
all other petitioners. The bars represent 95% confidence intervals.
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and political party petitioners, the magnitude of the effect is perhaps smaller than might be
expected because parties are not the only types of petitioners to litigate these issues. For
example, NGOs that work on election reform, such as CETRO, frequently challenge election
laws (see Section 5.4). Nevertheless, parties and politicians do set the Constitutional Court’s
agenda for these topics, at least to some degree.
Finally, private businesses and corporations were more likely to file petitions related
to the “finance” and “tax” topics (9 & 10). Businesses tend to engage in constitutional
litigation relatively infrequently, but it is not surprising that they tend to challenge laws
that regulate taxation and corporate governance. However, the magnitude of this effect is
relatively small (around 0.1 for both).
4.3.3 Type of NGO
As noted in the previous section, NGOs do seem to act as agenda setters in consti-
tutional litigation. However, the magnitude of the effect is generally small (around 0.05
for each topic). One possibility is that combining all types of NGOs into a single category
obscures individual differences. After all, the NGO category includes many different types
of organizations, including labor unions, student groups, legal aid organizations, professional
associations, and rights advocates. Each of these focuses on a unique set of policy issues. Fig-
ure 4.8 simply presents the average effect for all NGOs, obscuring any possible heterogeneous
effects.
To account for this problem, I use the disaggregated NGO categories in Figure 4.2 to
show the effect each type has on topic probabilities. I created a dummy variable for each
NGO type and found the difference between means to show how the presence of each type of
NGO affected the distribution of topic probabilities. The results are shown in Figure 4.9. I
only show plots for NGOs with at least one difference between means significantly different
from zero.
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Figure 4.9: Estimated Effects of NGOs on Topic Proportions (1)
The plot shows the expected difference in topic posterior probability for when the specific type of NGO petitioner is of the type listed below versus all other NGO petitioners.
The bars represent 95% confidence intervals.
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The upper-left panel of Figure 4.9 shows the effect of petitions supported by supported
by media/journalism NGOs. There is no topic specifically for “freedom of speech,” but
the “human rights” topic (16) seems to cover speech.25 The magnitude of the relationship
is relatively large in that the presence of a media NGO increases the amount of text in a
petition associated with the human rights topic by around 20%.
The next two panels in Figure 4.9 show the effect of petitions supported by health
and development NGOs, both of which are significantly associated with the “welfare” (17)
topic. Based on the top terms in Table 4.3, this topic seems to capture information about
several different issues, including health (e.g., sehat & tembakau) and social security (e.g.,
jamin & sosial). The magnitude of the effect for both types of NGOs is relatively large;
a development NGO increases the amount of text in a petition associated with the welfare
topic by just under 20%, while that rises to over 25% for health NGOs.
In the bottom-left panel of Figure 4.9, environmental NGOs have a significant rela-
tionship with the “agriculture” topic (6), such that the presence of an environmental NGO
increases the proportion of text in the petition associated with the “agriculture” topic by
around 25%. Surprisingly, environmental NGOs are not agenda setters with respect to the
“environment” or “natural resources” topics (1 & 22). I discuss possible explanations for
this in Section 5.5.
Labor unions have a significant relationship with the “labor” topic (2); the presence
of a labor union in a petition increases the text associated with that topic by around 20%.
Labor union petitions also have a significant relationship with the “economic,” “agriculture,”
and “welfare” topics (21, 6, & 17). The effect for the “economic” topic is modest (around
0.15), but still significant. These results likely stem from the fact that Indonesian labor
unions occasionally participate in policy debates about economic and welfare legislation.26
Finally, education NGOs have the strongest agenda-setting effect amongst all NGOs
25One of the constitutional amendments enacted during Reformasi protects the right to “communicate
and acquire information” (Article 28F). The inclusion of the word “informasi” in the top terms for Topic
16 could be a reference to this provision.
26E.g., Social Security Law Labor case, MK Decision No. 70/PUU-IX/2011.
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in Figure 4.9. Having an education NGO, teacher’s association, or university on the petition
increases the amount of text associated with the “education” topic (05) by around 60%. This
suggests that education NGOs proved dominant in policy debates about the constitutionality
of education policy. I discuss the agenda-setting powers of education NGOs in greater depth
in the next section.
Overall, the results in Figure 4.9 provide support for Hypothesis 4.2 in that NGOs with
a specific policy focus will be more likely to file petitions related to that issue. Education
NGOs are more likely to submit petitions related to education issues, labor unions file
petitions related to labor, etc. However, Hypothesis 4.2 is not uniformly true because not
all NGO petitions cover topics associated with the mission statements of those NGOs. The
most obvious example is that petitions from human rights NGOs are not strongly correlated
with the “human rights” topic (16). I discuss possible explanations for this discrepancy in
Section 4.5.
As predicted in Hypothesis 4.3, the results suggest that petitions from NGOs are more
likely to focus on socioeconomic issues compared to petitions from other types of petitioners.
The topics most strongly associated with NGO petitioners in Figures 4.9-4.9 – “education,”
“labor,” “agriculture,” “welfare,” and “economic” – all involve socioeconomic issues (and the
welfare topic covered health issues). This suggests that NGOs set much of the Constitutional
Court’s agenda with regard to socioeconomic rights and have considerable power in how they
frame these issues for the justices.
4.4 Case Narratives
As noted in the previous section, education NGOs were responsible for a large pro-
portion of the text in constitutional petitions associated with the education topic. In this
section, I provide a set of qualitative examples demonstrating how education NGOs provided
a support structure that allowed education-related policy disputes to reach the Constitutional
Court. These cases support my theoretical argument in three critical ways. First, they illus-
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trate the various tools NGOs use to set the Court’s agenda. Second, they reveal that many
of these cases would not have reached the Court but for the assistance of NGOs. Finally,
they show NGOs using agenda-setting to keep an issue on the docket until the government
complies with the Court’s judgments.
By the early 2000s, the Indonesian education system was notorious for its low quality
and corruption, with frequent accounts of parents or students paying bribes to obtain higher
grades. Although the New Order increased the geographic reach of the state education
system, government spending on education – per capita and as a percentage of GDP –
remained low. The 1997-98 Asian Financial Crisis and Reformasi created a new opening for
education reform by increasing the leverage of government technocrats and foreign donors,
especially the World Bank. These groups pushed for autonomy for educational institutions,
teacher certification, and market-based reforms (Rosser, 2015b, 199-200).
At the same time, leftist and progressive NGOs worried that the market-oriented re-
forms would lead to the privatization of the education system, increase costs, and reduce
access for poorer and marginalized groups. Spurred by groups like ICW, they also worried
that the reforms would exacerbate the corruption problem. For their part, teachers unions
wanted the government to increase funding for the public school system. These groups ini-
tially tried to push for policy change by raising public awareness through the media and
lobbying the DPR, but to no avail (Rosser, 2015b, 201). They then turned to the Constitu-
tional Court, where they found more success.
NGOs could bring education debates to the Court because Reformasi constitutionalized
education issues. As part of the fourth package of constitutional amendments passed in 2002,
the MPR inserted an explicit “right to obtain an education” in Article 31. It also added
a provision stating that the “government has a responsibility to fund” compulsory basic
education for grades 1-9 (Article 31(2)). In Article 31(4), it even imposed a requirement
that the government must allocate at least 20% of the state budget to education. Ironically,
this last provision was thought by many to be an aspirational statement rather than a
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justiciable right (Ellis, 2002, 146).
In 2004, a coalition of NGOs filed a petition alleging that the government had vio-
lated Article 31(4) because the 2005 budget only allocated 7% of the budget to educational
expenditures as opposed to 20% (Susanti, 2008, 258). The petitioners also challenged the
elucidation to the National Education System Law, which permitted the government to
reach the 20% threshold “gradually” instead of immediately.27 The Court agreed with the
petitioners, but declined to declare the budget null and void, citing practical concerns that
doing so would throw government into chaos (Butt, 2009).
A different group of NGOs, including the Indonesian Teacher’s Union, or Persat-
uan Guru Republik Indonesia (PGRI), challenged the 2006 and 2008 budgets on the same
grounds, and again the Court declared the budgets unconstitutional but not null and void,
deferring to the legislature to remedy the issue.28 However, because the president and DPR
had been made aware of the Court’s earlier ruling, they could no longer argue that they had
made a good faith effort to comply with the Constitution. In the 2008 case, the Court found
the president and DPR guilty of deliberately defying the Constitution and demanded that
the 2009 budget fully meet their constitutional obligations. It also informed the government
that if the next budget failed to pass constitutional muster, the Court would use its previous
rulings as precedent to declare the budget null and void (Hendrianto, 2016b, 7).
Although the Court hesitated to declare the state budgets null and void, its decisions
had several important impacts. First, the justices received an opportunity to participate in
the debate over education policy. Importantly, the majority stated unequivocally that Article
31 was justiciable. Second, the cases allowed the Court to interpret Article 31(4). Govern-
ment lawyers argued that the 20% requirement included teacher’s salaries, whereas PGRI
argued teacher salaries should be treated no differently than those of other civil servants –
a particularly important point for PGRI because it represented teachers. The Court agreed
272005 Budget case, MK Decision No. 012/PUU-III/2005.
282006 Budget case, MK Decision No. 026/PUU-III/ 2005 & 2008 Budget case, MK Decision No. 13/PUU-
VI/2008.
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with PGRI, shifting the benchmark for what citizens could and should expect for education
funding. Finally, the cases put pressure on the DPR to increase funding for education (Gauri
and Brinks, 2015, 93-94). After the rulings, the media and DPR committees increasingly
focused on the state of the education system (Venning, 2008, 125). Moreover, this pressure
led to concrete results; education as a share of total government expenditure increased from
an average of 14.3% during 2001-2008 to 18.2% during 2009-2014 (see Figure 4.10).29
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Figure 4.10: Education as Percentage of Total Government Expenditure (%)
Data are from the World Bank World Development Indicators available at http://data.worldbank.org/. Note data are
missing for the year 2006.
In another case, a coalition of NGOs and activists challenged the 2009 Law on Ed-
ucation Legal Entities (Badan Hukum Pendidikan or BHP), which was designed to grant
public and private schools greater autonomy. NGOs worried that these reforms were simply
a way for the state to avoid its obligation to fund the education system and raise tuition.
The coalition included the Education Forum, students associated with the Indonesian Is-
29It is interesting to compare this outcome with Chilton and Versteeg (2016), which finds that the adoption
of a constitutional right to education generally does not lead to a significant increase in government spending
on education.
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lamic Students’ Movement (PMII), and the Association of Indonesian Private University
Implementing Bodies (ABPPTSI), an association of charitable foundations managing pri-
vate universities. One group of parents involved in the case was represented by lawyers from
prominent NGOs, including ICW, the Institute for Policy Research and Advocacy (ELSAM),
and the Legal Aid Organization. The petitioners were divided in their reasons for opposing
the law. ABPPTSI feared losing control over the higher education institutions it managed
and its ability to ensure delivery of education services. By contrast, the Education Forum
parents worried about the cost of tuition and the stress of competitive exams (Rosser, 2015b,
204-05). ICW’s lawyers emphasized the risk of corruption due to privatization.
In 2010, the Constitutional Court declared the 2009 BHP law unconstitutional, not as
a violation of the constitutional right to education, but rather because it violated the right
to legal certainty.30 In other words, the Court accepted ABPPTSI’s arguments about how
the law would disrupt the status quo. The other NGOs were apparently satisfied with this
outcome, viewing the Court’s reasoning as a strategic decision to avoid the risk of a political
backlash from relying too heavily on Article 31 (Rosser, 2015b, 205).31 Some observers
believe that the NGOs’ public awareness campaign also helped because at the time Chief
Justice Mahfud was preparing to run for president and saw education as a popular cause
(Rosser, 2015b, 205).
Another education case involved the international standard schools, or Sekolah Bertaraf
Internasional (SBI). The government created the SBI program as a way to encourage high-
performing schools that used curricula from OECD countries, had modern information tech-
nology facilities, and taught in English. However, NGOs worried that the subsidies provided
to these schools diverted resources from other state schools. Moreover, SBIs were allowed to
charge fees, which NGOs claimed violated the constitutional obligation to provide free basic
education. Finally, some NGOs worried that corruption in the state schools would increase
30Education Entities case, MK Decision No. 11-14-21-126-136/PUU-VII/2009.
31The government later passed a new law (Law of 12 of 2012) granting a more limited form of autonomy
to higher education institutions. This law was challenged by by a group of student activists, but the justices
rejected their argument. University Entities case, MK Decision No. 98/PUU-XIV/2016.
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as they struggled to compete with SBIs (Rosser and Curnow, 2014, 305).
In 2012, three parents who had tried to pay for their children to attend SBIs submitted
a petition to the Constitutional Court challenging Article 50(3) of the Law on the National
Education System, which formed the legal basis for SBIs.32 The parents did not launch
the case on their own, but rather were supported by a coalition of NGOs, including ICW,
ELSAM, the Education Coalition, and Schools Without Borders. The parents were of modest
means, so it is unlikely they could have pursued litigation without this support (Rosser and
Curnow, 2014, 313). These NGOs not only helped finance the litigation, but also found
scholars, parents, and teachers through their networks who testified before the justices as
witnesses (Rosser and Curnow, 2014, 312). In January 2013, the Court ruled in their favor,
finding that funding public education is the responsibility of the state rather than private
individuals.33 The verdict rendered Article 50(3) null and void.34
The SBI case demonstrates how NGOs can set and frame the agenda even while ad-
vocating on behalf of indigent clients. The parents tended to focus on what they believed
were the injustices they faced in the form of school fees and discrimination against poorer
students. However, in the petition and in oral arguments, ICW focused on how corruption
in the SBIs undermined the quality of education (Rosser and Curnow, 2014, 313). Thus,
even within the specific field of education law, ICW’s participation in the case allowed it to
frame the case in a way that emphasized its policy preferences.
These cases help demonstrate how Indonesian NGOs used their agenda-setting power
to influence the Constitutional Court, and ultimately education policy. First, they helped
bring education issues to the Court’s attention, affording the Court an opportunity to engage
in policy debates. This is especially important given the initial uncertainty over the justicia-
bility of Article 31. Second, NGOs possessed the infrastructure to monitor the government’s
32Law No. 20 of 2003.
33Standard International Schools case, MK Decision No. 5/PUU-X/2012.
34The government has since encouraged parents to make “voluntary contributions” to the former SBIs,
and some local governments have chosen to provide these schools with additional funds to maintain their
facilities, but it has not formally attempted to revive the SBI policy.
117
compliance with judicial decisions and file petitions if they detected any violations. This
ability to engage in repeated litigation proved crucial with the budget cases because it al-
lowed the Court to express its frustration with the government’s noncompliance. Finally, in
pursuing litigation alongside political mobilization, NGOs created an atmosphere in which
the Court was allowed – or even expected – to rule against the government (Rosser, 2015b,
196).
4.5 Discussion
Both the topic model and the education cases provide evidence that Indonesian NGOs
do act as support structures for legal mobilization in constitutional litigation. NGOs are
more likely to file petitions dealing with socioeconomic issues compared to civil or criminal
rights. Moreover, NGOs act as agenda setters for topics related to their mission statements.
However, I also found significant heterogeneity in that these general results did not hold
true for all NGOs for all topics. In this section, I explore some of the reasons for that
heterogeneity, as well as other factors that might have affected my results.
One important question is why more types of NGOs in Table 4.2 did not end up acting
as agenda setters for more topics. The results might simply confirm Hypothesis 4.3, in that
NGOs are more likely to act as agenda setters for socioeconomic issues than for other types
of topics. As noted above, litigating socioeconomic rights requires overcoming collective
action problems and acquiring technical expertise. This is beyond the means of the average
Indonesian citizen without help from SSLMs. As such, NGOs that focus on socioeconomic
issues, such as PGRI, will have more opportunities to act as agenda setters than NGOs that
work on claims also pursued by individuals, private business, and political parties.
Another possible explanation is that the distribution of topics uncovered by the topic
model does not necessarily reflect how all NGOs view policy. While some NGOs, like PGRI,
focus narrowly on a single policy issue, other NGOs focus on social problems that cut across
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a range of topics. For example, ICW35 participated in challenges to legislation about crim-
inal procedure, elections, education, and legislature institutions. For ICW, these cases all
represented opportunities to combat corruption, an issue that did not form a unique topic
cluster in the topic model. Other NGOs, such as ELSAM,36 are oriented less around a spe-
cific issue and more around an ideological skepticism of neoliberal economic policies. Their
petitions might influence the docket, but not along the same dimensions as the clusters in
the topic model.
NGOs also vary in the extent to which they view the Court as an appropriate forum
for their grievances. As Bedner (2014, 565) notes, progressive NGOS tend to be more
comfortable framing their arguments in terms of legal rights than as political tradeoffs.
They lack influence in the legislature and bureaucracy, so they file petitions with the Court
as an alternative. By contrast, religious organizations and industry groups can influence
policy through the legislative and executive branches. Thus, these latter groups might not
act as agenda setters in constitutional litigation simply because they do not need to rely
on the Court to pursue their policy goals. More research on differences between types of
Indonesian NGOs would help clarify when and why NGOs pursue policy change through
constitutional litigation.
Finally, NGOs were not the only parties that filed petitions related to rights and other
topics typically associated with progressive causes. For example, although one might expect
environmental NGOs to be associated with the “environment” and “natural resources” topics
(1 & 22), they are not (see Figure 4.9). This is because corporations and regional govern-
ments also actively challenged the constitutionality of environmental laws.37 Their petitions
influenced the Court’s agenda and diluted the agenda-setting power of environmental NGOs.
Thus, NGOs are not the sole – or even the dominant – voice the Constitutional Court hears
with regard to these issues.
35Categorized as a “governance” NGO.
36Categorized as a “human rights” NGO.
37E.g., Mining Law case, MK Decision No. 10/PUU-X/2012.
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Scholars who study Indonesia claim that the Constitutional Court tends to favor so-
cioeconomic rights (Butt, 2012; Faiz, 2016b; Hendrianto, 2016c). By contrast, the justices
tend to balance civil and criminal rights, especially freedom of religion, against morality and
local customs (Faiz, 2016b, 167). While the results in this chapter do not directly confirm
these observations, they do suggest another possible explanation. NGOs dominate agenda-
setting for labor, education, and welfare issues on the Court’s docket. In engaging with the
Court so consistently on these issues, these NGOs might have helped persuade the Court to
accept their ideological preferences. By contrast, where NGOs do not play an agenda-setting
role, they have less influence over the Court, especially as it receives briefs from other types
of petitioners who might advance competing policy positions.
One important limitation to this study is that I cannot account for the counterfactual.
In other words, I can only observe the distribution of topics on the Court’s docket given that
petitioners had already filed those petitions. I cannot observe the distribution of topics with
NGOs and compare it to the distribution of topics in the absence of NGOs. In theory, this
presents a causal inference problem. It is possible that some of the cases filed by NGOs would
have been filed anyways in their absence by other types of petitioners. Indeed, NGOs often
formed a coalition with other types of litigants, including law professors, smaller political
parties, and individual activists.
I argue several factors mitigate this problem. First, the fact that the Court’s decisions
only apply prospectively means it is less likely non-NGO petitioners would have substituted
for NGOs in their absence. Individual citizens are less likely to pursue litigation without
the prospect of selective incentives, such as a remedy for past harms. More importantly, the
average Indonesian lacks the legal knowledge and financial resources to litigate constitutional
claims on their own. For example, although parents had wanted to challenge the education
policies discussed in the previous section, they required assistance from NGOs. In fact,
Rosser and Curnow (2014, 312) suggest that the initiative for the SBI case came from the
NGOs, not the parents. Finally, the anti-neoliberal, anti-politics preferences most of these
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NGOs represent are not widely shared by other elite Indonesian organizations with the power
and resources to pursue constitutional litigation.
It is worth noting that my test only covers one form of agenda-setting, namely bringing
topics to the court’s docket. This is critical in that the distribution of topics on the docket is
associated with the range of policy issues the court can adjudicate. However, agenda-setting
can also operate in more nuanced ways, such as how the petitioner frames a legal argument,
the type of evidence provided, etc. For example, in the SBI case, ICW attempted to frame
its objections to a law about education privatization in terms of corruption. Unfortunately,
it is more difficult to detect this type of agenda-setting with natural language processing
tools, so my results do not capture the full scope of NGOs’ agenda-setting powers.
4.6 Concluding Remarks
Much of the judicial politics literature focuses on the outcomes of disputes, but as
Epp (1998) argues it is at least as important to understand how and why disputes reach
courts in the first place. Using data from the Indonesian Constitutional Court, I developed
a Structural Topic Model in order to capture information about the distribution of topics
in petitions submitted to the Court from August 2003 to October 2013. I then tested the
agenda-setting power by measuring the association between each topic and each type of
petitioner. My results provide qualified support for Epp’s theory about the role of support
structures in setting the judicial agenda. However, they also demonstrate the importance
of treating NGOs and topics as heterogeneous groups. Past studies have treated all NGOs
alike, but my results suggest heterogenous NGO behavior in constitutional litigation. I also
found that NGOs had a stronger influence over socioeconomic cases than other types of
cases. At the very least, this suggests that scholars should be wary of overgeneralizing the
relationship between NGOs and rights litigation.
In assessing the generalizability of my results, I believe there are two features of the
Indonesia Constitutional Court that might not be present in other countries. First, the
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Court has adopted a relatively lax standing threshold. Higher standing thresholds in other
countries would raise the barriers NGOs face and prevent them from filing petitions not tied
to a specific harm. This could prove especially problematic for socioeconomic right viola-
tions, which tend to affect groups rather than individuals. Second, the Court’s prospectivity
doctrine prevents petitioners from obtaining redress for past harms, which discourages in-
dividuals from pursuing constitutional claims. In countries without such a rule, individual
citizens would probably play a larger role in constitutional litigation because there would be
greater benefit to obtaining a favorable decision. At the very least, these two rules influence
the strategic decisions of Indonesian NGOs in ways that might not hold true elsewhere.
Other factors influence the distribution of topics that Indonesian NGOs pursue. In-
donesia is a middle-income, developing democracy (approx. $3,475 GDP per capita). To the
extent NGOs are responsive to public demand, this means they will focus relatively more
on socioeconomic issues or corruption than civil rights or environmental issues. The dockets
of constitutional courts in other countries will inevitably contain a different distribution of
legal topics based on local demand. Moreover, Indonesian civil society includes an influential
subset of NGOs that is anti-neoliberal and anti-political. My specific findings about agenda
setting and socioeconomic rights might hold true for courts in other developing democracies
with an active, anti-neoliberal NGO sector, but not necessarily for developed democracies
like the U.S. or Japan.
The results in this chapter suggest several areas for future research. First, we need
to better understand the strategic factors that influence an NGO’s decision to pursue con-
stitutional litigation. To what extent do NGOs view litigation as simply an alternative to
lobbying the elected branches of government? What other factors encourage or discourage
NGOs from pursuing litigation? It is possible that political factors or resource constraints
affect the distribution of NGOs that even consider constitutional litigation, which in turn
affects the legal issues that reach the docket. Moreover, researchers should try to better
understand why some NGOs focus narrowly on a single issue, while others address a wider
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range of policies. This would help us better understand when we should expect NGOs act
as agenda setters for specific legal topics.
Of course, filing a petition is merely the first step in constitutional litigation and
tells us little about whether or not the Constitutional Court will grant the petition. Epp
(1998) argues that SSLMs do ultimately effectuate policy change through repeatedly setting
the judicial agenda. Although I did not specifically test this part of Epp’s theory, the
education cases discussed in Section 4.4 suggest that Indonesian NGOs did ultimately manage
to achieve policy change through repeated constitutional litigation. In the next chapter of
this dissertation (Chapter V), I focus on case outcomes in Constitutional Court cases and
the extent to which public opinion influences judicial voting behavior.
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CHAPTER V
Judicial Voting
In Chapter IV, I looked at how NGOs influence the agenda of the Indonesian Con-
stitutional Court by filing petitions. In this chapter, I examine how the justices dispose of
those petitions once they reach the docket. Although many scholars have used statistical
models to understand judicial voting behavior, most of the literature focuses on the effects
of political constraints or ideology, not on the litigants themselves (see Chapter III). The
identity of litigants could matter in several ways. On the one hand, Galanter (1974) argues
that litigation inherently favors wealthier litigants with greater access to legal resources. On
the other hand, Vanberg (2005) believes judges look to litigants, especially amicus curiae, for
signals of public opinion; the judges will feel more confident ruling against the government
if they believe the public will mobilize to support the court’s decision. I test these theories
using data from Indonesian Constitutional Court cases.
Although I build upon previous models of judicial voting behavior to test how litigants
influence case outcomes, my approach differs from the existing literature in three crucial ways.
First, I test several different measures of litigant identity, including an ordinal measure of
petitioner resources, a dummy variable for different types of petitioners, and a continuous
variable with the total number of petitioners. Second, I treat the number and diversity of
individuals and/or organizations that sign on to a petition as an indirect signal of public
support for the petition. Third, I count briefs submitted by amicus curiae as an alternative
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signal of public support, ones that might counteract signals sent by the petitioners.
In Section 5.1 of this chapter, I build upon the review of the judicial behavior literature
in Chapter III and discuss models that incorporate information about public opinion and
party identity. I also present a set of testable hypotheses. Next, in Section 5.2, I explain
my empirical strategy and data. I then summarize my results in Section 5.3, finding that
the Constitutional Court is more likely to grant petitions supported by a larger number of
petitioners, but less likely to do so when it receives third-party briefs opposing the petition.
In Section 5.4, I discuss constitutional challenges to electoral and blasphemy laws in order
to illustrate how and why public opinion influences the justices. Finally, in Sections 5.5 and
5.6, I discuss my results and the broader implications for the literature.
5.1 Theory
As discussed in Chapter III, the majority of the literature on judicial voting behavior
focuses on how political institutions and judges’ policy preferences affect voting outcomes.
There has been far less research on the effect of litigants, the actors with the most at stake in
the outcome of the case. In this section, I review the political science literature on litigant-
centric models of judicial voting behavior, particularly those addressing the roles of party
resources, litigant identity, and public opinion. I conclude with a game theoretic model that
leads to a set of testable hypotheses.
5.1.1 Literature Review
5.1.1.1 Party Resources
In theory, courts reduce power asymmetries between litigants by acting as neutral ar-
biters in legal disputes. However, Galanter (1974) argues that parties with greater access to
legal resources are more likely to succeed in litigation. He notes that resource-rich litigants
(“haves”), such as corporations, also tend to be “repeat players” in the legal system. The
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system advantages repeat players because they can: 1) amortize the costs of developing legal
expertise; 2) build a credible reputation through repeated interactions with the judges; 3)
afford short-term losses in order to maximize long-term gains; and 4) influence the develop-
ment of the rules of litigation over time (Galanter, 1974, 96-103). By contrast, “one-shot”
players focus on maximizing immediate gains and might prove unwilling or unable to invest
the resources needed to win a case.
Other scholars have sought to test Galanter’s party capability/resource inequality the-
ory, primarily in the U.S. appellate federal courts. Following Wheeler et al. (1987), scholars
measure party strength by ranking types of litigants, with the federal government as the
strongest, then state/local governments, businesses, unions/NGOs, and finally individuals.
The results have been mixed. Wheeler et al. (1987), Songer and Sheehan (1992), Songer,
Sheehan and Haire (1999), and Albiston (1999) find that stronger parties do possess an
advantage, with a much higher ratio of success as appellants than losses as respondents.1
Likewise, several articles have found a positive relationship between the quality of attorneys
and success in litigation (McGuire and Caldeira, 1993; McGuire, 1995).
While these findings seem to hold true for U.S. courts, evidence for the party capability
theory in other countries is at best inconclusive. Scholars have found that “have-nots,”
such as farmers, fare worse in Shanghai courts (He and Su, 2013), while more experienced
attorneys do seem to improve the chances of success in the South African Supreme Court
of Appeal (Haynie and Sill, 2007) and Canadian Supreme Court (John Szmer and Sarver,
2007). Beyond that, researchers have found no systematic advantage for repeat players or
“haves” in countries as different as Australia (Smyth, 2000), Israel (Dotan, 1999), Russia
(Hendley, Murrell and Ryterman, 1999), South Africa (Haynie and Sill, 2007), and Taiwan
(Chen, Huang and Lin, 2013). The results for Canada (e.g., McCormick, 1993; Flemming
and Krutz, 2002) and the U.K. (e.g., Atkins, 1991; Hanretty, 2013b) are also mixed, with
1Wheeler et al. (1987) recommend using this net advantage measure rather than the party’s absolute rate
of success because it is independent of the number of times the party acted as an appellant or appellee. This
is not a problem for my dissertation because the Indonesian Constitutional Court has exclusive competence
to adjudicate constitutional claims.
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different studies reaching different conclusions.
One reason for the contradictory results is that scholars treat litigant status as an ordi-
nal variable, which imposes questionable assumptions about the relative strength of litigants
(see Olson, 1990). As Grossman, Kritzer and Macaulay (1999) point out, governments are
not simply another form of repeat player, but rather have a unique ability to reshape the
rules of litigation. This is perhaps most evident in how governments can define the court’s
jurisdiction and standard of review (Shipan, 2000). Later work on party strength in the
U.S. (Farole, 1999; Ulmer, 1985; Sheehan, 1992), Canada (McCormick, 1993; Flemming and
Krutz, 2002), the U.K. (Hanretty, 2013b), and Taiwan (Chen, Huang and Lin, 2013) found
that the positive relationship between party strength and judicial outcomes in previous re-
search was driven largely – and sometimes exclusively – by government litigants. It is not
clear if party strength still matters in the absence of government litigants.
Another problem is that litigant status could be correlated with judicial ideology (Black
and Boyd, 2012). For example, in the U.S., liberal judges tend to be more sympathetic to
legal arguments associated with “have-nots” (e.g., racial minorities challenging discrimina-
tion), whereas conservative judges tend to be more sympathetic to legal arguments associated
with “haves” (e.g., such as corporations challenging economic regulations). Indeed, several
studies have found that the effect of party resources changes as the median justice’s ideal
point changes over time (Ulmer, 1985; Sheehan, 1992; Sheehan, Mishler and Songer, 1992).
Haynie (1995) presents an interesting rebuttal to the party capability theory. Using
two measures of party strength – litigant status (Haynie, 1994) and geographic location
(Haynie, 1995) – she finds that, during the years 1961-1986, the Philippine Supreme Court
was not only more likely to rule in favor of “have-nots,” but also in favor of litigants from
poorer regions of the country. She argues that the Court favored weaker litigants during the
Marcos dictatorship in order to enhance its legitimacy. Had the court consistently favored
elite parties, it would have risked appearing corrupt or politically subservient. Haynie’s
theory could help explain the presence of activist courts sympathetic to “have-nots” in weak
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authoritarian regimes or developing democracies.
Although this chapter is the first study to directly test the party capability theory
in Indonesia, the Community and Ecological Based Society for Law Reform (HuMa), an
Indonesian NGO focused on focused on justice for marginalized communities, issued a report
in 2012 alleging that the Constitutional Court primarily benefits elites. HuMa reached this
conclusion by analyzing 478 decisions and finding that most of the litigants were either
political parties or corporations; by contrast, only 6.4% of the decisions involved NGOs,
religious institutions, or traditional groups (HukumOnline, 2010). However, the report relies
upon a sample that includes not just constitutional review cases, but also disputes over
election results and the authority of state institutions, both of which inevitably involve
political parties or state actors. Moreover, while access to the Court is important, case
outcomes are even more so. Thus, while elite institutions pursue their policy goals in the
Court, it is far from clear that they possess a distinct comparative advantage. Most scholars
who study the Court believe that it does not systematically favor petitions from elites and
often rules against them (e.g., Mietzner, 2012; Butt, 2015).
5.1.1.2 Public Opinion
Litigants can also influence judicial behavior by sending signals about public opinion.
Judges do not poll the public about cases that come before their court, so litigants are
the primary intermediaries between the court and the public. The briefs sometimes include
information about public attitudes toward the policy challenged in the petition. For example,
briefs to the U.S. Supreme Court in death penalty cases regularly refer to opinion polling on
capital punishment (Vidmar and Sarat, 1976). In addition, judges might view the number of
parties that file briefs supporting/opposing a petition for constitutional review as indicative
of public opinion. The literature on U.S. courts finds that a party’s chances of success increase
as it receives more support from amicus curiae briefs (see Caldeira and Wright, 1988; Songer
and Kuersten, 1995; Songer, Kuersten and Kaheny, 2000; Vanberg, 2005; Collins, 2008;
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Collins and Martinek, 2010).2 Collins (2007, 63) even claims that the the unprecedented
number of amicus briefs in Grutter v. Bollinger (more than 70) convinced Chief Justice
Rehnquist, a conservative, to uphold affirmative action.
Courts are often depicted as countermajoritarian institutions, acting as a check on
the popular will (see Bickel, 1962). With a few exceptions,3 judges are selected by other
government institutions, not by the voters. However, even independent courts are not com-
pletely insulated from the elected branches of government, which in turn respond to public
opinion (Bergara, Richman and Spiller, 2003; Friedman, 2009). In many countries, the leg-
islature and executive have some role delineating a court’s jurisdiction, setting standards of
review, appropriating funds, and even removing judges. If the court becomes too unpopu-
lar, elected politicians might respond to their constituents by attacking or constraining the
court.4 Thus, judges do have incentives to pay attention to and not veer too far from public
opinion (Mishler and Sheehan, 1993).
On the other hand, a sympathetic public can protect the judiciary from a hostile
executive or legislature. Members of the public are more likely to mobilize on behalf of the
court if they view it as a legitimate and impartial forum for dispute resolution, regardless
of the outcome of any particular case. Courts accrue legitimacy over time, so older courts
tend to receive higher levels of public support (Gibson, Caldeira and Baird, 1998). This
presents a challenge for newer courts, which cannot rely upon their reputation or historical
legacy. People tend to evaluate newer courts based on the outcomes of individual cases.
They are more likely to view the court’s impartiality and independence as credible if they
observe it ruling against elite actors or the government. Thus, under certain conditions,
2Although in the Supreme Court the effect is larger for appellees than appellants (Collins, 2004; Kearney
and Merrill, 2000).
3Notably the United States, where around half of states hold elections for judges at either the trial or
appellate level, and Bolivia (see Baum, 2003; Driscoll and Nelson, 2013).
4As happened in the U.S. during the early 20th century, when courts regularly struck down popular
progressive economic legislation (Milkis, 2009). President Franklin D. Roosevelt infamously tried to pack
the Supreme Court with sympathetic justices, but was ultimately thwarted by Congress (Shesol, 2010).
Increasingly, countries use independent judicial commissions to appoint and discipline judges, creating an
additional buffer between popular opinion and the court (see Garoupa and Ginsburg, 2009).
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newer courts have an incentive to burnish their legitimacy by granting popular petitions
against elites (Haynie, 1994). In the Philippines, for example, strong public support has
enabled the Supreme Court to rule against other branches of government, despite strong
elite opposition (Deinla, 2014, 150-52). By contrast, the public is less likely to mobilize on
behalf of the court if it is viewed as politically or ethically compromised (Haynie, 1994).
Public opinion can also help courts enforce their judgments against recalcitrant politi-
cians. Even if legislature does not attempt to directly undermine the court’s independence,
it can still try to override the judgment by passing a constitutional amendment. For its part,
the executive can undermine the judgment by refusing to enforce it. Vanberg (2005) argues
that courts are more likely to rule against the government when the public can monitor and
punish such noncompliance. He tests this theory using amicus briefs submitted to the the
German Constitutional Court an indicator of public support. Indeed, he finds that the court
is more likely to declare a law unconstitutional if it receives a larger number of amicus briefs
asking it to do so. Thus, judges can strategically mobilize popular opinion to advance their
policy preferences.
However, Vanberg also notes that the public has less capacity to detect noncompliance
in cases dealing with complex legal issues. For complex policy issues, such as economic
regulation, assessing compliance with the law often requires advanced subject-matter exper-
tise. By contrast, the average person should possess enough information to determine if the
government has violated civil and political rights because such violations tend to be highly
visible and easily understood. Indeed, Vanberg (2001) finds that amicus briefs to the Ger-
man Constitutional Court are less effective in complex cases (see also Carrubba and Zorn,
2010, finding similar results for the U.S. Supreme Court). Thus, judges not only need to
consider public opinion, but also the extent to which the public can detect noncompliance.
Broad measures of public opinion do risk overlooking the views of impassioned minori-
ties. Even a decision popular with the general public could provoke a backlash if it angers
a mobilized and politically influential minority, such as a significant ethnic minority group
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or a geographic region of the country. As per the logic of Weingast (1997), when the court’s
ruling satisfies a broader coalition, it becomes less likely there exists a group that would
have an incentive to retaliate against the court for an adverse ruling. As such, we should
expect judges to give greater weigh to a litigant coalition’s claims if it represents a more
diverse set of interests. A coalition that cuts across social cleavages and interest groups has
greater capacity to mobilize the public against the executive should it refuse to comply with
the judgment.
There is some evidence that the decisions of independent courts do reflect public opin-
ion, at least to some extent. For example, although the U.S. Supreme Court’s jurisprudence
does not strictly track the public’s ideal point or policy preferences (Norpoth and Segal, 1994;
Calvin, Collins and Eshbaugh-Soha, 2011), the Court tends not to stray too far from public
opinion (Mishler and Sheehan, 1993; McGuire and Stimson, 2004), especially when it comes
to decisions on major policies or legislation (Barnum, 1985, 664). Friedman (2009) claims
that Congress and the president have successfully pressured the Court when it veered too
far from public opinion. In the Philippines, Deinla (2014, 144) finds that the Supreme Court
is very responsive to trends in public opinion, carefully evaluating which cases on its docket
received the largest public outcry or scrutiny. We know much less about how information
regarding public opinion reaches judges in the first place.
As discussed in Chapter II, Indonesian public opinion seems to influence the Consti-
tutional Court. The justices themselves openly admit the importance of public opinion.
Justice Muruarar Siaahan called public opinion “absolutely vital” to preserving the Court’s
independence. Former Chief Justice Asshiddiqie even claims that public opinion and NGO
activism were far more influential than any intimidation the justices faced from the execu-
tive, DPR, or military (Mietzner, 2010, 414).5 Knowing this, the chief justices took steps to
cultivate and shape public opinion. Asshidiqie launched a campaign to raise public awareness
about the MK, including a weekly radio and television program in which he discussed the
5On the other hand, he also worried that “some judges want to be popular” (Mietzner, 2010, 414).
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Court’s decisions. Former Chief Justice Mohammad Mahfud regularly gave interviews to the
media, sometimes to criticize government agencies that had not complied with judgments
(Hendrianto, 2016c, 520, 541).6 In this chapter, I investigate the effect of public opinion on
the outcome of individual cases.
5.1.2 Hypotheses
In this section, I present a game theoretic model in order to demonstrate how public
opinion and litigant identity might affect judicial voting outcomes in the Indonesian Con-
stitutional Court. I use an ideal point analysis along a unidimensional policy space with
three actors: the court/median judge (J), the government (G), and a petitioner (P ). Each
actor’s ideal point is located in the center of its tolerance zone, or Pareto set. I begin by
allowing the government to pass a law (x0) located at its ideal point G. I then assume that
a petitioner files a petition for constitutional review asking the Court to shift policy x closer
to its ideal point.
In Figure 5.1, I present the general game without any petitioners so as to demonstrate
the implications of the judicial behavior models discussed in Chapter III. According to a
formalist model, the judges would issue a decision based upon their understanding of the law,
which could result in x being shifted anywhere along the policy space. By contrast, according
to the attitudinal model, the judges would issue a decision based on their policy preferences,
moving policy from x0 to their ideal point xJ . However, the strategic-institutionalist model
argues that even independent courts do need to consider the preferences of other government
institutions. If the court moves policy too far left, then there is a risk that the legislature
will try to override its decision or that the executive will try to evade it. Knowing this, the
court only moves policy to x∗, as close to its ideal point as possible while remaining within
the government’s tolerance zone.
6For example, the General Election Commission initially refused to comply with the Court’s judgment
in the Open List case (MK Decision No. 22-24/PUU-VI/2008). Mahfud issued a press statement warning
that the commissioners would face political and criminal consequences if they did not comply, which they
eventually did (Budiarti, 2010, 92).
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x0x∗xJ
J
G
Figure 5.1: Game Theoretic Model: Judicial Voting Behavior
J = Judiciary; G = Government; x0 = government legislation; x = court’s judgment, such that x∗ is within the overlap
between court and government’s tolerance zones.
In Figure 5.2, I introduce petitioners, P1 and P2, to represent the party capabil-
ity/resource inequality model. P1 and P2 each file separate challenges to the constitutionality
of x0. Assuming for illustrative purposes that the petitioners share the same ideal point,
the party capability theory predicts that the stronger party is more likely to win its case.
If P1 < P2 (e.g., P1 is a street vendor and P2 is a multinational corporation), then P1 will
fail to convince the judges to grant its petition (i.e., x0 remains constitutional), but P2 will
succeed (i.e., x∗ = x2). This leads to the first hypothesis:
Hypothesis 5.1 (Petitioner Strength): The probability that the Constitu-
tional Court grants a petition increases if the petition is filed by a litigant with
greater access to resources.
Note that the court only shifts x to the petitioner’s ideal point, not the leftmost edge of its
tolerance zone, because otherwise the petitioner would acquiesce to government attempts to
shift x∗ to the right.
x∗2
P1,2
J
G
x0
Figure 5.2: Game Theoretic Model: Party Strength Model
P1 = Petitioner 1; P2 = Petitioner 2; J = Judiciary; x = court’s judgment, such that x∗ is within the overlap between court
and first petitioner’s tolerance zones if P1 > P2.
In Figure 5.3, I present a version of the model motivated by my discussion of embedded
judicial autonomy in Chapter III (see Section 3.2). The embedded autonomy model posited
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that courts have an incentive to strategically grant petitions from non-state actors because
doing so increases the government’s audience costs should it try to defy court judgments.
This effectively extends the government’s tolerance zone to the petitioner’s ideal point (as
indicated by the dashed line in Figure 5.3). In this scenario, I consider two different types
of non-state actors: NGOs and public opinion. If the judges believe that NGOs are critical
external stakeholders, then it will be more likely to rule in favor of petitions supported by
NGOs (i.e., P is an NGO). This leads to the second hypothesis:
Hypothesis 5.2 (NGOs): The probability that the Constitutional Court grants
a petition increases if NGOs support the petition.
In this case, the court rules in favor of PNGO, shifting policy away from the government’s
ideal point toward its own. It does so in the knowledge that the NGO will mobilize to defend
the decision because x∗ is closer to its ideal point than x0.
x0x∗
P
J
G
Figure 5.3: Game Theoretic Model: Embedded Autonomy Model
PNGO = NGO; J = Judiciary; G = Government; x0 = government legislation; x = court’s judgment, such that x
∗ is within
the overlap between court and NGO’s tolerance zones.
By contrast, the court might believe that NGOs are not a sufficient proxy for audience
costs, especially because NGOs do not always share the same policy preferences as the
average person. Courts might instead look for signals about public opinion more generally.
One observable signal – at least for judges in a low-information environment – is the size and
diversity of the petitioner’s coalition. Judges might believe that a petition more likely reflects
the public will if it is supported by a larger and more diverse group of individuals and/or
organizations. In this scenario, P in Figure 5.3 represents a large and diverse coalition of
petitioners. The court will rule in favor of this petition and move policy to x∗, knowing that
the public will mobilize to defend its decision. This leads to the following hypotheses:
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Hypothesis 5.3a (Petitioner Number): The probability that the Constitu-
tional Court grants a petition increases as the number individuals and/or orga-
nizations who support the petition increases.
Hypothesis 5.3b (Petitioner Diversity): The probability that the Consti-
tutional Court grants a petition increases as the diversity of individuals and/or
organizations who support the petition increases.
The mechanism of audience costs is similar to that of Hypothesis 5.2, but the court looks to
the general public instead of NGOs.
As Vanberg (2001) notes, courts also receive signals about public opinion through
amicus curiae briefs. If the court receives a larger number of related party briefs supporting
a petition, that would reinforce the perception that the petitioner’s policy preferences have
widespread public support. By contrast, if it receives a larger number of briefs against the
petition, it would signal that there exists a significant segment of the population that has the
ability and motivation to mobilize against the court if it grants the petition. In Indonesia,
amicus curiae, known as related parties (pihak terkait), can file briefs in support of or against
a petition. This leads to the following two corollary hypotheses:
Hypothesis 5.4a (Related Party Briefs For): The probability that the Con-
stitutional Court grants a petition increases as the number of related parties that
file briefs in support of the petition increases.
Hypothesis 5.4b (Related Party Briefs Against): The probability that the
Constitutional Court grants a petition decreases as the number of related parties
that file briefs against the petition increases.
5.2 Methodology & Data
In this section, I build upon the literature to develop a statistical model to test how
Indonesian litigants influence Constitutional Court case outcomes. Because there are no
preexisting databases of Indonesian Constitutional Court cases, I created a unique dataset
of cases adjudicated during the terms of the first three chief justices, Jimly Asshiddiqie,
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Mohammad Mahfud, and Akil Mochtar (August 13, 2003 – October 2, 2013). During this
period, the Court received 560 petitions and issued 460 final judgments,7 while 64 were
withdrawn before the Court could issue a final judgment (omitted from analysis). The
primary independent variables for the model utilize information about petitioner identity.
The primary dependent variable (outcome) is whether or not the Constitutional Court
granted the petition, either in whole or part. I use a logit model because the dependent
variable is binary (y = 1 if yes, 0 else). Although the Court can reject a petition for
many reasons, including lack of standing, I treat all rejections the same (y = 0). As noted
in Chapter II, the Court adopted relatively liberal standing rules; in most cases where
petitioners lacked standing, they did so because they had not proved a constitutional harm,
meaning that they would also not have won on the merits. Overall, the Court granted
around 28.5% of the petitions for constitutional review it received during its first ten years.
This rate remained fairly consistent under each of the three chief justices. To account for
unobserved effects of the Court’s leadership on the court’s proclivity to grant briefs, I use a
fixed-effects model grouped by the chief justice who presided over each case (Jimly Asshidiqie,
Mohammad Mahfud, or Akil Mochtar).
5.2.1 Petitioners
To test the party capability/resource inequality theory (Hypothesis 5.1), I follow the lit-
erature in creating an ordinal variable for the relative strength of petitioners (party strength).
Different scholars have taken different approaches to coding party strength (see Black and
Boyd, 2012, Table 1), but all tend to place individuals at the lowest level, then NGOs,
private businesses, and finally local and national governments. Because of the difficulty of
finding information about many Indonesian petitioners, I could not utilize the more granular
approach of Sheehan, Mishler and Songer (1992) or Collins (2007), who differentiate between
poor, minority, and other individuals. Moreover, almost a quarter of constitutional review
7Some petitions were consolidated with others challenging the same law.
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cases on the Indonesian Constitutional Court’s docket involved political parties and party
members (see Table 4.1), so I needed to create a new category for these litigants.
First, I used the same coding scheme to categorize petitioners as in in Section 4.2 of
Chapter IV (see also Appendix A). I then ranked the parties from weakest to strongest
as follows: 1) individual unaffiliated with any organization; 2) political party/candidate; 3)
nongovernmental organization (NGO); 4) private business/corporation; 5) local government
institution; and 6) national government institution. I placed the “political party/candidate”
group in between NGOs and individuals because the overwhelming majority of petitions
from parties/candidates were from small or niche parties that had no seats in the DPR.
I ranked each petition based on the identity of its strongest petitioner. For example, if a
petition included an individual, political party, and local government, then xparty strength = 5.
In Table 5.1, I provide summary statistics for each category of party strength. Although
government petitioners (5 & 6) are more likely to win, the overall rate of success is not clearly
correlated with party strength, providing preliminary evidence against Hypothesis 5.1.
Party Strength ≥ 1 2 3 4 5 6 Total
Number of Cases 186 93 107 31 28 15 460
Petitions Granted 26.9% 18.3% 34.6% 29.0% 39.3% 46.7% 28.5%
Table 5.1: Summary Statistics of Party Resources Variable
To test the effect of NGOs on case outcomes (Hypothesis 5.2), I created two vari-
ables. First, I created dummy variables for each petitioner type indicating the presence of
at least one of that type in the case. For example, if an NGO submitted the petition, then
xdummy ngo = 1, while xdummy individual=0, etc. These variables are not mutually exclusive; a
single case can contain more than one type of petitioner. Second, I created an alternative
measure using the number of each type of petitioner involved in each case (e.g., number ngo).
I then took the natural log of this measure because I expect the marginal effect of petitioner
identity to decrease with each additional petitioner.8 In Table 5.2, I provide summary statis-
tics on the types of petitioners involved in each case. Unlike Table 5.1, which focused on
8I transformed all logged variables in this chapter by adding 1 to avoid taking the log of 0.
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the overall strength of the petitioner coalition, Table 5.2 only looks at the identity of each
petitioner. Aside from the national government, NGOs have the highest rate of success in
constitutional litigation, followed closely by local governments. This provides preliminary
support for Hypothesis 5.2 in that the Court seems more likely to rule in favor of NGOs.9
Individual Political NGO Business Local gov. National gov. Total
Number of Cases 260 110 122 31 36 15 460
Petitions Granted 31.2% 19.8% 36.9% 29.0% 36.1% 46.7% 28.5%
Table 5.2: Summary Statistics of Petitioner Type Dummy Variables
To test the effect of public opinion on case outcomes (Hypotheses 5.3a & 5.3b), I simply
counted the overall number of petitioners – regardless of type – in a case (number petitioner)
in the expectation that judges would perceive a larger petitioner coalition as a signal of public
support for the petition. Overall, 3,002 individual petitioners filed petitions with the Court.
The average petition had six petitioners, while the median petition only had one. The mean
is much larger than the median because of a small number of outliers; less than 14% of the
petitions had more than 29 petitioners (the mean plus the standard deviation), while the
largest case had 503 petitioners.10 Again, I take the log in the expectation that the marginal
effect of each additional petitioner decreases.
I then interacted that variable with a dummy variable indicating if any of the petitioners
were based outside of Jakarta (number petitioner ∗ diversity petitioner). This interaction
term is intended to capture information about both the size and the diversity of the petitioner
coalition. Geography is one of the most important social cleavages in Indonesia. During
the New Order, Jakarta dominated the country’s political, economic, and cultural power.
Even after Reformasi, Jakarta is still home to much of the country’s elite. As such, if the
Constitutional Court looks to the petitioners as a signal of public opinion, they will be more
9I also tried a matching technique in order to improve causal inference for treatment variable peti-
tioner ngo. I utilized Coarsened Exact Matching (CEM) (see Blackwell et al., 2009) to find a matched
set of data on the following covariates: the other petitioner identity variables and the posterior probabilities
of topics 2, 3, 5, 6, 16, 17, 20, and 21 from the topic model in Chapter IV. I used these topics because they
are the ones significantly associated with NGOs in Figure 4.8. Ultimately, the matching did not change my
analysis, so I do not present those results here.
10See Parliamentary Threshold case, MK Decision No. 3/PUU-VII/2009.
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likely to grant a petition that is supported by at least some petitioners who are not based
in Jakarta. In over 60% of the cases, all of the petitioners lived or were based in Jakarta
(xdiversity petitioner = 0), which constitutes less than 4% of Indonesia’s population. Thus,
other parts of the country are severely underrepresented before the Court.11
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Figure 5.4: Histogram of Number and Diversity of Petitioners
The histograms represent the log of the average number of petitioners for petitions granted and rejected by the Constitutional
Court. The histogram on the left is for petitioners exclusively from Jakarta, whereas the histogram on the right is for
petitions with some petitioners from outside Jakarta. The log was transformed to avoid taking the log of 1. Bars represent
95% confidence intervals.
As seen in Figure 5.4, petitions that the Court granted had on average more petitioners
than those rejected by the Court. Moreover, this difference is statistically significant, pro-
viding preliminary evidence for Hypothesis 5.3a. By contrast, there does not appear to be
any significant difference in success rates based on the presence of petitioners from regions of
the country other than Jakarta, suggesting that geographic diversity does not significantly
improve a petition’s chances of success (Hypothesis 5.3b).
The data have a positive skew as there is a small number of cases with a large number
of petitioners. As such, before estimating the models, I conducted a diagnosis using Cook’s
11I reran the model using a geographic variable that included an intermediate tier for petitions with
members from Java but outside Jakarta. The island of Java contains around half of the country’s entire
population. However, the results for Java and for all other parts of Indonesia were nearly indistinguishable,
so I dropped that intermediate tier.
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Figure 5.5: Summary Statistics for Related Party (Pihak Terkait) Briefs
The histograms represent the log of the average number of related party briefs in cases granted and rejected by the
Constitutional Court. The log was transformed to avoid taking the log of 1. Bars represent 95% confidence intervals.
method to identify highly influential cases (Cook, 1977). The Cook’s distance is the scaled
change in fitted values after deleting a given observation. Not surprisingly, the Cook’s dis-
tance revealed that the case with 503 petitioners was an influential observation (by contrast,
the next largest case had just 136 petitioners). However, removing the observation did not
fundamentally affect my results or analysis, so I ultimately left it in the final model.
As noted above, it is possible that the Court views related party briefs as another signal
of public opinion (Hypothesis 5.4a & 5.4b). To test this, I count the number of related party
briefs in each case both for and against the petition. Overall, 328 related parties were
involved in 85 cases, 97 in favor of the petition and 231 against. I took the log of the number
of related parties in the expectation that the marginal effect of each additional related party
would decrease. As seen in Figure 5.5, the Court is more likely to grant petitions supported
by a larger number of related party briefs, although the difference is not significant because
of the large amount of variance. By contrast, there is no noticeable difference in success
rates for related party briefs against the petition.
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5.2.2 Other Variables
I also attempted to account for other theories of judicial behavior. It is difficult to
quantify the underlying legal of merits of a petition and how legal doctrine might constrain
judges. Because constitutional review was relatively new to Indonesia and many Indone-
sians did not understand what constituted a valid constitutional claim, I expect that some
petitioners mistakenly filed claims that had little basis in law, while others filed frivolous
petitions. The Court could dismiss these petitions relatively quickly. By contrast, claims
that have more merit should require more consideration, including longer oral arguments and
hearings for evidence. Thus, I use the length of the transcripts of court proceedings (risalah
sidang) as a proxy for the legal quality of the petition.12 All else equal, I expect transcripts
with more words to be associated with higher-quality petitions. I use the log of the number
of words in the expectation that the marginal effect of each additional word decreases.13
In order to account for political constraints on the Constitutional Court, I include a
dummy variable (president) indicating if the president submitted a statement in the case.
Because the Court’s jurisdiction only covers national legislation, all presidential statements
asked the Court to dismiss the petition. Given that it costs time and resources to submit
a brief, these statements act as a signal of the executive branch’s preferences.14 Overall,
the president submitted statements in 291 cases. The legislature (DPR) also submitted
statements to the Court in 250 cases, but I do not include these for two reasons. First,
cases with presidential and DPR statements are highly correlated (0.79), leading to concerns
about multicollinearity. Second, in a presidential system, statements from the executive are
a more informative signal to the Court regarding the risks of noncompliance or override.
12Note: I excluded transcripts that merely announced the Court’s judgment, usually the last transcript in
the case file.
13The risalah sidang variable is correlated with the dummy for presidential statements (0.71), potentially
leading to multicollinearity. However, the variance inflation factor (VIF) is less than 5 and tolerance is more
than 0.1, indicating an acceptable level of bias.
14In theory, the president’s statement could merely provide objective information relevant to the case
without taking a stance. In fact, Chief Justice Asshiddiqie initially instructed the president’s lawyers to
provide objective information, not argue the merits. However, he claims they did not take his advice.
Subject #32, interview with former justice, Jakarta, Indonesia, July 20, 2012.
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As Carrubba and Zorn (2010) argue, the president can veto legislation and oversees the
bureaucracy, giving him/her more influence over implementation of court judgments. By
contrast, it is more difficult for the legislature to override a constitutional decision because
to do so it would have to pass a constitutional amendment.15
I also include several controls in the model. First, I include a variable for the age
of the law being challenged (law age) to account for the effect of time. I suspect that the
Constitutional Court will be less likely to grant petitions challenging newer laws passed by
incumbent legislators. In general, older laws are less likely to reflect the policy preferences of
the governing majority, which, between the president and DPR, appointed six of the judges.
This should prove especially true in Indonesia because many of the country’s older laws were
passed under the authoritarian New Order or Dutch colonial governments, and thus might
be incompatible with post-Reformasi democracy. By contrast, declaring a law passed by
the current legislative majority unconstitutional would be more likely to provoke a backlash
from political elites.
Following Vanberg (2005), I also included a dummy variable indicating if the case in-
volved a complex legal issue, defined as economic, socioeconomic rights, or natural resource
issues (complex issue = 1). As discussed in Section 5.1.1.2, the public has less technical
capacity to monitor and detect violations of judgments in complex fields of law, so the Court
should be less likely to grant petitions challenging complex laws. Other issues, such as elec-
tions, government processes, the legal system, and rights issues, are considered “not complex”
because these issues are easier for the public to understand and monitor (complex issue = 0).
In an alternative attempt to control for the effect of legal issues on case outcomes, I also
used the results of Structural Topic Model from Chapter IV. I took the posterior probability
of the amount of text in each petition associated with each topic as an independent variable.
15To ensure that my results did not depend upon the choice of presidential or legislative statements, I
reran the models using a dummy variable for statements submitted by the DPR and omitting the president
variable. The magnitude of the (positive) coefficient for DPR statements was slightly smaller than for
presidential statements, but still significant. The inclusion of DPR statements did not otherwise change my
results.
142
For cases with two or more petitions, I used the average of the posterior probabilities.16 I
omit the complexity variable (complex issue) when including the topic posteriors.
Note that my models focus on case-level effects rather than vote-level effects. Al-
though Indonesian Constitutional Court justices can write individual opinions, dissents are
still relatively rare (and concurrences even rarer).17 The most frequent dissenter on the Con-
stitutional Court, Justice Maruarar Siahaan (2003-2008), only dissented in 5.72% of cases
in which he participated (most justices dissented in less than 2.5% of cases). Moreover, the
majority opinion is unsigned, so it is impossible to tell which justice took the lead in drafting
a particular decision. Thus, there is insufficient variation in vote-level outcomes to model
individual justices’ voting behavior.
5.3 Results
In Tables 5.3-5.6, I present the results of my judicial voting models. The expected
direction/sign (if any) for each independent variable is indicated in brackets. The first
model in each table includes only the petitioner variable(s), the second model adds controls,
and the third incorporates the latent topic variables. I also show the marginal effect for each
independent variable, holding all other variables at their means.
5.3.1 Petitioners
To measure the effect of party strength on case outcomes, I estimated the following
model:
Prob(const. review) = β1 + β2 party strength + βi controls +  (5.1)
16I exclude Topics 3, 15, and 16 (“judicial,” “addresses,” and “rights”) because tended to be highly
correlated with each other, leading to multicollinearity. I also ran the models using hand-coded categories
for topics. Using hand-coding did not change the results or analysis for my primary independent variables,
so I do not present those models here.
17Before Reformasi, Indonesian judges were prohibited from filing a dissents. The first formal dissent in a
Supreme Court case only occurred in 2004 (Pompe, 2005, 378).
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, where β2 should be positive if access to legal resources increases the probability that the
Court rules for the petitioner. Table 5.3 shows the results of this model. Although party
strength has a positive and significant effect in model 1, that effect is not robust; adding
any controls makes the effect statistically indistinguishable from zero (see models 2 & 3).
In Figure 5.6, I plot the marginal effect of each tier of party strength, holding all other
variables at their means. Although stronger petitioners are generally more likely to receive a
favorable decision from the Constitutional Court, the probability does not increase uniformly
with party strength. As with the other studies mentioned in Section 5.1.1.1, any advantage
for stronger parties seems primarily driven by government litigants. Moreover, the confidence
intervals overlap and the intervals for the strongest types of petitioners are especially large
(likely because there are so few government petitioners). Thus, the model does not provide
sufficient evidence for Hypothesis 5.1, meaning that a petitioner’s access to legal resources
does not significantly affect its probability of success in constitutional litigation.
.1
.2
.3
.4
.5
Pr
ob
. V
ot
e 
fo
r U
nc
on
sti
tu
tio
na
lity
 P
(Y
=1
)
1 2 3 4 5 6
Party Strength
Figure 5.6: Probability of Unconstitutionality & Party Strength
The plots represent the probability that the Constitutional Court will grant a petition/vote for unconstitutionality given each
level of the party strength variable. Results are taken from model 2 in Table 5.3. All other variables are held at their means.
Bars represent 95% confidence intervals.
To measure the effect of party identity on case outcomes, I estimated the following
144
(1) (2) (3)
Case outcome Coefficient % Change Coefficient % Change Coefficient % Change
Petitioners:
Party Strength [+] 0.162∗ +3.29% 0.048 +0.88% 0.011 –0.20%
(0.07) (0.09) (0.10)
Related Parties:
Support [+] 0.051 +0.92% -0.046 –0.84%
(0.33) (0.38)
Against [–] -0.489◦ –8.90% -0.539◦ –9.77%
(0.26) (0.31)
Case Attributes:
President brief [–] 1.478∗∗∗ +24.1% 1.364∗∗∗ +22.3%
(0.37) (0.37)
Hearing length [+] 1.078∗ +19.6% 1.385∗ +25.1%
(0.53) (0.60)
Law age [+] -0.150 –2.73% -0.183 –3.32%
(0.12) (0.16)
Complex issue [–] -0.010 –0.18%
(0.25)
Constant -1.300∗∗∗ -6.353∗∗ -7.244∗∗
(0.21) (2.03) (2.45)
Term NO NO YES YES YES YES
Topics NO NO NO NO YES YES
N 460 459 447
Pseudo R2 0.009 0.135 0.168
Model χ2 4.78 55.37 75.22
Table 5.3: Model of Constitutional Case Outcomes with Party Strength Variables
◦ p < 0.1, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001. The unit of analysis is each constitutional review case from August 13, 2003
to October 2, 2013. The dependent variable is binary indicating if the Constitutional Court voted for unconstitutionality. The
entries are logit coefficients with robust standard errors in parentheses. Coefficients for topic variables not shown. The
expected direction of the coefficients appears in brackets. Percent change indicates the marginal effect on the dependent
variable of a 0-1 increase in dummy variables or one standard deviation increase in continuous variables, holding all other
variables at their mean or modal values.
model:
Prob(const. review) = β1 + β2 NGO + β3 nat. gov. + β4 local gov.
+ β5 political party + β6 business + βi controls + 
(5.2)
, where β2 should be positive if the Court is more likely to grant petitions submitted by
NGOs. Table 5.4 shows the results for this model using the petitioner identity dummy
variables. NGO, national government, and local government petitioners all have positive
and significant effects on the probability of obtaining a favorable decision. However, these
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effects are not robust when controls are added (see models 2 & 3). By contrast, the dummy
for political parties is consistently negative and significant across all three models. Simply
having at least one political party as one of the petitioners decreases the probability that the
Court will declare a law unconstitutional by approximately 10%. Note that in model 3 the
topic variables include topics for election law (Topics 4 & 14), so that model should control
for the fact that political parties are more likely to challenge election laws.
Table 5.5 shows the results for the number of each petitioner type involved in each case.
Without any controls (model 1), the variable for NGO petitioners is positive and significant,
but the effect disappears with the introduction of controls in models 2 and 3. Although the
sign for the NGO variable is consistently positive, it is statistically indistinguishable from
zero. Combined with the results from Table 5.4, these results suggest that, contrary to Hy-
pothesis 5.2, the Constitutional Court is not significantly more likely to grant constitutional
petitions submitted by NGOs.
Another interesting result in Table 5.5 is that the coefficients for both national and local
government petitioners are positive and significant across all three models. This indicates
that the Court is more likely to grant petitions supported by government institutions, such
as the Indonesian Broadcasting Commission, or Komisi Penyiaran Indonesia (KPI), or a
provincial governor. Moreover, the marginal effect is substantively large. Using the results
from model 2, going from 0 to 1 national or local government petitioners increases the
probability that the Court declares a law unconstitutional by 12% and 10%, respectively.18
These results suggest that the Court views government institutions as key stakeholders in
the enforcement of any judicial decision, and thus is more likely to grant the petition when
it has their support.
Finally, to measure the effect of public opinion on case outcomes, I estimated the
18I use a change from 0 to 1 petitioners, not the standard deviation of the variable, because the variable
is logged.
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(1) (2) (3)
Case outcome Coefficient % Change Coefficient % Change Coefficient % Change
Petitioners:
NGO [+] 0.475∗ +9.97% 0.021 +0.39% -0.105 –1.87%
(0.23) (0.28) (0.32)
National gov. [+] 1.075◦ +25.1% 0.420 +8.37% 0.283 +5.45%
(0.62) (0.65) (0.75)
Local gov. [+] 0.465 +10.0% 0.370 +7.20% 0.238 +4.50%
(0.35) (0.38) (0.46)
Political party [?] -0.573∗ –10.7% -0.578◦ –9.60% -0.705◦ –11.5%
(0.28) (0.31) (0.41)
Business [?] 0.001 +0.01% -0.206 –3.55% 0.176 +3.30%
(0.41) (0.50) (0.56)
Related Parties:
Support [+] 0.054 +0.97% -0.035 –0.64%
(0.33) (0.37)
Against [–] -0.507◦ –9.16% -0.500◦ –8.99%
(0.27) (0.31)
Case Attributes:
President brief [–] 1.455∗∗∗ +23.6% 1.352∗∗∗ +22.0%
(0.37) (0.38)
Hearing length [+] 1.042◦ +18.8% 1.375∗ +24.7%
(0.54) (0.59)
Law age [+] -0.203 –3.67% -0.169 –3.04%
(0.13) (0.16)
Complex issue [–] -0.108 –1.93%
(0.27)
Constant -1.009∗∗∗ -5.894∗∗ -7.272∗∗
(0.16) (2.09) (2.43)
Term NO NO YES YES YES YES
Topics NO NO NO NO YES YES
N 460 459 447
Pseudo R2 0.027 0.143 0.175
Model χ2 13.89 63.96 84.40
Table 5.4: Model of Constitutional Case Outcomes with Party Type Dummy
Variables
◦ p < 0.1, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001. The unit of analysis is each constitutional review case from August 13, 2003
to October 2, 2013. The dependent variable is binary indicating if the Constitutional Court voted for unconstitutionality. The
entries are logit coefficients with robust standard errors in parentheses. Coefficients for topic variables not shown. The
expected direction of the coefficients appears in brackets. Percent change indicates the marginal effect on the dependent
variable of a 0-1 increase in dummy variables or one standard deviation increase in continuous variables, holding all other
variables at their mean or modal values.
following model:
Prob(const. review) = β1 + β2 # petitioners + β3 geographic diversity
+ β4(# petitioners ∗ geographic diversity) + βi controls + 
(5.3)
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(1) (2) (3)
Case outcome Coefficient % Change Coefficient % Change Coefficient % Change
Petitioners:
# NGO [+] 1.159∗∗∗ +23.3% 0.375 +6.81% 0.055 +0.99%
(0.34) (0.42) (0.49)
# National gov. [+] 3.977∗ +79.8% 1.972 +35.8% 1.402 +25.3%
(1.99) (2.12) (2.44)
# Local gov. [+] 1.948∗∗ +39.1% 1.842∗ +33.4% 2.248*∗ +40.5%
(0.64) (0.79) (0.84)
# Political party [?] 0.293 +5.87% 0.051 +0.93% 0.368 +6.63%
(0.41) (0.42) (0.59)
# Business [?] 0.950 19.1% 0.388 +7.05% 1.095 +19.7%
(0.70) (0.88) (1.02)
Related Parties:
Support [+] 0.080 +1.45% -0.109 –1.97%
(0.35) (0.40)
Against [–] -0.550∗ –9.99% -0.477 –8.60%
(0.28) (0.31)
Case Attributes:
President brief [–] 1.541∗∗∗ +25.0% 1.386∗∗∗ +22.5%
(0.38) (0.39)
Hearing length [+] 0.864 +15.7% 1.207∗ +21.8%
(0.57) (0.62)
Law age [+] -0.145 –2.63% -0.209 –3.76%
(0.13) (0.17)
Complex issue [–] -0.036 –0.64%
(0.27)
Constant -1.280∗∗∗ -5.553∗ -6.403∗
(0.14) (2.19) (2.50)
Term NO NO YES YES YES YES
Topics NO NO NO NO YES YES
N 460 459 447
Pseudo R2 0.042 0.146 0.181
Model χ2 23.88 64.29 83.94
Table 5.5: Model of Constitutional Case Outcomes with Number of Party Type
Variables
◦ p < 0.1, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001. The unit of analysis is each constitutional review case from August 13, 2003
to October 2, 2013. The dependent variable is binary indicating if the Constitutional Court voted for unconstitutionality. The
entries are logit coefficients with robust standard errors in parentheses. Coefficients for topic variables not shown. The
expected direction of the coefficients appears in brackets. Percent change indicates the marginal effect on the dependent
variable of a 0-1 increase in dummy variables or one standard deviation increase in continuous variables, holding all other
variables at their mean or modal values.
, where β2 + (β4 ∗ geographic diversity) should be positive if having a larger coalition of
petitioners increases the probability that the Court grants the petition. Table 5.6 presents
the results from this model. Because this is an interaction, I calculated the marginal effect
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of each variable to obtain the overall effect. The overall effect of the number of petitioners
across all three models was positive and significant (at p < 0.01). As the number of peti-
tioners increases, the probability that the Court grants a petition for constitutional review
also increases. The size of the effect is substantively large. Simply raising the number of
petitioners from 1 to 2 increases the probability that the Court will grant a petition by
around 2.87%. Moreover, this effect increases as the number of petitioners increases. Going
from 1 to 10 petitioners increases the probability of a favorable outcome by 13.8%.
On its own, the diversity of petitioners has a small effect. Including a petitioner from
outside Jakarta (xdiversity petitioner = 1) only increases the probability that the Court will
declare a law unconstitutional by 4.96%. Moreover, this effect is not statistically significant
at conventional levels. The interaction with the number of petitioners does yield interesting
results. As seen in Figure 5.7, for petitions with a smaller number of petitioners, geography
has no effect on case outcomes. As the number of petitioners increases, petitions with at least
one member from outside Jakarta do on average fare better than those with only Jakarta
residents. However, the confidence intervals overlap, reflecting the small number of cases at
higher values. Overall, the results in Table 5.6 suggest that the number of petitioners does
send a signal to the justices about public opinion, but geographic diversity has no effect
(accepting Hypothesis 5.3a, but rejecting Hypothesis 5.3b)
5.3.2 Other Variables
For all of the models in Tables 5.3-5.6, related party (pihak terkait) briefs that oppose
the petition have a negative and significant effect on the probability that the Court will grant
a petition for constitutional review. For example, for model 2 in Table 5.6, adding one related
party statement against the petition decreases the probability of unconstitutionality by 6.6%
(see Figure 5.8). Increasing the number of related party briefs has an even larger effect on
case outcomes; going from 0 to 3 briefs decreases the probability of unconstitutionality by
15.2%. This provides strong evidence for Hypothesis 5.4b in that related parties signal public
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(1) (2) (3)
Case outcome Coefficient % Change Coefficient % Change Coefficient % Change
Petitioners:
# Petitioners [+] 0.548∗∗∗ +14.4% 0.261 +7.79% 0.257 +9.04%
(0.17) (0.17) (0.19)
Diversity [+] -0.425 +0.41% -0.176 +4.96% -0.351 +5.35%
(0.44) (0.46) (0.49)
Number * Diversity [+] 0.338 0.337 0.483
(0.30) (0.30) (0.33)
Related Parties:
Support [+] 0.432 +0.95% -0.047 –0.876%
(0.33) (0.40)
Against [–] -0.564∗ –10.4% -0.596◦ –11.1%
(0.27) (0.32)
Case Attributes:
President brief [–] 1.443∗∗∗ +23.9% 1.331∗∗∗ +22.4%
(0.38) (0.38)
Hearing length [+] 0.953◦ +17.6% 1.172◦ +21.8%
(0.57) (0.62)
Law age [+] -0.093 –1.72% -0.172 –3.20%
(0.12) (0.16)
Complex issue [–] -0.870 +0.04%
(0.25)
Constant -1.666∗∗∗ -6.356∗∗ -6.873∗∗
(0.30) (2.23) (2.57)
Term NO NO YES YES YES YES
Topics NO NO NO NO YES YES
N 460 459 447
Pseudo R2 0.055 0.149 0.182
Model χ2 25.29 60.43 83.64
Table 5.6: Model of Constitutional Case Outcomes with Petitioner Coalition
Variables
◦ p < 0.1, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001. The unit of analysis is each constitutional review case from August 13, 2003
to October 2, 2013. The dependent variable is binary indicating if the Constitutional Court voted for unconstitutionality. The
entries are logit coefficients with robust standard errors in parentheses. Coefficients for topic variables not shown. The
expected direction of the coefficients appears in brackets. Percent change indicates the marginal effect on the dependent
variable of a 0-1 increase in dummy variables or one standard deviation increase in continuous variables, holding all other
variables at their mean or modal values. Marginal effects for number petitioners and diversity represent combined effects for
term both alone and in interaction.
opposition against the petition. By contrast, related party briefs supporting the petition do
not appear to help the petitioners obtain a favorable decision (contrary to Hypothesis 5.4a).
Surprisingly, a statement from the president consistently increases the probability that
the Court declares a law unconstitutional. For example, in model 2 of Table 5.6, filing a
presidential statement increases the probability that the Court will grant a petition by around
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Figure 5.7: Probability of Unconstitutionality vs. Petitioner Coalition
The plots represent the probability that the Constitutional Court will grant a petition/vote for unconstitutionality as a
function of the number of petitioners. Results are taken from model 2 in Table 5.6. All other variables are held at their
means. Dashed lines represent 95% confidence intervals. Note that I only plot values for the bottom-right panel up to x = 31
because none of the petitions with members from outside Jakarta had more than 31 petitioners.
24%! This contradicts much of the judicial politics literature, which argues that judges defer
to the president in order to avoid retaliation or noncompliance. I discuss why presidential
statements might be positively associated with constitutional review in Section 5.5.
Finally, I had tried to capture information about the underlying quality of the petitions
by measuring the length of the transcripts of court proceedings. This variable has a generally
positive and significant effect on the probability that the Constitutional Court grants a
petition for constitutional review, indicating that higher quality petitions are more likely to
succeed. None of the other variables, including the age and topic variables, had a significant
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Figure 5.8: Probability of Unconstitutionality vs. Related Party Briefs
The plots represent the probability that the Constitutional Court will grant a petition/vote for unconstitutionality as a
function of the number of related party briefs. Results are taken from model 2 in Table 5.6. All other variables are held at
their means. Dashed lines represent 95% confidence intervals.
effect on case outcomes.
5.4 Case Narratives
In this section, I discuss examples of individual Constitutional Court cases to explore
how public opinion affects judicial voting behavior, as suggested by the results in Table 5.6.
I begin by discussing how and why Indonesian lawyers form coalitions to submit petitions
to the Court. Next, I examine an elections case in which petitioners used a large coalition
to convince the Court that they represented the public interest. I then briefly look at a case
dealing with blasphemy law to see how related parties can mobilize to counteract a petition.
These cases support my theoretical argument in two critical ways. First, it shows that
the number of petitioners affiliated with a petition is a choice variable, often deliberately
designed to convey signals about public opinion. Second, the decisions suggest that the
justices themselves view the number of petitioners and related party briefs as signals of
public opinion.
In 2013, I interviewed Indonesian lawyers from NGOs and business groups involved
in constitutional litigation in order to understand how they made decisions about forming
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coalitions. Several lawyers expressed the belief that having a larger and more diverse coalition
creates the impression that the petition has widespread public support, or at least that
it represents the public interest. A larger coalition could also create the appearance of
momentum and help NGOs garner media attention.19 NGOs have even brought hundreds
of supporters to attend court proceedings in the belief that doing so would convince the
justices that they had the public on their side.20 In addition, with a larger group, lawyers
could distribute the work and cost of litigation amongst its members.
A 2011 case challenging the appointment of political party members to the General
Election Commission (KPU) provides a useful example of how petitioners can strategically
form coalitions in order to send signals about public opinion. The 2011 Electoral Adminis-
tration Law allowed politicians to join the KPU immediately after resigning from their party
(a previous version of the law had required them to wait five years).21 The petitioners saw
this as an attempt by the parties to expand their influence on the nominally independent
and nonpartisan commission (Butt, 2015, 173). According to several lawyers involved in the
case, the petitioners wanted a large and diverse coalition in order to convey the impression
that the new law sparked widespread public outrage.22 To do this, they recruited 23 NGOs
and 113 individuals to formally sign on to the petition. They also made sure that the coali-
tion included individuals and organizations from different regions of the country, including
22 from Sumatra, four from Bali, three from Sulawesi, and one from Kalimantan, as well as
67 from Java outside of Jakarta.
The Constitutional Court granted the petition, arguing that partisan election commis-
sion members would undermine the credibility of elections and threaten Indonesian democ-
19Subject #17, Interview with staff attorney at Indonesian NGO, Jakarta, Indonesia, November 1, 2013.
20In a 2012 case involving a challenge to a 2004 law on fiscal decentralization, a local NGO from East
Kalimantan brought over a thousand of its supporters to attend the reading of the Court’s decision. The
chairman of the group told reporters, “The move is a form of our support to the panel of judges of the
Constitutional Court to never hesitate to make a decision that gives us justice” (Abdi, 2012).
21Law No. 15 of 2011.
22Subjects #17 & #13, Interviews with attorneys at Indonesian NGO, Jakarta, Indonesia, November 1 &
6, 2013
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racy.23 They decided to impose a ban of five years on party members before they could join
the KPU (effectively reinstating the 2007 Electoral Administration Law). Importantly, the
Court accepted that the petitioners represented the public interest (“kepentingan publik”),
both for the purposes of standing and for its decision on the merits.24 The composition of
the petitioner coalition impressed upon the justices that the petition both represented the
public interest and was representative of the public. It is also worth noting that the justices
did not have a general presumption against appointing party members to independent gov-
ernment institutions; in 2014, they declared that a law disqualifying party members from
appointment to the Constitutional Court unconstitutionally stigmatized party members.25
This provides further evidence that the Court’s ruling in the KPU case was not simply the
result of ideology or firm policy preferences.
While the petitioners can try to signal public support for their case, related parties
can file briefs against the petition to send a countervailing signal against the petition. The
Blasphemy Law case provides an illustrative example. After Reformasi, conservative Islamic
groups lobbied the government to crack down on religious minorities and “profane” behavior,
such as blasphemy. From 1998 to 2011, the government brought at least 47 blasphemy cases
under the 1965 Blasphemy Law, compared to just 10 cases during Suharto’s 33-year reign
(Crouch, 2012, 11). In 2009, a group of eleven NGOs and public intellectuals filed a petition
challenging the constitutionality of the Blasphemy Law. They argued that it discriminated
against religious groups not officially recognized by the state.26 Moreover, the Legal Aid
Organization ran a high-profile advocacy campaign that garnered widespread media coverage
(Crouch, 2016, 4-5).
In response, 18 Islamic NGOs filed related party briefs expressing their support for the
Blasphemy Law. At the time, conservative Muslims worried about the increase in unorthodox
23KPU case, MK Decision No. 81/PUU-IX/2011.
24MK Decision No. 81/PUU-IX/2011, p. 63.
25MK Perpu case, MK Decision No. 1-2/PUU-XII/2014.
26The government only officially recognizes Islam, Protestantism, Catholicism, Hinduism, Buddhism, and
Confucianism.
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Islamic sects, such as Ahmadiyah, and saw the law as a useful way to contain them (Crouch,
2011, 57). The FPI, a radical Islamic group known for vigilantism, claimed that annulling the
Blasphemy Law would threaten national stability because it would undermine the established
religions. Even Nahdlatul Ulama (NU), a more tolerant Islamic organization, expressed its
fear that Indonesia would succumb to inter-religious conflict without the law (Crouch, 2012;
Butt, 2016, 27-28). These groups sought to create the impression that they represented a
powerful mass movement, to frame the case as a war between liberal activists and Islam
(Hasyim, 2016). Some of their members attended oral arguments and chanted “Allahu
Akbar” in support of government witnesses and shouted down the petitioners’ witnesses
(Crouch, 2012, 37). Supporters even protested outside the Constitutional Court building
and held up posters condemning prominent human rights activists (Menchik, 2014, 612).
The Court rejected the petitioners’ arguments, declaring that the law did not prevent
the government from officially recognizing other religions, and thus did not discriminate.27
It also went on to note that, unlike Western countries, the Indonesian Constitution does not
erect a strict separation between church and state.28 However, the most revealing part of
the Court’s decision is that it accepts the related parties’ argument about the link between
religious deviancy and social disorder (Crouch, 2016, 6). The Court’s emphasis on maintain-
ing public order suggests the justices believed declaring the Blasphemy Law unconstitutional
would prove unpopular with large segments of the Muslim population (over 87% of Indone-
sians are Muslim), and likely provoke a negative backlash (Crouch, 2012, 42). In short, by
having a large group of NGOs submit briefs against the petition, the related parties showed
that a sizable segment of the populace – even if only an impassioned minority – supported
the Blasphemy Law.29
This section helped unpack the relationship between the composition of the litigant
27Blasphemy Law case, MK Decision No. 140/PUU-VII/2009.
28MK Decision No. 140/PUU-VII/2009, p. 275.
29The recent prosecution and conviction of former Jakarta Governor Basuki Tjahaja Purnama (“Ahok”),
a Christian, for allegedly citing a verse from the Qur’an shows just how controversial blasphemy remains in
Indonesia (Gee, 2017).
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coalition and outcomes in constitutional litigation. My interviews demonstrated that In-
donesian lawyers view the size of a petitioner coalition as a potential signal to the Constitu-
tional Court about public opinion. Second, the KPU case shows how having a large, diverse
coalition can convince the justices that the petition represents the policy preferences of the
general public. Third, the Blasphemy Law case shows that related parties can counteract a
petition by revealing the presence of significant constituencies opposed the petition. In both
cases, these signals played at least some role in influencing the Court’s decision. Moreover,
in their written opinions, the justices spent considerable time discussing the “public interest”
and “public order,” demonstrating a concern not just for the legal arguments, but also for
the impact of their decisions on the public.
5.5 Discussion
Although scholars who study the Indonesian Constitutional Court have long claimed
that public opinion influences the justices in high-profile cases (see, e.g., Mietzner, 2010),
this chapter is the first empirical tests to provide evidence that it does so over a wide range
of cases. As seen in Table 5.6 and Figure 5.7, the number and diversity of petitioners seem to
consistently increase the probability of success in constitutional litigation (Hypotheses 5.3a
& 5.3b). On the other hand, the number of related party briefs opposing the petition has
a countervailing effect, signaling public opposition to the petition (Hypothesis 5.4b). This
latter result is consistent with the literature on amicus briefs in the U.S., which generally finds
that support from amicus curiae increases the probability of success in court (see Section 6.1
of this dissertation).
If the number and diversity of petitioners do have such an effect on case outcomes, it
is fair to ask why all petitioners would not simply form large coalitions. There are several
possible reasons. First, although the Constitutional Court’s standing rules are relatively
liberal, petitioners must still prove that they suffered a constitutional harm. The petitioners
in the KPU case successfully argued that the health of Indonesian democracy concerned
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all citizens, but the Court has dismissed individual petitioners from cases if it finds that
they did not actually suffer a harm.30 Second, lawyers must balance the benefits of a larger
coalition against the costs. Lawyers I interviewed expressed concern that larger groups tend
to be unwieldy and more difficult to coordinate.31 At worst, different members could work
at cross-purposes. Finally, some lawyers believe that a larger coalition risked triggering a
more aggressive response from the government and other actors opposed to the petition.
For example, several lawyers challenging a 2008 law on wiretapping32 deliberately sought to
maintain a lower profile in order to reduce the risk of confrontation with the the executive.33
One possible concern about my findings is endogeneity. In theory, the number and di-
versity of petitioners could be a function of the probability of winning; if petitioners perceive
some benefit to joining a successful petition, then they should be more likely to join petitions
that they believe will succeed on the merits.34 Ultimately, I believe several factors mitigate
the risk of endogeneity. First, as discussed above, Indonesian lawyers view the composition
of the petitioner coalition as a choice variable. Having a larger, diverse coalition entails
both costs and benefits depending on the circumstances in the case. None of the lawyers I
interviewed advocated simply allowing any interested party to join a petition.
Second, petitioners receive relatively little benefit from being the ith member of a pe-
titioner coalition. As noted in Chapter II, the Constitutional Court’s decisions only apply
prospectively. Unlike a class action suit in the U.S., in which each plaintiff hopes to recoup
monetary damages, the average Indonesian does not have a pecuniary incentive to join the
petition; all Indonesians will enjoy the benefits of any constitutional decision, whether or
30For example, in the PKI case, the Court granted standing to former communists who wished to overturn
the ban on the Communist Party, but denied standing to individuals who had no prior affiliation with the
party. MK Decision No. 11-17/PUU-I/2003.
31Subject #38, Interview with attorney at Indonesian NGO, Jakarta, Indonesia, November 12, 2013.
32Wire-Tapping case, MK Decision No. 5/PUU-VIII/2010.
33Subject #1, Interview with researcher at Indonesian NGO, Jakarta, Indonesia, November 6, 2013. Other
lawyers dismissed this fear, noting that the government almost always responds when a petition challenges
its interests. Subject #13, Interview with attorney at Indonesian NGO, Jakarta, Indonesia, November 6,
2013. Indeed, the president submitted a statement in almost two-thirds of cases adjudicated between August
13, 2003 and October 2, 2013.
34I considered several instrumental variables to overcome this potential endogeneity problem, but none
satisfied the exclusion restriction (i.e., all potential Z had an effect on Y outside of X).
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not they actually sign on to the petition. If anything, the greater risk is that Indonesian
citizens who do want policy change will free ride off the efforts of those willing to invest the
money and resources to pursue constitutional litigation. Some prominent organizations and
individuals might derive a reputational benefit from being associated with a successful peti-
tion, but in most cases the causal relationship is the opposite; petitioners want a prominent
organization/individual to enhance the credibility of their petition.
It is also worth briefly discussing why my models failed to find support for the other
hypotheses. As seen in Table 5.3 and Figure 5.6, elites do not have a systematic advantage
over weaker parties in constitutional litigation contrary to HuMa’s report and Hypothesis
5.1. Also, as seen in Table 5.6, individuals and organizations based in Jakarta do not have
a systematic advantage over those outside Jakarta. Given the weak support for the party
capability theory outside the U.S. (see Section 5.1), these findings are not particularly sur-
prising. Moreover, as noted in Chapter III, having a single court with exclusive jurisdiction
over constitutional claims should mitigate some of the disadvantages weaker parties face
by reducing the costs of litigation, removing the possibility of appeal, and simplifying the
rules of procedure.35 Haynie’s (1994) critique of the party capability theory also applies to
Indonesia; like the Philippine Supreme Court, the Indonesian Constitutional Court avoids
consistently ruling in favor of stronger parties in order to enhance its legitimacy. In fact, as
noted in this chapter and Chapter II, the Court’s decisions often struck a populist, anti-elitist
tone.
It is perhaps more surprising that NGO support for a petition does not increase its
probability of success (contrary to Hypothesis 5.2). Given former Chief Justice Asshidiqie’s
close ties to civil society, I would have expected the Constitutional Court to view claims
from NGOs favorably. One possible explanation is that the justices believe the petitioner’s
coalition and number of related party briefs against the petition are more reliable signals
of public opinion. In other words, despite the fact that NGOs typically claim to represent
35Also, litigants in the Constitutional Court do not need to engage in the “bidding wars” and corruption
that regularly occur in the rest of the Indonesian justice system (Buehler, 2009).
158
the public interest, the justices know they do not always reflect the policy preferences of the
median voter. Moreover, NGOs do not always share the same policy preferences and can
send competing signals. For example, as discussed above, a coalition of progressive NGOs
asked the Court to declare the Blasphemy Law unconstitutional, while a coalition of Islamic
NGOs submitted briefs supporting it. The null finding for NGOs is also important as it
suggests that the justices’ relationship with civil society is not merely based on ideological
kinship.
Despite the fact that the number of related party briefs opposing a petition significantly
decreased its probability of success, related party support for a petition did not significantly
increase the probability that the Constitutional Court would grant it (contrary to Hypothesis
5.4a). One possible explanation is that the signal from these related parties is redundant
because the justices had already received similar information about public support from the
petitioners themselves. Indeed, this finding is consistent with Kearney and Merrill (2000)
and Collins (2004), who find that amicus briefs in the U.S. Supreme Court tend to help
respondents more than petitioners. In other words, related party briefs are more effective at
countering a petition and revealing disagreement than in attempting to show consensus. I
explore this question further in Chapter VI.
5.5.1 Presidential Statements & Public Opinion
As seen in Tables 5.3-5.6, if the president submits a statement opposing the petition,
then the Court is more likely to grant that petition. As noted above, this result is puzzling,
especially given the strategic-institutionalist literature on judicial behavior. One possibility
is that the presence of a presidential brief in an Indonesian constitutional case is highly
correlated with the underlying legal merits of the petition. The president’s lawyers would
be less likely to bother responding to frivolous petitions. I had attempted to control for
the underlying legal merits of each petition by including a variable for the length of oral
arguments, but ultimately I cannot completely capture legal quality using a quantitative
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measure.
Another possibility is that the mere presence or absence of a presidential statement is
not a reliable indicator of political constraints because it fails to account for the intensity
of the president’s preferences. To check this, I reran the model substituting the president
dummy variable with a variable counting the number of words in the president’s state-
ment. In theory, this new variable should capture information about the intensity of the
president’s preferences in each case. Because writing legal briefs takes time and resources,
executive branch lawyers are more likely to draft longer statements in response to petitions
that challenge the executive’s core interests. However, using this new measure does not
change the sign or significance of the results; longer presidential statements are positively
correlated with favorable outcomes for the petitioner (see Appendix C).
Finally, accepting the results at face value, it is possible that the Constitutional Court
accepted or even sought confrontations with the executive branch. Most of the literature
on judicial voting assumes that judges care primarily about policy outcomes, so they try
to avoid issuing decisions that the executive will refuse to implement. However, as I noted
in Section 3.2, judges might have other incentives to rule in favor of a petition even if they
have have legitimate concerns about executive noncompliance. As Hendrianto (2016c) notes,
Indonesia’s two chief justices, Asshidiqie and Mahfud, both had reasons to rule against the
executive branch. Asshidiqie believed he needed to demonstrate the Court’s independence
and relevance by issuing bold decisions in politically salient disputes. Mahfud was considering
running for president and thus sought to elevate his public profile. Thus, at least in some
cases, ruling against the president might have been a goal in and of itself.
Overall, the results for presidential statements, combined with the results for the num-
ber of petitioners, suggest that the Indonesian Constitutional Court responds to public
opinion because of concerns about its institutional legitimacy rather than concerns about
executive noncompliance. If the Court were concerned primarily about executive branch’s
compliance with its judgments, it would have been less likely to grant a petition when it
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received a statement from the president. Instead, as noted above, the opposite proved true.
Moreover, the justices did not try to avoid political confrontations by upholding laws re-
cently passed by the DPR; as seen in Tables 5.3-5.6, they were not significantly less likely
to declare newer laws unconstitutional.
Instead, the Constitutional Court appears to respond to signals about public opinion
because of concerns about its institutional legitimacy. As noted in Section 5.1.1.2, newer
courts in developing democracies cannot rely upon historical goodwill and must develop
their legitimacy over time (Gibson, Caldeira and Baird, 1998). One way to do this is to issue
popular decisions against political elites (Haynie, 1994), which my results indicate is the
approach the justices took. Many of their major decisions, such as the KPU case, involved
populist challenges to elite interests. The justices’ attempts to increase transparency and
access also make sense as steps to improve the Court’s standing with the public. They relaxed
standing rules and waived filing fees in order to make the court more accessible the general
public. Unlike other Indonesian courts, the Constitutional Court has a modern website
that regularly posts decisions and other documents. In addition, Asshidiqie and Mahfud
frequently gave interviews to the media explaining major Court decisions (Hendrianto, 2017;
Faiz, 2017).36 These efforts to bolster the Constitutional Court’s legitimacy have proven at
least partially successful. In a 2005 survey, over 68% of Indonesians who were aware of the
Court approved of its performance, compared to just 11% who disapproved (International
Foundation for Election Systems, 2005, 53).37 As discussed in Chapter II, public opinion
helped thwart several government attempts to constrain the Court.
The Court’s popularity held until October 2013, when the Anticorruption Commission
36Chief Justice Hamdan Zoelva’s efforts to get reappointed for a second term present a fascinating case
study in how the justices can attempt to cultivate popular opinion to erect a buffer between the Court and
the elected branches of government. After he dismissed a petition from losing presidential candidate Prabowo
Subianto in August 2014, Zoelva became a social media star on Twitter. However, President Jokowi refused
to reappoint him to a second term, which was set to expire in January 2015. Zoelva expressed his frustration
on Twitter, hoping to mobilize public opinion to pressure the president. He ultimately failed and left the
Court at the end of his term (Hendrianto, 2017, 22-24).
37Relatively few Indonesians had heard of the Court at this point (just 34%). The Court’s approval ratings
compared favorably with the DPR and Supreme Court, which had net favorability ratings of 23% and 10%,
respectively (International Foundation for Election Systems, 2005, 29).
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arrested Chief Justice Akil Mochtar for bribery. The Court’s approval rating dropped from
65.5% in March 2013 (International Republican Institute, 2013) to just 28% in the week
following Mochtar’s resignation (Warat, 2014). The Court regained some of its popularity
the following summer when it successfully adjudicated a dispute between presidential can-
didates Joko Widodo and Prabowo Subianto, reaching 35.8% (Warat, 2014). My dataset
only covers cases decided before October 2013, but the the aftermath of the scandal suggests
that the relationship between public opinion and the Constitutional Court does not depend
exclusively – or even primarily – on the Court’s handling of individual cases. Although the
public had strong opinions regarding some constitutional issues, no single decision moved
the Court’s approval rating by as much as 37 percentage points. News about the Court’s in-
tegrity or impartiality can have a much larger impact on public opinion than individual case
outcomes. The Mochtar scandal was particularly damaging because corruption has become
a central criterion on which Indonesians judge political institutions.38
5.6 Concluding Remarks
While Chapter IV looked at how petitioners influence the Indonesian Constitutional
Court’s docket, in this chapter I examined the conditions under which those petitions succeed.
I found evidence that the justices are more likely to grant a petition supported by a large
coalition of individuals and/or organizations. By contrast, the justices are less likely to
grant a petition if it is opposed by a large coalition of related parties. My statistical models
confirm the widespread impression of the Court as an institution not beholden to traditional
elites and more responsive to the general public. Litigants with access to more resources do
not have a systematic advantage over weaker ones in constitutional litigation. Moreover, as
noted by Butt (2015, 38) and others, the justices do not demonstrate deference toward the
president or DPR. In fact, the Court is more likely to grant a petition if the president issued
38According to surveys of Indonesian voters, corrupt behavior is the most important reason disqualifying
a political candidate (International Foundation for Election Systems, 2010, 22).
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a statement opposing it.
This chapter contributes to – and sometimes challenges – the broader literature on
judicial voting behavior in three ways. First, I found no support for the party capability
theory, adding to the growing consensus that it does not hold true for litigation outside
the U.S. Second, my results suggest that judges do respond to signals regarding public
opinion. This result is consistent with the work of Mishler and Sheehan (1993), Barnum
(1985), Calvin, Collins and Eshbaugh-Soha (2011), and Friedman (2009), all of which find
that judicial decisions track and are even informed by public opinion. However, I disagree
with the literature about the precise mechanism through which public opinion influences
judges. Most scholars posit that judges pay attention to public opinion because the public
can moderate the response of the elected branches of government (see, e.g., Vanberg, 2005;
Friedman, 2009). Instead, my results suggest that the justices seem to view public support
as important regardless of the president’s response. In other words, the Court strategically
decided cases in order to build its independence and legitimacy. Ultimately, I confirm former
Chief Justice Jimly Asshidiqie’s intuition that the Court is indeed more responsive to NGOs
and public opinion than to pressure from the other branches of government.
The positive effect of presidential briefs on case outcomes presents a particularly im-
portant challenge to the existing literature. The Indonesian Constitutional Court represents
what should have been an “easy case” for scholars looking for evidence that judges strate-
gically defer to the executive. The justices serve short, renewable terms and have relatively
few institutional protections against the other branches of government. However, not only
do justices not defer to the executive, they are actually more likely to rule in favor of a
petition if the president expresses opposition. To my knowledge, this is a unique finding in
the literature; no other study of judicial behavior has found a court more likely to declare
a law unconstitutional if the executive branch supports that law. In the previous section, I
provided several possible explanations for this result. At the very least, the findings suggest
the need for more research into the conditions under which political institutions constrain
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judges.
In assessing the generalizability of my results, two features of the Indonesian Constitu-
tional Court are particularly important. First, the Court’s lax standing doctrine means that
standing rules play less of a role in filtering out cases from the general public. The petitions
and related party briefs that do reach the Court should on average be more representative of
the broader public, and thus more reliable signals of public opinion, compared to countries
with stricter standing rules.
Second, Indonesia’s first two chief justices were both political savvy leaders who strongly
believed that the Court should play an active role in checking the government (Hendrianto,
2016c). Although my dataset covers the brief term of Akil Mochtar (April-October 2013), it
does not cover the later chief justices, who lacked the charisma of Asshiddiqie and Mahfud.
As such, it is not clear if the decade my dataset covers represents an aberration or a set-
tled political equilibrium. Indeed, the Court has become less likely to grant petitions since
Mochtar resigned; as seen in Table 2.4, during 2003-2013, the Court granted approximately
28.9% of petitions, but during 2014-2016 that number fell to 22.4% (see also SETARA,
2015, noting a decline in rulings for petitioners). I discuss the implication of these trends in
Chapter VII.
As noted in Chapter IV, much of the literature on judicial behavior focuses exclusively
on judicial voting. In this chapter, I addressed that literature directly using data from
Indonesia. However, voting to accept or reject a petition is only part of the adjudication
process. Judges also have to provide written justifications for their votes. The Court’s
reasoning can be as important as the final declaration of unconstitutionality because the
text of the decision becomes a source of law. Litigants often want judges to accept their
specific legal arguments as a way to influence the application of legal doctrine in future cases.
In the next chapter of this dissertation (Chapter VI), I look at how litigants use their briefs
to influence the text of judicial decisions.
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CHAPTER VI
Credible Information
In Chapter IV, I looked at how NGOs influence the agenda of the Indonesian Con-
stitutional Court by filing petitions. In Chapter V, I demonstrated that public opinion –
as represented by the number of petitioners and related party briefs – affects the proba-
bility that the Court grants a petition. In this chapter, I focus on one specific mechanism
through which briefs can influence judicial decisions: the text. In most countries, the text
of a constitutional court decision constitutes binding law, so influencing the contents of the
opinion could ultimately shape legal doctrine. I use a plagiarism-detection software called
WCopyfind in order to determine the extent to which the text in Indonesian briefs influences
the text of the Constitutional Court’s written opinions.
Other scholars have started to use plagiarism-detection software to study the effect
of briefs on judicial decisions (see, e.g., Collins, 2007; Collins, Corley and Hamner, 2014),
but my approach differs from the existing literature in two crucial ways. First, my study
focuses on the extent to which judges view a litigant’s identity as a signal of the credibility
of information in its brief. Most of the literature focuses on other signals of credibility, such
as the extent to which amicus briefs repeat information from other briefs (see Section 6.1).
Second, I build and test an argument about why Indonesian Constitutional Court justices
might view briefs submitted by NGOs as more credible than briefs submitted by other types
of litigants.
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In Section 6.1 of this chapter, I begin with a short review of the literature about the
effect of legal briefs on written judicial opinions. I also present a set of testable hypotheses.
Next, in Section 6.2, I explain my data and the plagiarism-detection software I use. I then
present my results in Section 6.3, finding that the Constitutional Court’s final opinion is
more likely to incorporate text from petitions submitted by NGOs than from other types of
petitioners. In Section 6.4, I discuss a constitutional challenge to the privatization of the
natural gas sector, which helps illustrate how and why the Court might find petitions from
NGOs more credible or persuasive. Finally, in Sections 6.5 and 6.6, I discuss my results and
the broader implications for the literature.
6.1 Theory
Lawyers spend considerable time and effort trying to persuade judges to cite their briefs
because the judicial opinions of most constitutional courts – as well as ordinary courts in
common law systems – constitute binding sources of law. However, there is relatively little
research on when and why judges incorporate text from briefs instead of using their own
language. In this section, I review the literature about judicial citations or quotation of
briefs. I focus on the extent to which party identity serves as a signal to the court about the
credibility of the brief. This literature is related to, and in some cases directly builds upon,
the literature review in Section 5.1 of Chapter V. I then present a set of testable hypotheses
regarding text in petitions and related party (pihak terkait) briefs before the Indonesian
Constitutional Court.
6.1.1 Literature Review
In most jurisdictions, judges are required to adjudicate disputes relying solely upon
the information presented to them by the parties and amicus curiae, if any. Unlike the
legislative and executive branches, which have staff to conduct research on policy issues and
can call upon independent experts, judges cannot – and lack the capacity to – conduct their
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own research into the facts or the policy implications of a case. A court’s research capacity
is typically limited to researching the law, jurisprudence, and legal doctrine. Compared
to other policymakers, judges are limited in their sources of information. This creates an
information asymmetry problem as judges are extremely dependent upon the quality of the
information contained in the briefs and do not check the underlying sources (see Larsen,
2014).1
Judges are thus faced with the question of when to cite or quote information from a
brief. Judges are expected to engage with the arguments of the parties, but they are not
required to directly quote language from briefs, especially briefs submitted by non-litigants
(i.e., amicus curiae). There are several reasons judges they might do so. First, judges might
quote a legal argument that they find particularly persuasive or well explained (Collins,
Corley and Hamner, 2015, 921-22). Second, they might cite information from experts about
the legal, policy, economic, or scientific implications of a law rather than attempting to
explain it themselves. Finally, judges might cite briefs simply to minimize the time and
effort spent on any given case (Corley, Collins and Calvin, 2011). In each of these scenarios,
judges must assess the credibility and quality of a brief before deciding whether or not to
cite it. Judges are more likely to cite briefs that they believe to be credible or informative.
That said, it is important to note that credibility does not necessarily guarantee a favorable
outcome; the justices might well accept a brief’s factual allegations and take the litigant’s
arguments seriously, but ultimately rule against them.
The identity of a party engaging in litigation can send a signal to the court about the
credibility of its brief (see Kearney and Merrill, 2000, 749-50).2 Judges might have prior
beliefs about the credibility of some parties, and thus be more willing to trust information
1This problem is not merely theoretical; a recent study of U.S. Supreme Court decisions between 2011-
2015 found that around 8% of them contained material errors of fact, including several that might have
affected the outcome of the case (Gabrielson, 2017).
2Another solution to the information asymmetry problem is the reputation of the attorney representing
the party. There is some evidence that U.S. judges view an attorney’s reputation as a signal of credibility
(McGuire and Caldeira, 1993; McGuire, 1995; Corley, 2008). Unfortunately, I lack sufficient information
about the reputation of Indonesian attorneys who appeared before the Constitutional Court to test this
proposition in my dissertation.
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contained in their briefs. For example, in the U.S., the Supreme Court views the Solicitor
General as a particularly trusted source, with some scholars even referring to the position
as a de facto “tenth justice” (Chandler, 2011). Indeed, for the 2010-2011 term, the U.S.
Supreme Court cited 79% of amicus briefs submitted by the Solicitor General (Anderson
and Franze, 2011). By contrast, NGOs proved far less influential; only 8% of the 628 amicus
briefs submitted by NGOs during that term were cited, while the Court cited NGO amicus
briefs in only 40% of its decisions. However, NGOs with a reputation for high-quality legal
analysis, such as the American Civil Liberties Union, proved far more successful and were
even cited in multiple cases (Lynch, 2004, 49-56).3
Information asymmetry becomes especially problematic in cases dealing with complex
policy or technical issues. Most judges are generalists, not specialists; they must adjudicate
many different types of legal disputes (see Legomsky, 1990). Judges do not always have the
knowledge to determine the reliability of information in subject areas outside their expertise.
In such circumstances, party identity can serve as a signal of credibility. If a party, such as a
prominent NGO or academic expert, possesses a reputation for policy or technical expertise,
judges might prefer to quote their briefs directly rather than attempt to explain the issue in
their own words. The little empirical research we do have on this question is inconclusive.
It does appear that organized interest groups are more likely to submit amicus briefs in low-
information, high complexity cases (Hansford, 2004), but there is no evidence that judges
are more likely to cite their briefs in complex cases (see Corley, 2008, 474).4
The amount of political or moral capital a litigant possesses can also affect its reputa-
tion, and thus the court’s propensity to cite its brief. For example, the U.S. Supreme Court’s
decision in Grutter v. Bollinger extensively quoted a brief submitted by a group of retired
high-ranking U.S. military officers in support of affirmative action. The fact that a respected
3But see Salamone (2014), which finds that the four U.S. Supreme Court justices who were members
of the Federalist Society were not significantly more likely to quote amicus briefs submitted by Federalist
Society members.
4Another solution to the information asymmetry problem is for courts to issue evidentiary rules governing
the conditions under which they will accept scientific evidence as credible (e.g., Nardi, 2008b).
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institution not traditionally identified with progressive policy preferences nevertheless sup-
ported the policy lent credence to the respondent’s claims (see Leach, 2004). Bryant (2008)
argues that moral capital is particularly important for NGOs because a “good reputation”
can help it obtain donor funding, increase membership, and influence policy debates. When
NGOs engage in constitutional litigation, they claim to do so in order to advance the public
interest, not for a pecuniary reward or to political office. As such, judges might view NGOs as
having reputational incentives to provide the court with accurate and credible information.
In theory, the relative strength and capability of the parties engaged in litigation could
affect the extent to which judges cite their briefs. Galanter (1974) argues that parties
with greater access to legal resources, such as better lawyers, are more likely to obtain
favorable outcomes in litigation. However, as noted in Chapter V, there is little evidence
that party capability plays a determinative role in litigation outside the U.S. (see Dotan,
1999; Smyth, 2000; Flemming and Krutz, 2002; Haynie and Sill, 2007; Hanretty, 2013b).
The party resources theory seems particularly inappropriate in explaining why judges cite
briefs from non-litigants. Non-litigants generally do not have a direct stake in the case and
thus do not expect to bear the primarily financial burden of litigation. Indeed, according to
Songer, Kuersten and Kaheny (2000), U.S. amicus briefs seem to provide more support to
parties that are one-shot players and “have-nots” as opposed to repeat players and “haves.”
This suggests that amicus briefs level the playing field rather than enhance the position of
more powerful litigants.
One prominent debate in the literature focuses on the extent to which non-litigant briefs
provide unique information/arguments as opposed to simply repeating information/arguments
already presented by the parties. On the one hand, non-litigants could maximize the infor-
mation value of their briefs by raising new arguments or providing information that the
judges have not already received.5 Non-litigants are often uniquely positioned to advance
arguments that the parties themselves cannot or chose not to include in their briefs, such
5Indeed, Rule 37.1 of the U.S. Supreme Court invites amici to raise matters not already included in the
appellant and respondent’s briefs.
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as the policy or ethical implications of a lawsuit (Epstein, 1993). Moreover, the preferences
of non-litigants do not always overlap exactly with those of the litigants, and amicus briefs
allow them to nudge the court closer to their ideal point. On the other hand, by repeating
information contained in the parties’ briefs, non-litigant briefs can reinforce their credibility;
seeing the same information from multiple sources helps convince judges that it is reliable
(see Arkes, Hackett and Boehm, 1989; Boehm, 1994).
Several studies of amicus curiae briefs in U.S. litigation confirm that most do contain at
least some new information (Spriggs and Wahlbeck, 1997; Collins, 2007). Collins, Corley and
Hamner (2014) use the plagiarism-detection software WCopyfind to measure the similarity
between briefs and find that the language in amicus briefs rarely repeated the same infor-
mation as other briefs in the case. Despite this, the most effective amicus briefs were those
that did repeat information from other briefs. Spriggs and Wahlbeck (1997) find that the
U.S. Supreme Court was more likely to cite and accept arguments from amicus briefs that
reiterated arguments from the parties’ briefs. Collins, Corley and Hamner (2015, 920-21)
reach a similar conclusion; using WCopyfind, they find the Court was more likely to quote
language from amicus briefs that repeat information contained in other briefs.
The Indonesian Constitutional Court seems especially likely to view litigant identity as
a signal of credibility. As discussed in Chapter II, several of the justices had close ties to civil
society groups. Chief Justice Jimly Asshidiqie invited NGOs to review laws for constitutional
defects and file challenges with the Court.6 He also recruited lawyers and activists from
NGOs to work at the Court as research assistants and staff.7 Given this familiarity, the
justices and staff have more reason to trust NGOs than individuals or organizations with
which they have less direct experience. In fact, many of the justices shared the progressive
policy preferences of the NGO community,8 making them more likely to give more credence
6Subject #19, Interview with attorney at Indonesian NGO, Jakarta, Indonesia, July 20, 2012.
7Subject #32, interview with former justice, Jakarta, Indonesia, November 21, 2013.
8According to one lawyer familiar with the Court, during the first term the progressive faction held a
majority over the conservative justices. By the second term, all of the justices were progressives. Subject
#28, interview with former Constitutional Court staff attorney, Jakarta, Indonesia, July 20, 2012.
170
information from groups already aligned with their worldview. Thus, even if the Court does
not always accept the legal arguments proposed by NGOs, the justices are more likely to
treat them as worthy of their attention.
6.1.2 Hypotheses
In this section, I present a set of hypotheses about the conditions under which the
Indonesian Constitutional Court adopts text from petitions, government statements, and
related party briefs. The party capability theory predicts that stronger parties are more
likely to submit high-quality briefs that get cited by the Court because they have greater
access to legal resources. This leads to the first hypothesis:
Hypothesis 6.1 (Litigant Strength): The Constitutional Court’s written
opinion is more likely to adopt text from briefs submitted by relatively stronger
litigants than from briefs submitted by relatively weaker litigants.
In other words, the justices are more likely to quote briefs submitted governments and
corporations than those submitted by NGOs or individuals.
As discussed above, the justices will likely view some types of litigants as inherently
more credible than others. In particular, several justices on the Constitutional Court, includ-
ing the first two chiefs, had close ties with civil society groups. Moreover, NGOs typically
develop policy expertise in a specific field of law. Even if the Court disagrees with their
arguments, it should still be more likely to find them credible and worth discussing at length
in its final opinion. This leads to the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 6.2 (NGOs): The Constitutional Court’s written opinion is more
likely to adopt text from briefs submitted by NGOs than from briefs submitted
by other types of litigants.
This hypothesis applies to both petitions and related party briefs submitted by NGOs,
although I do not predict if one effect will be larger than the other.
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Another signal of credibility is public support. The justices might be more likely to
treat a brief as credible if they believe that it has the support of the general public. As with
repetition in amicus briefs, validation from multiple independent sources can help reassure
judges about the credibility of the brief. As discussed in Chapter V, one observable signal of
public support – at least for judges in a low-information environment – is the number and
diversity of individuals and/or organizations that sign onto the brief. This leads to the final
hypotheses:
Hypothesis 6.3a (Litigant Number): The Constitutional Court’s written
opinion is more likely to adopt text from briefs submitted by a larger number of
individuals and/or organizations than from briefs submitted by smaller coalitions.
Hypothesis 6.3b (Litigant Diversity): The Constitutional Court’s written
opinion is more likely to adopt text from briefs submitted by a more diverse
coalition of litigants than from briefs submitted by less diverse coalitions.
In other words, the more individuals/organizations vouch for a brief, the less likely there
exists other individuals/organizations that would consider its contents unreliable or false.
These hypotheses potentially apply to both petitioners and related parties.
6.2 Methodology & Data
Although a written judicial decision is important both for explaining the court’s rea-
soning and as a binding source of law, we know relatively little about when and why judges
decide to incorporate text from briefs into their opinions. One reason is because, until rela-
tively recently, it was impractical to quantitatively assess the similarity between all texts in a
large corpus. With plagiarism-detection software, such as WCopyfind, we can now calculate
the percentage of text in a legal brief that is similar or identical to text in a court’s written
decision (Collins, Corley and Hamner, 2014). In this section, I describe my data and how
I compare documents using WCopyfind. I also describe the statistical models I use to test
the hypotheses presented in the previous section.
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6.2.1 Data & Measurement: WCopyfind
The primary data for this chapter are the written briefs in each Constitutional Court
case between August 13, 2003 and October 2, 2013 (the terms of the first three chief justices).
The unit of analysis is the brief, either petitions, government statements, or related party
briefs. During this time, the Court received 560 petitions, but several were withdrawn before
the Court reached final written decision on the merits. For the remaining 460 cases, the Court
received 483 petitions, 249 written statements from the president, 243 written statements
from the legislature (DPR), 62 briefs from related parties in support of the petition, and
141 briefs from related parties against the petition.9 Only around 20% of cases received any
submissions from related parties.
I use WCopyfind to compare each brief with the Constitutional Court’s decision and
all other briefs in the same case. WCopyfind was originally developed to detect plagiarism
in college papers, but has since been used in studies of amicus briefs in the U.S. (Collins,
Corley and Hamner, 2015), policy diffusion amongst states (Hinkle, 2015), and Senate press
releases (Grimmer, 2010). The program systematically searches through strings of text in
two documents to find matches. The user can set the minimum string length to a certain
number of words such that WCopyfind will only report phrases at least that long. WCopyfind
then reports the total number of matching words, as well as the number of matched words
as a percentage of the total number of words in the document.10
I adopt the WCopyfind settings used by Collins, Corley and Hamner (2015), but de-
viate in two important ways. First, they use the default setting, which sets the shortest
string of words to match at six; allows up to two non-matching words in a phrase (“imper-
fections”); and only requires 80% of a phrase to contain a perfect match.11 They tolerate
some imperfections because one document might refer to information in another without
9Note that there is some missingness as some documents were not in the case files. Also, a handful
government statements were presented orally during court hearings rather than in writing.
10For more, see WCopyfind instructions at http://plagiarism.bloomfieldmedia.com/.
11I also turn off the default settings for ignoring letter case, numbers, outer punctuation, and nonwords.
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directly quoting it or using the same language (i.e., paraphrasing). I chose a more conser-
vative threshold of ten words with no imperfections (i.e., only perfect matches). Compared
to English, Indonesian is a relatively sparse language with a smaller vocabulary and fewer
synonyms.12 This increases the risk of false positives because two documents addressing the
same issue could coincidentally end up using similar language. In other words, the Court
could use language similar to that in a brief even if the justices did not actually intend to
cite or quote that brief. The higher threshold for WCopyfind matches should reduce the risk
of false positives.
Second, Collins, Corley and Hamner (2015) use the proportion of text in the decision
that matches text in the brief. This measure is problematic because it is not independent of
the length of the documents. All else equal, a court is more likely to quote more text from
a longer brief than a shorter one, so their measure is likely biased in favor of longer briefs.
Moreover, the proportion of a judicial decision matching a brief depends upon the length of
the decision. For example, if the Court receives a large number of related party briefs, it
will have to allocate proportionately less text to summarizing each brief. Instead, I use the
proportion of text in the brief – petition or related party – that matches text in the written
judicial decision as my dependent variable. For each brief, I found the number of matching
words and then divided by the total number of words in that brief. This effectively measures
how much of the brief was “quoted” or “cited” by the court, i.e. how informative the judges
found the brief.13
In Figure 6.1, I plot the average proportion of text from each type of brief that matches
text in the Constitutional Court’s written opinion in that case. Overall, the Court adopted
just under 48% of the text of the average brief in its opinion. At first glance, this number
12As a point of comparison, the Oxford English Dictionary contains 252,200 entries, whereas the Great Dic-
tionary of the Indonesian Language of the Language Center, the Department of Education’s official dictionary,
contains around 90,000 entries. See http://public.oed.com/history-of-the-oed/dictionary-facts/
and https://kbbi.kemdikbud.go.id.
13This measure is not completely independent of the length of the brief because longer briefs are more
likely to have substantive text worth quoting. However, there is less risk of substantial inferential error
than with Collins, Corley and Hamner’s (2015) measure, which also depends upon the length of the judicial
decision and all other briefs submitted in the case.
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seems extremely high. However, the Indonesian Constitutional Court summarizes almost all
of the briefs it receives. Thus, at least some of the matched text comes from these sections.
Figure 6.1 also shows that the Court is much more likely to adopt text from statements
submitted by the president (61%) or DPR (55%) than other types of briefs. The Court
adopts text from petitions at around the same rate as the overall average (43.8%). This
makes sense as petitions constitute the majority of documents in the corpus. Finally, the
Court is much less likely to adopt text from related party briefs.
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Figure 6.1: Similarity between Briefs and Constitutional Court Decisions
WCopyfind was used to calculate the similarity between each brief and the Constitutional Court’s decision in that same case.
If there were more than two briefs in the case, the average was used. The histogram shows the average percentage of text in
each type of brief similar to the text in the Court’s decision. Bars represent 95% confidence intervals.
6.2.2 Empirical Strategy: Fractional Logit
To test my hypotheses, I use a fractional logit model. Fractional logit is a quasi-
likelihood method estimated as a generalized linear model (Collins, Corley and Hamner,
2015), which accounts for the fact that the dependent variable – the percentage of the brief
quoted in the written judicial opinion – is a proportion bounded from 0 to 1. To account for
unobserved effects of the Constitutional Court’s leadership on the court’s proclivity to quote
briefs, I use a fixed-effects model grouped by the chief justice who presided over each case
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(Jimly Asshidiqie, Mohammad Mahfud, or Akil Mochtar). I also cluster standard errors by
docket number to account for unobserved heterogeneity between cases because some cases
received more than one petition or related party brief. I again conducted a diagnosis using
Cook’s method to identify highly influential cases, but as in Chapter V ultimately decided
against removing outliers.
To test the hypotheses from Section 6.1.2, I used the same coding scheme as in Sec-
tion 4.2 of Chapter IV (see also Appendix A) to classify each petitioner/related party as one of
the following: 1) individual unaffiliated with any organization; 2) political party/candidate;
3) nongovernmental organization; 4) private business/corporation; 5) local government in-
stitution; or 6) national government institution. I then used this information to create four
different measures of litigant identity. First, I ranked the litigant types from 1 to 6 in order
to create an ordinal measure of party resources, with individuals being the weakest type and
national government the strongest. If a brief has more than one individual/organization at-
tached to it, I rank it based on the strongest party associated with it. In Table 6.1, I provide
summary statistics for each category. Although the Court is more likely to adopt text from
briefs submitted by governments, the overall rate of adoption is not clearly correlated with
party strength, providing preliminary evidence against Hypothesis 6.1.
Party Strength ≥ 1 2 3 4 5 6 Total
Number of Petitions 195 95 114 30 38 11 483
% Text Adopted 41% 47% 48% 40% 43% 47% 44%
Table 6.1: Summary Statistics of Party Resources Variable
Second, I created a dummy variable for each category of litigant, with xidentity typei = 1
if at least one of that type officially signed on to the brief. I also counted the number of each
type of litigant associated the brief. In Table 6.2, I provide summary statistics of the types
of petitioners involved in each case. This provides preliminary support for Hypothesis 6.2
in that the Court is more likely to adopt text from briefs submitted by NGOs than those
submitted by other types of litigants.
Finally, counted the total number of litigants associated with the brief and interacted
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Individual Political NGO Business Local gov. National gov. Total
Number of Cases 266 117 129 30 39 11 483
Number of Petitioners 1204 845 473 98 103 11 2734
% Text Adopted 44% 47% 48% 40% 42% 47% 44%
Number of Cases 9 16 78 20 37 46 206
Number of Related Parties 41 16 81 21 48 46 253
% Text Adopted 20% 29% 24% 32% 30% 40% 32%
Table 6.2: Summary Statistics of Litigant Identity Variables
that variable with a dummy for geographic diversity, for which xdiversity = 1 if at least one
of the litigants resided outside Jakarta. As noted in Chapter V, there are still considerable
differences between Jakarta and the rest of the country. As seen in Figure 6.2, there is a
small correlation between the size of the petitioner coalition and proportion of text matching
that of the Court’s decision. This provides provides preliminary support for Hypotheses 6.4a
& 6.4b in that the Court is more likely to adopt text from briefs submitted by a larger and
more diverse group of litigants.
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Figure 6.2: Histogram of Number and Diversity of Litigants
The plot represent the log of the proportion of text that the Constitutional Court adopted from a brief as a function of the
number of individuals and/or organizations associated with that brief. The log was transformed to avoid taking the log of 1.
Bars represent 95% confidence intervals.
In each model, I include a dummy variable to see if judges are more likely to cite
from briefs in cases dealing with complex issues. As in Chapter V, I follow Vanberg
(2005) by coding economic, socioeconomic rights, or environmental law as complex issues
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(complex issue = 1). Other issues, such as elections, government processes, the legal system,
and human rights, are considered “not complex” because these issues are easier for the public
to understand and monitor (complex issue = 0). If the justices are more likely to cite briefs
in complex cases, then a change from 0 to 1 should increase the proportion of text cited.
As an alternative measure of legal issues, I used a latent topic model to obtain infor-
mation about the percentage of text in each brief associated with each topic. For petitions,
I simply used the results of my topic model from Chapter IV (see Section 4.2). For related
parties, I developed a new topic model using the same parameters, but with 14 topics. The
results, as well as labels for each topic, are included in Appendix D. I dropped several
topics in the fractional logit models because they covered information not relevant to legal
arguments/information, such as the addresses of the individuals associated with the brief,
as well as because of collinearity with other variables.14 I exclude the dummy variable for
issue complexity when I add the latent topic variables.
To test the effect of repetition in non-litigant briefs, I used WCopyfind to create three
variables that measure the similarity between each related party brief and other briefs in the
same case. The first variable measures the average proportion of each related party brief
that matches text in other related party briefs in the same case that take the same stance
towards the petition. For example, if a related party brief supports the petitioner, then
the variable would indicate the average proportion of text matching all other related party
briefs that also support the petition. The second variable measures the proportion of text in
each related party brief that matches text in the petition. The third variable measures the
proportion of text in each related party brief that matches text in the presidential statement,
if any. If the justices are more likely to cite related party briefs that repeat information from
other briefs as opposed to presenting new information, then those briefs should contain more
text that matches the Court’s final decision.
I then interact each of these three variables with a dummy indicating whether that
14Topics 3, 15, and 16 for petitions, and Topics 3 and 7 for related parties.
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particular related party supported or opposed the petition. I do this because I expect
differential effects for those related party briefs that support a petition versus those that
oppose it. It also helps capture information about the context of matching text. If a related
party brief supporting the petition contains a high proportion of text that matches the
petition, any such similarity likely indicates favorable treatment of the petitioner’s argument.
I also include several control variables in the models. Because longer briefs contain
more text, there is a higher chance the Court will find some portion of text that it decides to
adopt in its decision. As such, I control for length with a variable that takes the log of the
total number of words in the brief (length). There is also a possibility that the Court will
generally be more inclined to adopt text from briefs in some cases than others. To account for
this proclivity to cite on a case-by-case basis, I include a variable measuring the proportion of
the DPR statement – if any – in the case matching text in the Court’s decision (DPR text).
If the Court extensively quotes the DPR statement, it should also be more likely to cite
other briefs as well. I include a dummy variable indicating if the Court ultimately decided
to grant the petition in case (case outcome) because the justices might believe they need to
provide a more thorough justification for a decision declaring a law unconstitutional than
for a decision upholding a law. For models in which I focus on petitions, I include a variable
containing the length of the transcripts of court proceedings as a proxy for the legal quality
of the petition (hearing length). As I argued in Chapter V, constitutional claims that have
more merit should require more consideration, including longer hearings to consider evidence
and hear arguments.
6.3 Results
In Tables 6.3-6.7, I present the results of my models for matching text in judicial
decisions and briefs. The expected direction/sign (if any) for each independent variable is
indicated in brackets. The first model in each table includes only the primary independent
variable(s), the second model adds controls, and the third incorporates the latent topic
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variables. For each model, I also show the marginal effect for each independent variable,
holding all other variables at their means. I focus first on petitions and then address related
party briefs in a separate section.
6.3.1 Petitioners
(1) (2) (3)
% Similar Coefficient % Change Coefficient % Change Coefficient % Change
Petitioners:
Party Strength [+] 0.033 +0.85% 0.024 +0.58% 0.064◦ +1.56%
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Brief Attributes:
Length [+] 0.356∗ +8.77% 0.348∗ +8.55%
(0.16) (0.16)
Complex issue [+] -0.150◦ –3.70%
(0.09)
Case Attributes:
Case Outcome [+] 0.019 +0.48% -0.001 –0.02%
(0.09) (0.09)
DPR Text [+] 0.539∗∗∗ +0.13% 0.518∗∗∗ +0.13%
(0.14) (0.14)
Hearing length [+] -0.002 –0.05% 0.019 +0.48%
(0.12) (0.12)
Constant -0.325∗∗∗ -1.493∗ -1.564∗
(0.08) (0.63) (0.89)
Term NO NO YES YES YES YES
Topics NO NO NO NO YES YES
N 483 482 482
Pseudo R2 0.000 0.013 0.032
Model χ2 1.16 46.53 113.21
Table 6.3: Model of Similarity between Petitions and Judicial Opinions with Party
Strength Variables
◦ p < 0.1, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001. The unit of analysis is each petition in each case that resulted in a final
decision from August 13, 2003 to October 2, 2013. The dependent variable is the percentage of words from the petition that
matches the final decision according to WCopyfind. The model is a fractional logit indicating that the dependent variable is a
percentage ranging from 0 to 1. Coefficients for topic variables not shown. The expected direction of the coefficients appears
in brackets. Percent change indicates the marginal effect on the dependent variable of a 0-1 increase in dummy variables or
one standard deviation increase in continuous variables, holding all other variables at their mean or modal values.
To test the party resources/capacity theory, I estimated the following model:
Prob(textpetition = textdecision) = β1 + β2 party strength + βi controls +  (6.1)
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, where β2 should be positive if greater access to legal resources increases the probability
that the Court quotes text from a petition. Table 6.3 presents the results of this model. The
estimated effect of party strength is consistently positive across all three models, indicating
that the Constitutional Court is more likely to adopt text from stronger petitioners, such as
the national government. However, the effect is only significant in model 3, suggesting the
possibility of bias due to collinearity with one of the controls. Moreover, the marginal effect
of the variable only increases significantly in going from an individual petitioner (level 1) to
political party (level 2); it does not increase significantly for values above 2. As such, the
evidence for Hypothesis 6.1 is weak, at best; it appears that having greater access to legal
resources does not increase the probability that the justices will quote or cite text from a
petition.
Next, I look at how party identity affects the amount of text that the Constitutional
Court adopts from a petition. If the Court believes that some types of parties are more
credible than others, it should be more likely to quote their briefs. Figure 6.3 depicts
the differences between means for each type of petitioner. Each row indicates the average
proportion of text from petitions that included at least one of that party type minus the
average proportion of text from all other petitions. As seen in the second row, the Court
is significantly more likely to adopt text from petitions supported by NGOs. This suggests
that the justices view NGOs as having higher levels of credibility.
To better measure the credibility effect of party identity, I estimated the following
model:
Prob(textpetition = textdecision) = β1 + β2 NGO + β3 nat. gov. + β4 local gov.
+ β5 political party + β6 business + βi controls + 
(6.2)
, where β2 should be positive if the Constitutional Court is more likely to to adopt text from
petitions submitted by NGOs. Table 6.4 presents the results of this model using dummy
variables for each type of petitioner. Even after controlling for other features in the case, the
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Figure 6.3: Similarity between Petitions and Judicial Opinions
WCopyfind was used to calculate the similarity between each petition and the Constitutional Court’s decision in that same
case. The plot shows the difference in means for each type of petitioner. A positive number indicates greater similarity with
judicial decisions, while a negative number indicates less similarity. Bars represent 95% confidence intervals.
Court is still more likely to adopt text from petitions submitted by NGOs. If a petition has
the support of at least one NGO, the proportion of the text adopted increases from around
42% to 47.5% – a difference of almost six percentage points.
Table 6.5, which uses the number of each type of petitioner supporting a petition,
likewise shows that the proportion of text matching the Court’s written opinion is higher
for petitions supported by a larger group of NGOs. Moreover, the magnitude of the effect
grows larger as the number of NGOs increases. I plot the marginal effects in Figure 6.4.
The largest change comes from the addition of a single NGO (around 3%). After that initial
jump, the marginal effect of each additional NGO decreases. If the number of NGOs in a
petition increases from 1 to 2, the proportion of text that the Court adopts from the petition
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(1) (2) (3)
% Similar Coefficient % Change Coefficient % Change Coefficient % Change
Petitioners:
NGO [+] 0.266∗∗ +6.56% 0.211∗ +5.19% 0.219∗ +5.39%
(0.10) (0.11) (0.11)
National gov. [+] 0.160 +3.95% 0.071 +1.74% 0.075 +1.85%
(0.26) (0.25) (0.30)
Local gov. [+] -0.064 –1.58% -0.051 –1.26% 0.148 +3.63%
(0.15) (0.15) (0.15)
Political party [?] 0.215∗ +5.29% 0.191◦ +4.69% 0.193 +4.75%
(0.10) (0.10) (0.12)
Business [?] -0.121 –2.98% -0.134 –3.30% 0.129 +3.17%
(0.20) (0.20) (0.20)
Brief Attributes:
Length [+] 0.308◦ +7.58% 0.325◦ +7.99%
(0.17) (0.17)
Complex issue [+] -0.119 –2.93%
(0.10)
Case Attributes:
Case Outcome [+] 0.028 +0.69% 0.013 +0.31%
(0.09) (0.09)
DPR Text [+] 0.544∗∗∗ +0.13% 0.528∗∗∗ +0.13%
(0.14) (0.13)
Hearing length [+] -0.028 –0.70% 0.010 +0.24%
(0.12) (0.13)
Constant -0.363∗∗∗ -1.270◦ -1.413◦
(0.06) (0.68) (0.76)
Term NO NO YES YES YES YES
Topics NO NO NO NO YES YES
N 483 482 482
Pseudo R2 0.004 0.015 0.033
Model χ2 11.59 58.72 122.07
Table 6.4: Model of Similarity between Petitions and Judicial Opinions with Party
Type Dummy Variables
◦ p < 0.1, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001. The unit of analysis is each petition in each case that resulted in a final
decision from August 13, 2003 to October 2, 2013. The dependent variable is the percentage of words from the petition that
matches the final decision according to WCopyfind. The model is a fractional logit indicating that the dependent variable is a
percentage ranging from 0 to 1. Coefficients for topic variables not shown. The expected direction of the coefficients appears
in brackets. Percent change indicates the marginal effect on the dependent variable of a 0-1 increase in dummy variables or
one standard deviation increase in continuous variables, holding all other variables at their mean or modal values.
increases by 2.5%, while going from 14 to 15 NGOs increases the proportion of text by less
than 0.3%. Taken with Table 6.4, these results provide considerable support for Hypothesis
6.2 in that the Court is more likely to adopt text from NGO petitions.
I then disaggregated the NGO category to see if certain types of NGOs were more likely
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(1) (2) (3)
% Similar Coefficient % Change Coefficient % Change Coefficient % Change
Petitioners:
# NGO [+] 0.461∗∗ +11.3% 0.392∗∗ +9.65% 0.406∗ +9.98%
(0.14) (0.15) (0.17)
# National gov. [+] 0.460 +11.3% 0.243 +5.98% 0.240 +5.90%
(0.88) (0.86) (1.02)
# Local gov. [+] 0.150 +3.70% 0.138 +3.39% 0.565∗ +13.9%
(0.26) (0.27) (0.24)
# Political party [?] 0.191 +4.71% 0.085 +2.09% 0.017 +0.42%
(0.16) (0.17) (0.19)
# Business [?] -0.024 –0.59% -0.137 –3.37% 0.274 +6.74%
(0.33) (0.34) (0.35)
Brief Attributes:
Length [+] 0.261 +6.42% 0.276 +6.78%
(0.17) (0.18)
Complex issue [+] -0.173◦ –4.25%
(0.10)
Case Attributes:
Case Outcome [+] 0.008 +0.19% -0.024 –0.60%
(0.09) (0.09)
DPR Text [+] 0.557∗∗∗ +0.13% 0.539∗∗∗ +0.13%
(0.14) (0.13)
Hearing length [+] -0.052 –1.28% -0.018 –0.45%
(0.12) (0.13)
Constant -0.344∗∗∗ -0.960 -1.112
(0.05) (0.69) (0.82)
Term NO NO YES YES YES YES
Topics NO NO NO NO YES YES
N 483 482 482
Pseudo R2 0.003 0.014 0.033
Model χ2 11.71 60.12 129.55
Table 6.5: Model of Similarity between Petitions and Judicial Opinions with
Number of Party Type Variables
◦ p < 0.1, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001. The unit of analysis is each petition in each case that resulted in a final
decision from August 13, 2003 to October 2, 2013. The dependent variable is the percentage of words from the petition that
matches the final decision according to WCopyfind. The model is a fractional logit indicating that the dependent variable is a
percentage ranging from 0 to 1. Coefficients for topic variables not shown. The expected direction of the coefficients appears
in brackets. Percent change indicates the marginal effect on the dependent variable of a 0-1 increase in dummy variables or
one standard deviation increase in continuous variables, holding all other variables at their mean or modal values.
to succeed in persuading the Constitutional Court to quote text from their petitions. I used
the coding scheme from Table 4.2 of Chapter IV (see also Appendix A). I present the results
in Figure 6.5. Petitions with at least one education NGO saw the largest significant increase
in the proportion of text the Court adopted in its final decision (around 20%). Petitions with
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Figure 6.4: Similarity between NGO Petitions and Judicial Opinions
WCopyfind was used to calculate the similarity between each petition and the Constitutional Court’s written opinion in that
same case. Using the results from Model 3 in Table 6.5, the plot shows the marginal effect of the number of interest group
petitioners associated with a petition on the amount of text associated with the Court’s opinion. All other variables are held
at their mean or modal values. Dashed lines represent 95% confidence intervals.
at least one development or governance NGO also saw significant increases (approximately
15% and 10%, respectively). None of the other types of NGOs were associated with a
significant change in the proportion of text adopted.
None of the other types of petitioners, including national government institutions, had
a consistently significant effect on the proportion of text that matched the Constitutional
Court’s decision.
Finally, to measure the effect of public opinion on text matches, I estimated the fol-
lowing model:
Prob(textpetition = textdecision) = β1 + β2 # petitioners + β3 geographic diversity
+ β4(# petitioners ∗ geographic diversity) + βi controls + 
(6.3)
, where β2 + (β4 ∗ geographic diversity) should be positive if signals of public support
for a petition increase the proportion of text that the Court adopts in its written opinion.
Table 6.6 presents this model. The results are neither substantively large nor robust. Indeed,
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Figure 6.5: Similarity between NGO Petitions and Judicial Opinions
WCopyfind was used to calculate the similarity between each petition and the Constitutional Court’s written opinion in that
same case. The plot shows the difference in means for each type of petitioner. A positive number indicates greater similarity
with judicial decisions, while a negative number indicates less similarity. Bars represent 95% confidence intervals.
upon adding the topic variables in model 3, the best estimate of the marginal effect for the
size and diversity of the petitioner coalition is negative – the opposite of what Hypotheses
6.3a and 6.3b had predicted. As such, although public opinion influences the justices’ votes
(see Chapter V), it appears that it does not influence how the justices write their opinions.
6.3.2 Related Party Briefs
The identity of related parties had no significant effect on the proportion of text from
the related party brief that the Constitutional Court adopted in its written decision. Unlike
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(1) (2) (3)
% Similar Coefficient % Change Coefficient % Change Coefficient % Change
Petitioners:
# Petitioners [+] 0.159 +5.85% 0.033 +2.19% 0.013 +1.40%
(0.14) (0.15) (0.15)
Diversity [+] -0.247 –3.65% -0.202 –3.25% -0.207 –3.73%
(0.16) (0.16) (0.16)
Number * Diversity [+] 0.176 0.126 0.099
(0.27) (0.28) (0.28)
Brief Attributes:
Length [+] 0.334◦ +8.21% 0.333◦ +8.18%
(0.17) (0.18)
Complex issue [+] -0.157◦ –3.88%
(0.09)
Case Attributes:
Case Outcome [+] 0.006 +0.14% -0.011 –0.03%
(0.09) (0.09)
DPR Text [+] 0.523∗∗∗ +0.13% 0.495∗∗∗ +0.12%
(0.14) (0.14)
Hearing length [+] -0.030 –9.74% 0.016 +0.40%
(0.12) (0.14)
Constant -0.264∗ -1.188◦ -1.294◦
(0.11) (0.69) (0.88)
Term NO NO YES YES YES YES
Topics NO NO NO NO YES YES
N 483 482 482
Pseudo R2 0.002 0.014 0.032
Model χ2 8.82 51.86 109.61
Table 6.6: Model of Similarity between Petitions and Judicial Opinions with
Petitioner Coalition Variables
◦ p < 0.1, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001. The unit of analysis is each petition in each case that resulted in a final
decision from August 13, 2003 to October 2, 2013. The dependent variable is the percentage of words from the petition that
matches the final decision according to WCopyfind. The model is a fractional logit indicating that the dependent variable is a
percentage ranging from 0 to 1. Coefficients for topic variables not shown. The expected direction of the coefficients appears
in brackets. Percent change indicates the marginal effect on the dependent variable of a 0-1 increase in dummy variables or
one standard deviation increase in continuous variables, holding all other variables at their mean or modal values.
for petitions, there is no evidence that the Court is more likely to quote text from related
party briefs submitted by NGOs (table not presented). This suggests that whatever credi-
bility the justices attach to NGOs only applies to petitioners, not related parties. I discuss
several possible explanations for this differing treatment in Section 6.5.
In this section, I briefly discuss how repetition in related party briefs affects the extent
to which the Constitutional Court adopts text from that brief. To measure the effect of
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repetition, I estimated the following model:
Prob(textpetition = textdecision) = β1
+ β2 matchotherrelated + β3 support petition + β4(matchrelated ∗ support petition)
+ β5 matchpetitions + β6 support petition + β7(matchpetitions ∗ support petition)
+ β8 matchpresident + β9 support petition + β10(matchpresident ∗ support petition)
+ βi controls + 
(6.4)
, where each match variable measures the proportion of matching text between the re-
lated party brief and other related party briefs, the petition, and president’s statement,
respectively. If the Court is more likely to quote related party briefs that support the peti-
tion (support petition = 1) when they repeat information from other related parties, then
β2 + β4 should be positive. By contrast, for related party briefs that oppose the petition
(support petition = 0), β2 should be positive.
Table 6.7 presents the results of this model. None of the three text-matching variables
is significant, although the best estimate is positive. Repeating information from either the
petition, president’s statement, or other related party briefs does not significantly increase
the probability that the Court will quote that information. In other words, repetition does
not have a significant effect on the credibility of the brief.15
6.3.3 Other Variables
Some scholars had expected courts to cite more text from briefs in cases dealing with
complex issues. However, my results provide no indication that holds true for the Indonesian
Constitutional Court. In Tables 6.3-6.7, the best estimate for the dummy variable for issue
15When I plotted the marginal effects for the text-matching variables, it did appear that, at extremely high
levels, repetition had a significant and positive effect on the similarity between the related party brief and
the Court’s decision, but only for related party briefs that supported the petition. However, these higher
values did not actually exist as observations in the dataset (the model had projected based on existing
observations), so I discount these results.
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(1) (2) (3)
% Similar Coefficient Coefficient % Change Coefficient Coefficient % Change
Matching Text:
Related Parties [+] -0.051◦ –1.11% -0.069∗ +0.65% -0.061◦ +0.78%
(0.03) (0.02) (0.03)
Related * Support [+] 0.294 0.346◦
(0.25) (0.18)
Petitions [+] 0.089∗ +1.93% 0.093∗ +1.20% 0.092 +0.92%
(0.04) (0.05) (0.08)
Petitions * Support [+] -0.124 -0.160
(0.11) (0.10)
President [+] 0.059 +1.28% 0.046 +1.44% 0.015 +1.16%
(0.04) (0.04) (0.02)
President * Support [–] 0.065 0.129∗∗
(0.06) (0.05)
Brief Attributes:
Length [+] 0.334 +7.07%
(0.31)
Support Petition [?] -0.410 –0.06% -0.375 –2.91%
(0.31) (0.31)
Case Attributes:
Case Outcome [+] -0.048 –1.01%
(0.40)
DPR Text [+] 0.022∗∗ +0.46%
(0.01)
Constant -1.038∗∗∗ -0.902∗∗∗ -2.545∗
(0.22) (0.27) (1.26)
Term NO NO NO NO YES YES
Topics NO NO NO NO YES YES
N 203 203 203
Pseudo R2 0.031 0.041 0.119
Model χ2 9.03 21.23 74.15
Table 6.7: Model of Similarity between Related Party Briefs and Judicial Opinions
◦ p < 0.1, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001. Robust standard errors clustered on docket number in parentheses. The unit
of analysis is each related party brief in each case that resulted in a final decision from August 13, 2003 to October 2, 2013.
The dependent variable is the percentage of words from the brief that matches the final decision according to WCopyfind.
The model is a fractional logit indicating that the dependent variable is a percentage ranging from 0 to 1. Coefficients for
topic variables not shown. The expected direction of the coefficients appears in brackets. Percent change indicates the
marginal effect on the dependent variable of a 0-1 increase in dummy variables or one standard deviation increase in
continuous variables, holding all other variables at their mean or modal values.
complexity is negative, indicating that the Court is less likely to adopt text from a brief
in complex cases. Moreover, this result is significant (at p < 0.1) for all except Table 6.4.
Likewise, the topic variables from the latent topic models do not provide any evidence that
the Court is more likely to adopt text in complex cases. For example, only three topics have
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statistically significant effects for petitions – agriculture (Topic 6), regional issues (Topic 8),
and taxes (Topic 10) – and all three are negative. This suggests the Court does not deal
with issue complexity by relying heavily on the text in the briefs.
The fixed effects for each chief justice’s term show that the Constitutional Court was
significantly less likely to adopt text from a petition under Chief Justice Jimly Asshidiqie
than under his two successors. Two of the other controls in Tables 6.3-6.7 – the length
of briefs and adoption of text from DPR statements – proved significant in the expected
directions. In general, longer briefs were overall more likely to contain text adopted by
the Constitutional Court. The proportion of text adopted from DPR briefs was a highly
significant predictor of the proportion of text in a brief that matches the Court’s decision,
indicating that there is heterogeneity across cases in the Court’s propensity to cite text from
briefs.
6.4 Case Narrative
In this section, I provide a qualitative example to explore how the identity of the
petitioner influences the Court’s willingness to quote that text. I begin by summarizing
a series of cases challenging the 2001 Petroleum & Natural Gas Law. I then look at how
the petitioners presented their arguments to the Court. These cases support my theoretical
argument in two ways. First, I show that the Court was more inclined to quote arguments
from NGOs. The cases involve challenges to the same law, but filed by different petitioners, so
I can compare the Court’s willingness to quote a petition across different types of petitioners.
Second, the reason the Court quoted more text from the NGO briefs was because the NGOs’
reputation lent their brief greater credibility.
Indonesia’s 1945 Constitution reflects the economic nationalism of the country’s found-
ing fathers. Article 33 of the Constitution mandates “state control” over the country’s nat-
ural resources in order to maximize prosperity for the people. In particular, paragraphs 2
and 3 of Article 33 read:
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(2) Sectors of production which are important for the country and affect the life
of the people shall be under the powers of the State.
(3) The land, the waters and the natural resources within shall be under the
powers of the State and shall be used to the greatest benefit of the people.
However, because the country lacked a mechanism for constitutional review at the time, this
article served more of a statement of ideology than a constraint on government action.
During the early New Order, the oil and natural gas sectors were particularly impor-
tant sources of economic growth. In 1974, oil and gas accounted for 58% of government tax
revenue and three-fourths of all commodity exports (Davidson, 2015, 113). Indonesia was
the only Asian member of OPEC. Given the lucrative rents at stake, it is not surprising that
political elites sought to control fossil fuel resources. In 1957, the government created Per-
mina – later Pertamina – to act as a state-owned enterprise with a monopoly over oil and gas
production. The company acted as both a market participant and a regulator, but mostly
outsourced extraction through production-sharing agreements with foreign companies. How-
ever, critics alleged that Pertamina was corrupt and inefficient, acting as a lucrative source
of patronage for the Suharto regime (see Hertzmark, 2007; Leith, 2003).
The 1997 Asian Financial Crisis prompted market-based economic reforms in the oil
and gas sector, but also laid the foundations for a resurgence in economic nationalism. When
the Rupiah crashed, the Indonesian government sought assistance from the International
Monetary Fund (IMF). The IMF imposed several conditions on its rescue package, including
privatization of the petroleum sector and reduction in fuel subsidies. The legislature passed
the Petroleum & Natural Gas Law in 2001 to meet these conditions. The law allowed
domestic businesses to compete in upstream (exploration and exploitation) and downstream
(processing, transport, storage, and trade) activities. The law also transformed Pertamina
into a state-owned limited liability company, PT Pertamina (Persero). Finally, it established
an independent regulatory authority, BP Migas, to oversee licenses and concessions in the
oil and gas sector. In order to protect the new agency from politicians and rent seekers, BP
Migas derived its funding from a 1% administrative charge applied to production sharing
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contracts, rather from than the general state budget. The IMF and Indonesian reformers
hoped making BP Migas independent would reduce the risks of corruption and inefficiency
that had plagued its predecessor.
Figure 6.6: Photograph of IMF Managing Director Michel Camdessus & President
Suharto (Jan. 15, 1998)
Source: Associated Press
Economic nationalists saw these reforms as a threat not just to the country’s oil re-
sources, but also to its independence.16 Progressive NGOs worried market reforms would let
foreign companies exploit Indonesia’s resources without generating benefits for local com-
munities (Rosser and van Diermen, 2016, 344). Moreover, with democratization, Indonesian
politicians now had an incentive to openly oppose market reforms as a way to win over
poorer voters, especially those who relied upon the fuel subsidies (Davidson, 2015, 117-18).
Not surprisingly, one of the first petitions to reach the new Constitutional Court in-
volved a challenge to the 2001 Petroleum & Natural Gas Law. A group of four NGOs, a
labor union representing Pertamina employees, and a professor argued that the law violated
Article 33. The Court refused to disband BP Migas, stating that regulation, administration,
16An infamous photograph (see Figure 6.6) of IMF Managing Director Michael Camdessus hovering over
President Suharto as he signed a Letter of Intent captured this nationalist sentiment (Stockmann, 2007, 53).
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management, and supervision of the oil and gas sector remained in government control.17
However, it did grant three related claims.18 In 2007, a group of eight DPR members filed
another constitutional challenge against the law, but the Court rejected it.19
In 2012, a different coalition of NGOs filed another challenge to the constitutional
authority of BP Migas. The petitioners in this case were ten Islamic organizations and 32
prominent individuals. The group was led by Muhammadiyah, a modernist Islamic organi-
zation famous for its charitable work. In 2009, the organization’s leadership board decided to
investigate laws that violated the Constitution, calling for a “constitutional jihad” (Habir,
2013, 127). The petitioners claimed BP Migas violated Article 33 in three ways. First,
any production-sharing agreements BP Migas signed with private foreign companies legally
bound the government in a way that reduced its control over the resources. Second, the
arbitration clauses in the contracts exposed the government to binding rulings from private
international arbitration panels. Finally, state-owned enterprises were forced to compete
with private companies.
In a surprising decision, the Constitutional Court accepted the petition and disbanded
BP Migas.20 As a matter of law, the Court found that allowing BP Migas to enter into bind-
ing contracts unconstitutionally bound the government because it would lose the ability to
later pass regulations or policies that contradicted those contracts.21 The Court spent much
of its decision discussing the policy merits of 2001 law. It concluded that the arrangement
with BP Migas did not maximize public welfare. It also noted allegations against BP Migas
for abuse of power and corruption (see Butt and Siregar, 2013). In short, this decision, in ad-
dition to the Court’s jurisprudence in other natural resource cases, all strongly suggest that
17Oil & Gas case I, MK Decision No. 2/PUU-I/2003, pp. 220-22.
18First, it forbade private businesses from upstream activities because it would deprive the state of control
over those resources. Second, it rejected the limit on the percentage of crude oil and/or natural gas that
the government could force private companies to divert for domestic consumption. Third, the Court held
that prices should be regulated by the government rather than determined by the market. MK Decision No.
2/PUU-I/2003, pp. 227
19Oil & Gas case II, MK Decision No. 20/PUU-V/2007.
20Oil & Gas case III, MK Decision No. 36/PUU-X/2012.
21MK Decision No. 36/PUU-X/2012, p. 105.
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that Court believes privatization is incompatible with the state’s obligations under Article
33(2) (see Butt and Lindsey, 2008; Venning, 2008).22
Why did the Court reach different outcomes in three cases challenging the same statute?
Part of the answer might be that oil and gas had decreased in economic importance by the
2010s (Davidson, 2015). Oil production had fallen below 1 million barrels per day by 2004
and Indonesia withdrew from OPEC in 2008.23 However, despite the relative decline, fossil
fuels still constitute an important part of the economy. Fossil fuels still accounted for around
20% of government revenue around the time of the decision (Habir, 2013, 121). By 2012, BP
Migas had been in operation for about decade and signed over 350 contracts worth around
$70 billion per year (Butt and Siregar, 2013, 108). Another factor was the rise of economic
nationalism during President Yudhoyono’s second term (2009-2014) and increased criticism
of foreign oil firms. Yet, while this created political space for the Court to declare BP Migas
unconstitutional, it does not explain why the Court decided to overturn its previous two
decisions on the subject.
A crucial piece of the puzzle is that the petitioners in each case had different levels of
credibility and moral authority. As (Davidson, 2015, 123-24) notes, the petitioners in the
2007 case – the least successful of the three – were politicians whom the Court likely saw as
motivated by political interest rather than the public good. Davidson also points out that
the NGOs in the 2003 case, primarily labor organizations representing Pertamina employees,
not only lacked the gravitas of more established NGOs, but also had a financial stake in the
case because competition from the private sector would threaten their jobs. Thus, they had
little credibility as champions of the public interest. By contrast, Muhammadiyah is one of
the most reputable organizations in Indonesia.24 It claims around 30 million members and
22Several hours after the decision, President Yudhoyono issued a regulation to comply with the Court’s
order and transferred all BP Migas functions to the Energy and Mineral Resources Ministry. The Ministry in
turn established a temporary unit, SKSP Migas, which performed some of the same functions as BP Migas.
23It rejoined a few years later, only to leave again in 2016. Recent news reports suggest it is currently
seeking to once again rejoin the organization.
24Menchik (2014, 617) even calls Muhammadiyah and Nahdlatul Ulama, another large Islamic NGO, the
“backbone of civil society.”
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runs thousands of nonprofit schools, hospitals, and youth organizations across the country.25
Davidson (2015, 126) claims that Hatta Rajasa, Yudhoyono’s Coordinating Minister of Eco-
nomic Affairs and head of the National Mandate Party (PAN), worked behind the scenes to
encourage Muhammadiyah to file the case because the organization had “vastly more social
and moral authority in the country than any political party.”26
Indeed, the effect of Muhammadiyah’s credibility and moral authority is reflected in
the Constitutional Court’s treatment of the petition. The Court quoted around 63% of the
text in the petition – nearly 20% higher than the average for petitions (c.f., Figure 6.1).
Moreover, this was not simply a case in which the Court tended to quote briefs at a higher
rate; for comparison, the Court only adopted 51% of the text in the president’s statement,
around 10% less than the overall average. By contrast, in the 2007 Oil & Gas case, the Court
adopted more text from the government’s statement than from the petition.27
Some of the text that the justices copied – and ultimately accepted – contains charged
rhetoric and broad claims about the political motivations behind the 2001 Petroleum &
Natural Gas Law. For example, the Constitutional Court copied the following block of text
almost exactly as it appeared in the petition:
Therefore, one of the factors driving the formation of Oil and Gas Law in 2001
was to accommodate foreign pressure and even foreign interests[...] The interna-
tional interests that infiltrate every political consideration underlying the Oil and
25Justices Akil Mochtar and Ahmad Fadlil Sumadi even attended Muhammadiyah schools in Pontianak
and Yogyakarta, respectively. Despite their affiliation with Muhammadiyah, Hosen (2016) points out that
the justices’ views did not necessarily reflect those of the organization.
26Only Judge Harjono questioned the standing of Islamic groups to challenge a law about oil and gas.
Muhammadiyah responded that the group had a long history of engaging in nationalist politics going back
to the colonial era, framing its lawsuit as part of its broader activism on behalf of nationalist causes (Habir,
2013, 127).
27In the 2007 case, the Court quoted around 72% of the brief. By contrast, in the section of the Court’s
decision dedicated to explaining its legal reasoning as opposed to summarizing the briefs, the justices quoted
9 sentences or phrases from Muhammadiyah’s petition in the 2012 Oil & Gas case, compared with only two
in the 2007 decision. However, because multiple factors influence the rate at which the Court adopts text
from a brief, it is difficult – and probably misleading – to compare the 2012 and 2007 cases directly. For
example, the Court also seemed to adopt text at a higher rate in the 2007, also quoting around 72% of the
president’s statement and 76% of the DPR’s statement. Moreover, the 2007 case was decided by a different
group of justices at a different time in the Court’s history.
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Natural Gas Law make the formation of Oil and Gas Law, even though it was
adopted through the formal legislative procedures, flawed because the intention
behind the formation of Oil and Gas Law is injurious Article 33 of the 1945 Con-
stitution. The branch of production which controls the livelihood of the people
is merely a constitutional illusion[...]28
Although this text comes from the Court’s summary of the petitioners’ arguments, it is
notably not surrounded by quotation marks or framed as the petition’s words. Nor do the
judges ever challenge these assertions elsewhere in the decision. The Court implicitly accepts
the petitioners’ assertions about the politics and policy surrounding the law.
This section helped explain how petitioner identity might influence the justices’ opinion
of a brief, and in turn their willingness to quote it. Although it is difficult to isolate one
specific factor that made the petition in the 2012 challenge to the Petroleum & Natural Gas
Law more effective than its predecessors, having an NGO petitioner with a high level of
moral authority likely primed the justices to view the petition as more credible. Moreover,
the justices not only quoted the petition at a higher rate than average, but also cited some
of the petition’s more incendiary allegations about the politics behind the law. Unlike the
previous petitioners, Muhammadiyah’s history and reputation gave the Court little reason
to doubt its motives.
6.5 Discussion
My results reveal several interesting facts about how Indonesian Constitutional Court
decisions utilize text from briefs. The Court is more likely to adopt a higher proportion
28The original Indonesian text is:
Oleh karena itu salah satu faktor pendorong pembentukan UU Migas di tahun 2001 adalah untuk
mengakomodir tekanan asing dan bahkan kepentingan asing[...] Kepentingan Internasional yang
menyusupi dalam setiap pertimbangan politik yang diambil dalam UU Migas menjadikan pem-
bentukan UU Migas meskipun dianggap melalui prosedur formal yang telah ditentukan. tetapi
bisa menjadi cacat ketika niat pembentukan UU Migas adalah untuk mencederai amanat Pasal
33 UUD 1945. Sehingga penguasaan negara terhadap cabang-cabang produksi yang menguasai
hajat hidup orang banyak hanyalah menjadi sebuah ilusi konstitusional semata[...]
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of text from petitions submitted by NGOs (see Figure 6.3 and Table 6.4). The magnitude
of this effect increases as the number of NGOs associated with the petition increases (see
Table 6.5). Of course, quoting text from NGO petitions does not necessarily imply that
the Court accepts their arguments; as seen in Chapter V, the Court was not significantly
more likely to grant petitions submitted by NGOs. However, it does strongly imply that the
justices tend to view petitions submitted by NGOs as more credible and informative than
those submitted by other types of litigants. Even if the justices do not ultimately accept the
arguments in the brief, they do allocate more time and space in the decision to addressing
them.
The most obvious objection to this interpretation of my findings is that WCopyfind
merely measures the similarity between the brief and the Constitutional Court’s decision,
not the intent of the justices. Ultimately, I believe my interpretation is the most plausible
explanation of the results for several reasons. First, it is important to distinguish between
credibility and persuasiveness. The justices can find a brief informative and worth addressing
without ultimately accepting its conclusions. By contrast, if they find a brief uninformative
or unreliable, they will likely spend less time quoting and discussing it in their opinion. The
justices should be far more likely to quote a brief that they find credible and informative,
even if only to reject its claims.29
Second, the Constitutional Court usually quotes text from briefs simply to summarize
the brief, not to assess its validity (see Appendix E). The majority of text in each Constitu-
tional Court decision consists of detailed summaries of the petition, government statements,
and related party briefs, as well as any evidence presented during hearings (upwards of 90%
of the Court’s written decision in some cases). Moreover, these summaries present each
party’s claims and evidence in an objective manner. This means that, for the most part,
matching text indicates that the justices included text from a brief in its summary of the
29In fact, other works that use WCopyfind to study legal briefs do not even make this distinction. For
example, Collins, Corley and Hamner (2014) assume that matching text indicates favorable treatment, i.e.
that the court accepted the brief’s argument.
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brief, not to accept or reject the brief’s claims. The question then becomes why does the
Court rely more on the text of a brief when summarizing some briefs but not others. This
difference in treatment suggests the justices perceive some briefs to be of higher quality than
others. All else equal, the justices should rely more on the text of a brief when they find
that brief to be more credible and informative, even if simply summarizing its contents.
This raises the question of what factors influence the credibility of NGO briefs. Part of
the answer stems from the unique role of NGOs play as litigants. On average, NGOs possess
more legal resources and policy expertise than individuals unaffiliated with any organization.
As repeat players who have an incentive to protect the reputation of the organization, they
also realize that filing frivolous or unreliable briefs could undermine their credibility. As
such, the judges can reasonably expect NGOs to act as a filter by refusing to file low-quality
petitions with the Court.
However, unlike other types of organizations, such as private businesses or political
parties, NGOs typically claim to pursue constitutional litigation on behalf of the public
interest, or at least a segment of the public.30 As with Muhammadiyah in the BP Migas
case, they rely heavily on moral capital when making the claim that their policy preferences
would benefit the public interest (see Bryant, 2008). In other words, the justices have greater
reason to believe that the arguments put forward by reputable NGOs are not simply self-
interested and might in fact raise legitimate constitutional objections to the law.
The topic model from Chapter IV hints at another possible explanation. In Section 4.3,
I had found that petitions submitted by NGOs were significantly more likely to be associated
with certain legal issues, particularly education, labor, agriculture, and economic topics. As
NGOs focus on these issues, they gain experience and knowledge. As such, it is possible that
certain NGOs gain a reputation as “policy experts” in the eyes of the Court. Education,
development, and governance NGOs are significantly more likely to have text adopted from
30This is less clear when dealing with NGOs that promise its members club goods, such as labor unions
or professional associations that confer benefits to their members. However, they constitute a minority of
NGOs involved in constitutional litigation.
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their petitions (see Figure 6.4). Indeed, the Court has come to view certain NGOs and their
expert witnesses as credible voices on policy. For example, in economic and environmental
cases, NGOs regularly call upon the same left-leaning economists to testify, whom the Court
now views as authoritative experts in their fields.31
It is not immediately clear why the Constitutional Court did not quote related party
briefs submitted by NGOs at the same level as petitions. Related parties play a secondary
role in constitutional litigation and overall the Court did quote related party briefs less
frequently than petitions. It is possible the justices focus on briefs submitted by NGOs with
strong reputation for expertise or moral capital. Moreover, the distribution of NGOs that act
as related parties differs qualitatively from those that act as petitioners (see Figure 6.2). For
example, religious, health, and legal aid organizations were the largest related parties NGO
categories (at 11%, 4%, and 2% of the total, respectively). By contrast, for petitions, human
rights, labor, and governance organizations were the largest groups of NGOs (see Figure 4.2).
Therefore, it is possible that the justices have different beliefs about the credibility of the
types of NGOs that tend to act as petitioners versus those that participate as related parties.
My results also support claims in the literature about how courts tend to find briefs
submitted by the national government to be more credible. Figure 6.1 shows that the
Constitutional Court cites a much higher proportion of text from the president and DPR’s
statements than from petitions or related party briefs. Initially, this appears to contradict my
findings in Chapter V about presidential statements and how they do not affect judicial voting
behavior. However, as noted above, adopting text from a brief does not necessarily imply that
the Court agrees with its arguments, just that it finds them credible and relevant. Indeed,
government statements are important as a source of argumentation against the petition
because there is no designated respondent in constitutional cases to rebut the petition.
Interestingly, the president and DPR’s credibility do not extend to other types of
national government institutions. As seen in Figure 6.3 and Tables 6.4-6.5, the Court is
31E.g., Subject #7, interview with staff at international NGO, Jakarta, Indonesia, October 13, 2013.
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not more likely to adopt text from petitions submitted by other government actors. One
reason is that the petitioners from national government institutions are generally independent
commissions and as such cannot claim to represent the entire government. In fact, the
president and DPR sometimes submit statements opposing petitions submitted by these
commissions.32 This potential for conflict within the national government and differences
in institutional strength suggests another yet another reason why the party capacity theory
might not hold true for Indonesia.
Surprisingly, the Court is not more likely to adopt text from petitions or related parties
in cases dealing with complex issues. On the one hand, the literature makes a persuasive
case for why judges should in theory rely more on briefs in complex cases (Hansford, 2004,
see). On the other hand, my result is consistent with Corley (2008), which also finds no effect
for complex issues. One possible explanation for the result is that, as a specialized court
focused on constitutional issues, the Constitutional Court justices are more likely to possess
relevant expertise than judges in courts of general jurisdiction. However, even within the
field of constitutional law, the justices faced questions about natural gas exploitation, social
security reform, and a variety of other policy issues outside their immediate legal expertise.
It is possible that my data simply do not capture sufficiently nuanced information
about issue complexity. I coded issue complexity based on Vanberg (2005), but this dummy
variable might not align with how Indonesian judges view complexity. The latent topic
models provide more refined measures of topics, but I still found no correlation between
complex topics and the amount of text quoted from the brief. Indeed, the justices were less
likely to cite text from petitions if they contained more text about taxation, arguably one
of the more complex fields of law. Moreover, it is possible that the most salient information
in complex cases is conveyed through expert witness testimony rather than the briefs, so
the judges will cite that testimony if they need to rely upon external information to deal
32Juvenile Justice case, MK Decision No. 1/PUU-VIII/2010 (in which the Indonesian Child Protection
Commission, or Komisi Perlindungan Anak Indonesia (KPAI), challenged the 1997 Juvenile Justice Law
over the objections of the president).
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with complex issues. Future research should try alternative measures of issue complexity, as
well as conduct in-depth qualitative case studies to better understand where judges get their
information about policy issues.
Another puzzling finding is that Constitutional Court decisions were less likely to quote
text from briefs during the term of the first chief justice (Asshidiqie) than under the later
chief justices (Mahfud & Mochtar). One might have expected the justices to rely less upon
the briefs as they gained more experience and confidence, but the opposite proved true.
Moreover, the proportion of text in the decisions allocated to explaining the Court’s legal
reasoning decreased over time. This accords with Butt’s (2015, 62) claim that the quality of
legal reasoning in the Court’s decisions actually decreased under Mahfud and his successors.
6.6 Concluding Remarks
Where Chapter V explored the conditions under which the Indonesian Constitutional
Court grants petitions for constitutional review, this chapter examined when and why the
Court quotes or cites text from briefs. Just as NGO petitions were the most effective in
setting the Court’s agenda (see Chapter IV), I find that NGO petitioners are also the most
effective in influencing the text of the Court’s written opinion. The Court is also more likely
to adopt text from statements submitted by the president and DPR, if any.
My results confirm some findings from the judicial politics literature, but also raise new
questions. First, this chapter contributes to our understanding of how judges obtain and
process information. Judges face an information asymmetry problem and lack the resources
to conduct their own research into the facts of each case. My results suggest that judges
attempt to ameliorate this problem by treating the identity of the litigant as a signal about
the credibility of the information in its brief. That said, it is far from clear if litigant identity
actually provides a reliable signal of quality. Indeed, recent studies of errors in U.S. Supreme
Court decisions suggest that judges rely too heavily on the briefs and do not check the
information presented to them rigorously enough (see Larsen, 2014; Gabrielson, 2017).
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Second, unlike Anderson and Franze’s (2011) study of U.S. amicus briefs, I find that
the Indonesian Constitutional Court is more likely to quote text from petitions submitted by
NGOs. Unlike Lynch (2004), which found that the U.S. Supreme Court focused on amicus
briefs submitted by NGOs with a preexisting reputation for quality, my finding holds true
for NGOs as a broad class of litigants. In assessing the generalizability of my results, it is
important to acknowledge the Indonesian Constitutional Court’s unique relationship with
NGOs. As discussed in Chapter II, the first two chief justices had close ties to civil society
groups, so they might have been more likely than judges in other countries to view NGO
briefs as credible. At the least, my results suggest the need for more comparative research
on the relationship between NGOs and credibility in constitutional litigation.
Finally, in line with Anderson and Franze (2011) and Chandler (2011), I find that the
Indonesian Constitutional Court is more likely to adopt text from briefs submitted by the
president and DPR. At the same time, in Chapter V, I found that the Court is not more
likely to rule in favor of the government. Taken together, the results strongly suggest that
the decision to quote text from a government brief and the decision to rule in favor of that
brief, while related, are not the same. The justices take the national government’s lawyers
seriously without necessarily agreeing with their arguments.
The past three empirical chapters have attempted to show the influence of non-state
actors at various stages of litigation, including the Constitutional Court’s agenda (Chap-
ter IV), the Court’s verdict (Chapter V), and the Court’s written opinion (Chapter VI). In
the next chapter, I situate the importance of these findings within the broader literature, as
well as address limitations of this dissertation and potential for future research.
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CHAPTER VII
Conclusion
In February 2016, around the time I started writing this dissertation, U.S. Supreme
Court Justice Antonin Scalia passed away. Obituaries regularly called Scalia one of the most
influential justices in recent memory, largely for his promotion of originalism. At the same
time, Scalia failed to achieve many of his policy goals, such as overturning Roe v. Wade
or Miranda rights. His insistence on ideological purity often meant that he failed to forge
coalitions with other justices to shift the law closer to his ideal point (see, e.g., Savage, 1996;
Rosen, 2016).1 Tellingly, media coverage often focused on his sharply worded dissents. This
presents a fascinating paradox: how could Scalia both be one of the most influential justices
in history and consistently fail to influence the development of the law?
I soon realized that the embedded autonomy model could help explain part of the
puzzle. Scalia’s place in jurisprudential history makes much more sense after considering
his engagement with non-state actors. Scalia hoped to convince lawyers, activists, and the
general public of the benefits of originalism. He wrote his opinions, especially his dissents,
with a clarity that made them accessible and even entertaining. He also regularly gave
talks to the Federalist Society, Christian universities, and other conservative groups (Hollis-
1Even in the majority, his tendency to focus on bright-line legal rules sometimes had the unintended
consequence of allowing governments to circumvent his rulings with slight modifications to policies. For
example, Scalia’s decision in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council sought to make it easier for citizens
to receive compensation for regulatory takings. However, his emphasis on how the regulation completely
denied all value of the property in question allowed lower courts to avoid awarding compensation by finding
that a regulation did not completely wipe out the value of the property.
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Brusky, 2015; Murphy, 2015). These groups in turn have become key stakeholders in the
U.S. judicial system. They regularly mobilize voters to support politicians who promise to
appoint judges “in the mold of Scalia.” They also file briefs challenging U.S. government
actions. In short, Scalia might not have authored as many majority opinions as his colleagues,
but he did cultivate a large network of stakeholders who could advocate for and defend his
policy preferences.
Although I initially conceived of the embedded autonomy model when studying the
Indonesian Constitutional Court, the example above hints at how it could provide theoretical
insights into judicial systems around the world. Judges are not isolated in an ivory tower,
but rather embedded in a larger social milieu. My dissertation focuses on the ways that
NGOs and public opinion influence judges, but both Scalia and Jimly Asshidiqie also took
steps to try to influence civil society’s perception of the law and their respective courts. In
judicial systems as different as the Indonesian Constitutional Court and the United States
Supreme Court, judges had an incentive to engage with non-state actors.
In the concluding chapter of this dissertation, I explore this potential for embedded
autonomy to improve our understanding of judicial behavior. I begin by summarizing my
major contributions to the literature on judicial behavior. I then discuss several theoretical
and practical limitations, especially those that might undermine the generalizability of my
findings. Finally, I conclude by discussing potential directions for future research on the role
of non-state actors and judicial behavior.
7.1 Major Contributions
This dissertation makes five major contributions to the comparative politics literature.
First and foremost, it offers a new theoretical explanation for judicial behavior. Previous
models of judicial behavior have tended to focus on constraints – or lack thereof – imposed
on courts by other branches of government (e.g., Segal and Cover, 1989; Maltzman, Spriggs
and Wahlbeck, 1999). With embedded autonomy, I shift the focus to non-state litigants.
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In Chapters IV and VI, I found that Indonesian NGOs had a significant effect on the Con-
stitutional Court’s agenda and jurisprudence, while in Chapter V I found that the Court
responds to public opinion when deciding cases. In fact, the Court during this period was
more responsive to NGOs and public opinion than to the president or legislature. At the
very least, my findings indicate that judicial behavior is not merely the result of interactions
between the judiciary and the elected branches.
The embedded autonomy model could prove especially useful to understanding new
constitutional courts in developing countries. As noted in Chapter III, much of the existing
literature on judicial behavior originates from studies of courts in the U.S. or Western Eu-
rope (e.g., Segal and Cover, 1989; Maltzman, Spriggs and Wahlbeck, 1999). There has been
far less research on how to adapt existing models of judicial behavior to the unique politi-
cal and economic circumstances in developing democracies.2 For example, my work on the
Indonesian Constitutional Court suggests public opinion is more important to new courts
still trying to establish their legitimacy than to established courts. Moreover, the policy
preferences of NGOs in developing countries might differ from those of NGOs in developed
economies. In Chapter IV, I found Indonesian NGOs tended to focus far more on socioeco-
nomic issues than on civil and political rights. Hopefully, this dissertation will prompt more
examination of the implicit assumptions underlying existing models of judicial behavior.
Second, this dissertation contributes to the literature on social movements and their
ability to affect policy through constitutional litigation. In theory, constitutional courts
reduce power asymmetries, allowing even the weakest members of society to hold the gov-
ernment accountable. Epp (1998) argued NGOs that can engage in sustained litigation are
a necessary precursor to a rights revolution. However, such arguments have proven diffi-
cult to test empirically (see Urribarri et al., 2011a). Moreover, scholars have cast doubt on
the ability of weaker parties to win against opponents with greater access to legal resources
(Galanter, 1974) or, if they do win, enforce court judgments against recalcitrant governments
2Although comparative politics scholars have increasingly turned their attention to courts in Latin Amer-
ica (e.g., Helmke, 2004; Wilson and Cordero, 2006; Staton, 2010; Carroll and Tiede, 2012).
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(Rosenberg, 1991). This has been a concern in Indonesia as well. As noted in Chapter V, a
recent report by an Indonesian NGO argues that the Constitutional Court primarily bene-
fits elites because most litigants are either political parties or corporations, not marginalized
groups (HukumOnline, 2010).
My dissertation results provide reason for optimism. I found considerable evidence that
social movements can change policy through litigation. Indonesian NGOs set the judicial
agenda by filing socioeconomic and human rights cases that might not otherwise have reached
the Constitutional Court. They also influence the text of written judicial opinions by filing
credible briefs. Meanwhile, I found no evidence that petitions filed by elites like political
parties or corporations had a greater probability of success. Instead, the Court was more
likely to grant petitions perceived to have broad public support. Moreover, despite the fact
that the Court has declared a law unconstitutional in over 26% of cases, there is no evidence
that the Indonesian government regularly evades or undermines adverse decisions (Butt,
2015).3 In short, unlike so many Indonesian political institutions, the Constitutional Court
has not fallen victim to elite capture.
Third, this dissertation advances the use of natural language processing (NLP) tools
in comparative politics research. My dissertation is one of the first political science studies
to utilize NLP on non-English language court documents. I also demonstrate several new
applications of NLP. In Chapter IV, I used a latent topic model to derive clusters of topics
in petitions submitted to the Indonesian Constitutional Court. I employed this information
in a novel test of agenda-setting in constitutional litigation. In Chapter VI, I built upon
studies of plagiarism-detection software on U.S. amicus briefs (Collins, 2007; Collins, Corley
and Hamner, 2015) to track the extent to which the justices quote briefs in their written
opinions. In addition, I address several unique challenges that arose when applying existing
3My dissertation does not focus on the implementation of Constitutional Court judgments so I cannot
assess whether or not its decisions actually improved the lives of marginalized groups. Moreover, some
economists worry that the Court’s economic nationalism could in fact undermine economic growth and
poverty alleviation over the long term (see Butt and Lindsey, 2008). Nevertheless, the Court’s policy
preferences on major economic issues are more closely aligned with leftist NGOs than with the country’s
traditional elites.
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NLP tools to Indonesian documents. As such, my dissertation can serve as a guide for other
scholars interested in using NLP to study judicial behavior.
Fourth, the research done for this dissertation resulted in the first publicly available
dataset of coded Indonesian judicial decisions.4 The dataset includes basic metadata for each
of the 524 cases adjudicated between August 13, 2003 and October 2, 2013, such as the name
of the law being challenged and the outcome of the case. I also coded information about
party identity and document length for each of the 541 petitions, 253 presidential statements,
245 DPR statements, and 205 related party statements (see Appendix A). This dataset is
especially important because it will help make the Indonesian Constitutional Court more
accessible to American political scientists.
Finally, this dissertation has important lessons for policymakers, particularly interna-
tional donors that fund rule of law projects in developing countries. Traditionally, donors
and practitioners have focused on supply-side reforms, such as providing technical assistance
to courts. In recent years, there has been a greater focus on the potential of demand-side
reforms, such as helping key stakeholders and the media better understand the legal system
(see Golub, 2006; USAID, 2008). My results suggest that demand-side factors are important
– and potentially crucial – for strengthening the rule of law. The Indonesian Constitutional
Court has been one of the few policy forums through which marginalized groups can con-
sistently influence government policy. Moreover, as noted in Chapter II, civil society groups
have been important stakeholders in the institution and played a key role in thwarting gov-
ernment attempts to circumscribe the Court’s jurisdiction. Thus, rule of law projects that
teach local citizens and NGOs about constitutional remedies could not only improve access
to justice, but also create a set of stakeholders for judicial reform.
4Available at www.domnardi.com.
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7.2 Limitations
Although this dissertation makes important contributions to the literature, it is nec-
essary to acknowledge the limitations of my research in order to better understand what
conclusions we can – and cannot – draw from my findings. Some of these limitations are
simply endemic to the broader judicial behavior literature, while others are more specific to
my methodological approach and data. In this section, I outline several limitations in my
methodology, and then discuss the generalizability of my results.
First and foremost, my empirical tests cannot definitively identify the causal mecha-
nisms linking the identity of litigants and case outcomes. Although I did identify several
strong correlations, correlation does not equal causation. This becomes particularly worri-
some if litigants select cases strategically and only join those they believe have the greatest
probability of success (McCammon and McGrath, 2015, 133). Ideally, one would utilize a
experiment to establish a causal relationship between case outcomes and litigant identity
(see Holland, 1986), but my research questions are not amenable to experimental methods.
There would be serious practical and ethical barriers to randomizing petitioners in constitu-
tional cases. Moreover, I could not find an instrumental variable to reduce concerns about
endogeneity because none of the IVs I considered satisfied the exclusion restriction (see
Angrist, Imbens and Rubin, 1996). I attempted to compensate by using a multi-method ap-
proach, presenting statistical models alongside qualitative case studies that helped unpack
the causal relationships. I also noted how institutional design features of the Indonesian
Constitutional Court, such as the lower standing threshold and lack of appeals, reduced the
risk of endogeneity by posing less of a barrier to low-quality cases.
A related limitation concerns my data and measurement strategy. Many of the variables
I use involve latent concepts that cannot be directly measured. For example, I have no way
to directly measure the legal merits of a petition, arguably one of the most important factors
determining the petition’s success. I ultimately used the length of court transcripts on the
assumption that the justices would need to hold more hearings to adjudicate more meritorious
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claims, but this is at best an indirect proxy for legal quality.5 This is also true of litigant
identity; I based my categories of litigant identity on previous scholarship, but ultimately
cannot guarantee that the categories I used are those that best capture information about
the litigants who appear before the Constitutional Court. When appropriate, such as for
presidential preferences in Chapter V, I tested alternative measures of the same concept to
see how much the results depend on particular measures of latent concepts.
Even if had been able to conduct an experiment, the single-country approach I took in
this dissertation limits my ability to generalize any findings. In Chapter I, I explained why
I believed this approach suited my dissertation better than a cross-national approach, but
the tradeoff means that my results might be tied to the unique political and social context
of Indonesia. Throughout the dissertation, I tried to highlight when a result might be driven
by Indonesia-centric factors. However, the design of my dissertation simply does not allow
me to examine cross-national differences that could potentially affect a court’s relationships
with civil society. For example, I cannot directly test my argument in Chapter III that newer
courts in developing democracies rely more on public support than older, more established
courts. I also do not know how much the institutional design of the Indonesian Constitutional
Court might have affected its behavior in individual cases (see Section 7.4 below).
7.3 Recent Developments
In addition to the limited geographic scope, this dissertation also has a narrow temporal
scope. My dataset only covers Indonesian Constitutional Court cases adjudicated between
August 13, 2003 and October 2, 2013, the terms of the first three chief justices. Any study
of modern political institutions can at best provide a snapshot in time as institutions grow
and change. I conducted my fieldwork during the fall of 2013 and do not have case files for
later cases. As such, it is possible that the conclusions I draw in this dissertation will not
5To my knowledge, most other studies of judicial behavior do not even attempt to control for the quality
of legal briefs.
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hold true for the Court under later chief justices. Indeed, there have already been several
recent developments that might affect the Court’s role as a political actor.
First, it is entirely possible that the first decade of the Constitutional Court does
not represent a stable political equilibrium. The first two chief justices – Jimly Asshidiqie
and Mohammad Mahfud – were charismatic and politically savvy leaders who had strong
incentives to push the Court toward more activist outcomes (Hendrianto, 2016c). Moreover,
other political actors were still adjusting their expectations and beliefs about the new court.
Before 2003, many believed that it would be a relatively weak institution with a limited role
in politics. After 15 years, political elites have had a chance to observe the Court’s behavior
and update their strategies accordingly. There is evidence that the DPR and president have
taken greater care in recent years to screen potential justices to find those who will support
their policy preferences (Hendrianto, 2015b). For their part, the justices have now had several
years to observe the appointment process; having seen the government not reappoint justices
because of their performance on the Court, future justices might view the threat of not being
reappointed as more credible.
However, by 2017, the Constitutional Court had already demonstrated that it could
serve as a credible forum for non-state actors to challenge government policy. As predicted
by the embedded autonomy model, by being receptive to claims from NGOs and responding
to public opinion, the Court developed a reputation for independence and political activism.
While the later chief justices have adopted a quieter leadership style, there has been no
indication that the Court has or plans to retreat from its politically active role; between 2014-
17, the Court granted around 22% of petitions, only slightly less than the average rate for
the preceding decade. The Court is still willing to issue judgments in politically controversial
disputes and to declare major government policies unconstitutional (Hendrianto, 2016b).6
Corruption has also undermined the public’s perception of the Constitutional Court
6In fact, in March 2015, the Court struck down the 2004 Water Resources Law (Water Resources Law
case II, MK Decision No. 85/PUU-XI/2013), which it had declined to do in 2005 ( Water Resources Law
case I, MK Decision Nos. 58-59-60-63/PUU-II/2004 & 8/PUU-III/2005).
210
and the extent to which NGOs view it as an ally. In October 2010, Refly Harun, a lawyer
and former Court employee, accused Justice Arsyad Sanusi’s daughter of having received
bribes from a losing candidate in a regional elections case. Although the Constitutional
Court’s Honour Council found no evidence that Sanusi himself knew about or participated
in the bribery, it reprimanded him for allowing family members to interact with litigants.
Sanusi ultimately resigned without admitting to any wrongdoing. On October 3, 2013,
the Anticorruption Commission (KPK) arrested Chief Justice Akil Mochtar for taking Rp.
60 billion in bribes during the adjudication of 15 regional elections disputes. In addition,
investigators found narcotics in his office. He was sentenced to life imprisonment in June
2014. The Court under Hamdan Zoelva regained some of the public’s confidence with its
handling of the dispute over the 2014 presidential election (Butt, 2015). However, in January
2017, the KPK arrested another justice, Patrialis Akbar, on suspicion of having taken Rp.
2 billion in bribes from an from a meat company while presiding over a case involving the
review of a food safety law (McBeth, 2017).
It is not yet clear how much these scandals will undermine the Constitutional Court
as an institution. When Mochtar was arrested, many NGOs seemed willing to accept that
the problem stemmed from the individual justice rather than the institution.7 In fact, legal
activists, including Refly Harun, had raised concerns about Mochtar before his appointment
(Wijaya, 2013). Likewise, they had raised concerns about Patrialis Akbar, even having gone
so far as to file a lawsuit in the Jakarta Administrative Court challenging his appointment
(Parlina, 2013a; Faiz, 2016a). As such, the problem could be seen as one of a few “bad apples”
rather than a rotten institutional core. On the other hand, there is growing concern about the
appointment process and the quality of justices (see Faiz, 2016a). As long as the short term
length and the possibility of reappointment remain part of the institutional design, there is
a risk that justices will be susceptible to political pressure. In addition, Hendrianto (2016a)
worries that Indonesia has relatively few people who possess the expertise and stature to
7E.g., Subject #35, interview with NGO staff, Jakarta, Indonesia, November 15, 2013.
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serve on the Court, so forcing justices to retire after just 5-10 years severely reduces the pool
of potential candidates. Thus far, reform efforts have focused on policing judicial ethics once
justices arrive on the bench, but future reforms might do well to focus more on the selection
and reappointment of justices.
7.4 Potential for Future Research
This dissertation will hopefully encourage more research into the influence of non-state
actors on judicial behavior, both in Indonesia and in other countries. In this section, I
propose four directions that have the potential to prove particularly fruitful. First, there is
still much we need to learn about litigation strategies. As noted in Chapter V, Indonesian
lawyers were divided over the benefits of having a large coalition of petitioners. Although
I found that a larger coalition significantly improved the petition’s probability of success,
the optimal litigation strategy might depend on other conditions, such as the features of
the case or the political environment. Another question that arose from Chapter IV is why
some NGOs focus on a narrow set of legal issues while others participate in a broader range
of cases. Are these decisions driven primarily by ideology, strategy, or financial concerns?
A better understanding of litigants’ strategic choices would also help allay concerns about
endogeneity in studies of judicial behavior.
Throughout this dissertation, I have implicitly presented relations between judges and
civil society as mutually supportive. This is primarily because in Indonesia that has been
the case. Although Indonesia is a democracy, corruption and unaccountable political parties
mean that unelected institutions like the Constitutional Court and Corruption Eradication
Commission end up acting as popular checks on the elected branches. However, other scholars
might want to explore what happens when civil society constrains courts by protesting or
retaliating against unpopular decisions. If a court issues too many unpopular decisions,
NGOs might even lobby the government to curtail judicial independence. This happened in
the United States during the early 1900s, when courts regularly struck down redistributive
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socioeconomic policies. The progressive movement sought – and in many states succeeded
– to make judges more accountable to the public through elections (Baum, 2003). Future
research might focus on what embeddedness means for judges who do not share the policy
preferences of the general public.
As noted above, this dissertation does not address any of the cross-national variation
that could affect a court’s relationship with civil society. For example, in Chapter III I had
speculated that NGOs would have more influence in civil law systems with a single con-
stitutional court, as opposed to in common law systems that permit any court to exercise
constitutional review. I did not pursue a cross-national approach because of the obstacles
outlined in Chapter I. Hopefully, as scholars develop better cross-national datasets, we will
be able to better test theories of judicial behavior across countries. In the meantime, a
more productive approach would be to replicate the empirical tests from Chapters IV-VI of
this dissertation with data from a different country, such as the Philippines. While tech-
nically a civil law system, the Philippine Supreme Court is a court of general jurisdiction
with heavy influence from the U.S. common law. In addition, Indonesia and the Philippines
share common historical, linguistic, and cultural roots,8 and both have reached similar levels
of economic and political development. This allows us to minimize potentially confound-
ing variables and isolate any differences in judicial behavior to differences between the two
judicial institutions.
Finally, this dissertation focused on embedded autonomy as it applies to litigants.
However, judges and civil society can interact outside the formal litigation process in a
variety of ways. In systems where judges are selected by elected representatives, interest
groups often play an important role in the appointment process by providing information
about judicial candidates and mobilizing support or opposition (Caldeira and Wright, 1998).
They can also provide information to judges through scholarship and conferences (Hollis-
Brusky, 2015,0). Finally, interest groups might try to send signals about public opinion by
8To such an extent that in 1963 they briefly formed a confederation with Malaysia called Maphilindo.
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issuing statements to the media (Barkan, 1980), organizing protests outside the courthouse
(Bernstein, 2013; Silverstein, 1996), or even issuing threats against judges (Bo´, Bo´ and Tella,
2006). For their part, judges can try to actively mobilize political support by giving speeches
to certain stakeholders or issuing statements to the media (Trochev and Ellet, 2011). These
types of interactions are more difficult to quantify, so their absence from the literature is
understandable, but unraveling them could significantly deepen our understanding of judicial
behavior.
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APPENDIX A
Coding of Petitioner Identity
The empirical tests in Chapters IV-VI rely heavily on information about the identity
of the petitioners and related parties in each case. A team of four Indonesian law students
assigned each petitioner/related party to one of the following six categories: 1) national
government institution; 2) local government institution; 3) private business/corporation; 4)
nongovernmental organization (NGO); 5) political party/candidate; or 6) individual unaffil-
iated with any organization.1 I then had coders group any NGOs into one of the following
categories: 1) commercial; 2) consumer; 3) development; 4) education; 5) environment; 6)
gender; 7) governance; 8) health; 9) human rights; 10) indigenous; 11) labor union; 12)
lawyers; 13) legal aid; 14) media/journalism; 15) religion; or 16) youth. I gave the coders a
handbook with instructions on how to distinguish between the categories.
There were three sources of ambiguity that potentially undermined intercoder reliabil-
ity. First, I treated the categories as mutually exclusive in that petitioners/related parties
could not be members of more than one category. This usually did not prove problematic
for the six litigant identity categories, but did sometimes prove difficult when classifying
different types NGOs. Some Indonesian NGOs have broad mission statements that encom-
1I had asked coders to categorize litigants based on even more refined categories (i.e., “unemployed
individual,” “student,” etc.). I ended up not using these categories in the final dissertation, so I only
calculated intercoder reliability for the six broader identity categories.
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pass a variety of potential issue areas. For example, according to its website, the Epistima
Institute’s work touches upon “democratic values, social justice, environmental protection,
and cultural pluralism.”2 In such cases, coders were asked to make a judgment as to the
organization’s primary mission as reflected in its charter – if any – and its legal claims in
the relevant case.
Another source of ambiguity arose when petitioners and related parties used lawyers
affiliated with an NGO as their legal counsel, even though the NGO itself did not file the
brief. For example, the Legal Aid Society (LBH), frequently provides legal assistance to
indigent or marginalized petitioners without actually joining the petition. In such cases, I
asked coders to only code the identity of the individuals or organizations formally listed as
litigants, not their counsel. I treated NGOs serving as counsel like law firms in that the firm
might submit a brief on behalf of a client, but the brief does not necessarily represent its
own policy preferences.
Finally, coders had to unpack principal-agent relationships. Constitutional Court de-
cisions list the name, address, and profession of each petitioner. Thus, it is not always clear
if an individual affiliated with an organization was in fact acting as a duly authorized agent
of that organization. Individuals were classified as organizations (categories 1-5) if they for-
mally represented the organization and acted on its behalf. Otherwise, that litigant would
be classified as an individual (category 6). For example, if a CEO filed a petition on behalf
of a company, then he/she would be coded as a “private business.” By contrast, if the CEO’s
petition involved a personal matter, such as a divorce, then he/she would be coded as an
“individual.” Some organizations require at least two officers – usually the head and deputy
– to authorize a legal brief on behalf of the organization. In such situations, coders were
instructed to count the litigant as one organization rather than as two separate individuals.
These coding rules helped reduce discretion in coding, but likely did result in underes-
timating the number of NGOs indirectly involved in constitutional litigation. For example,
2See http://epistema.or.id.
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coders recognized prominent activists who were affiliated with NGOs, but had joined the
petition without claiming any affiliation. Although they did not formally represent their
NGO, they had the opportunity to contribute legal knowledge and advice. This likely bi-
ased the results against my hypotheses because some of the potential strengths associated
with NGOs might spill over into the “individuals” category. Individuals receiving informal
support from NGO staff would likely perform better than expected relative to NGOs, thus
minimizing the difference between NGOs and other types of litigants.
I assigned about 10% of the total dataset (56 cases) to multiple coders to assess in-
tercoder reliability. I took the percentage agreement between all of the coders for both
the litigant identity and the NGO identity variables (see Neuendorf, 2016, 168). The per-
centage agreement averaged 92.2% for litigants generally and 74.6% for NGO litigants (see
Table A.1). As expected, there was less consensus for NGO identity. However, because
percentage agreement is a lenient measure that does not account for agreement by chance
(see Suen and Lee, 1985; Popping, 1988), I also used Krippendorff’s alpha coefficient. Krip-
pendorff’s alpha is a widely used measure of intercoder reliability in content analysis and
calculates the observed disagreement in coding as a percentage of the expected disagreement
(see Krippendorff, 1987, 2011). The alpha for litigant identity was 0.861, while the alpha for
NGO identity was much lower at 0.697, indicating more difficulty in ascertaining the true
identity of NGOs. Although the alpha for NGO litigants is lower than ideal, it is still within
the range of tolerance for coding, especially given the challenges described above.
Litigant Identity NGO Identity
Percentage Agreement 92.2% 74.6%
Krippendorff’s Alpha 0.861 0.697
Table A.1: Intercoder Reliability for Identity Variables
Upon examining the results for intercoder reliability, I noticed that one of the coders
consistently coded principal-agent relationships incorrectly, coding individuals representing
organizations as “individuals” rather than as one of the five types of organizations. I decided
to omit that coder’s results and recode them myself. I also checked principal-agent relations
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in all other coding. When there was ambiguity over whether or not a litigant represented
an organization, I checked the the brief (not available to the coders) to see if it was printed
on the organization’s official letterhead. I did use all four coders’ results for the identity of
organizations.
218
APPENDIX B
Permutation Tests for Topic Models
As mentioned in Chapter IV, one concern about Structural Topic Models (STM) is that
combining the measurement model with the estimation of a covariate effect risks fitting a
relationship onto the covariates, “baking in” the conclusion. This would increase the chances
of obtaining spurious results. It is important to note that STM simply uses the covariate as
additional information in calculating the latent variable; it does not “fit” the topic clusters
to the covariate. As seen in my results, not all covariates were significantly associated with
a topic.
Nevertheless, I used a permutation test as a robustness check whenever I found a
significant relationship between a petitioner identity variable and topic posterior (Figure 4.8
and Figures ??-??). The permutation test compares the estimated covariate effect with 24
random dummy variables in the same model (i.e., “placebos”). If any of the placebo runs
shows a result significantly different from zero in the same direction as the covariate, it means
that there was at least a 1
24
chance that the relationship between the covariate and the topic
could have arisen due to chance.
Figures B.1-B.2 show the permutation tests for topics associated with NGO petitioners.
The red line shows the best estimate and confidence interval for the covariate, i.e., the
difference between the mean topic posterior for petitions with at least one NGO and petitions
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Figure B.1: Permutation Test for NGO Petitioners and Select Topic Proportions
The plot shows the permutation test for covariates and topic posteriors that demonstrated a significant relationship in the
difference of means test. The red dot shows the relationship between the petitioner identity variable and the topic. The 24
black dots show the the expected difference in topic posterior probability for the random dummy variables. The bars
represent 95% confidence intervals.
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Figure B.2: Permutation Test for NGO Petitioners and Select Topic Proportions
The plot shows the permutation test for covariates and topic posteriors that demonstrated a significant relationship in the
difference of means test. The red dot shows the relationship between the petitioner identity variable and the topic. The 24
black dots show the the expected difference in topic posterior probability for the random dummy variables. The bars
represent 95% confidence intervals.
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without any NGOs. The 24 black lines show the effect and confidence intervals for the
placebos. The estimated effect of NGOs on all of these topics differs significantly from zero.
However, the result for the education topic does not pass the permutation test because the
result for one of the placebos (#17) was also significant and positive.
When looking at specific types of NGOs, there are several in Figures B.3-B.4 that pass
the permutation test in that none of the placebos differs significantly from zero:
• Media NGOs for the human rights topic (Topic 16)
• Health NGOs for the welfare topic (Topic 17)
• Development NGOs for the welfare topic (Topic 17)
• Environmental NGOs for the agriculture and economic topics (Topics 6 & 21)
• Education NGOs for the education and legislative topics (Topics 5 & 18)
• Labor unions for the labor, welfare, and economic topics (Topics 2, 17, & 21)
I discussed the implications of these findings in Chapter IV.
Lawyers associations and indigenous groups were significantly associated with topics
(the “lawyers” and “regional” topics, respectively), but in both cases one of the placebos
was also yielded a significant positive result, indicating that those results might have been
due to chance.
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Figure B.3: Permutation Test for Types of NGO Petitioners and Select Topic Proportions
The plot shows the permutation test for covariates and topic posteriors that demonstrated a significant relationship in the difference of means test. The red dot shows the
relationship between the NGO petitioner identity variable and the topic. The 24 black dots show the the expected difference in topic posterior probability for the random
dummy variables. The bars represent 95% confidence intervals.
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Figure B.4: Permutation Test for Types of NGO Petitioners and Select Topic Proportions
The plot shows the permutation test for covariates and topic posteriors that demonstrated a significant relationship in the difference of means test. The red dot shows the
relationship between the NGO petitioner identity variable and the topic. The 24 black dots show the the expected difference in topic posterior probability for the random
dummy variables. The bars represent 95% confidence intervals.
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APPENDIX C
Alternative Measure for Presidential Statements
In Chapter V, I used a dummy variable in my judicial voting behavior models to in-
dicate if the president had submitted a written statement opposing the petition. I found a
strong and significant positive relationship between the presence of a presidential statement
and the likelihood that the Constitutional Court grants the petition. This seemed counterin-
tuitive because the judicial politics literature tends to find that courts are more reluctant to
declare a law unconstitutional if the government expresses its support for the law (Vanberg,
2005; Bergara, Richman and Spiller, 2003).
However, I also mentioned two potential problems. First, there is a risk of endogeneity
if the president’s decision to submit a statement depends on his or her assessment of the
petition’s probability of success. In other words, if the likely outcome of the case affected the
president’s decision to submit a statement, not vice versa. This does not necessarily seem
to be the case in Indonesia (the president submitted a statement in almost two-thirds of
cases), and presidential statements seem tied more to the importance of the legislation being
challenged than the probability of success. This leads to a second problem. The dummy
variable simply indicated the presence of a presidential statement; it did not capture any
information about the intensity of the president’s preferences. All else equal, the Court
should be less likely to grant a petition when confronted with strong signals of presidential
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opposition.
party strength petitioner ID dummy petitioner ID number petitioner coalition
(Table 5.3) (Table 5.4) (Table 5.5) (Table 5.6)
... ... ... ... ...
President (words) [–] 0.452∗∗ 0.464∗∗ 0.462∗∗ 0.446∗∗
(0.15) (0.16) (0.15) (0.16)
... ... ... ... ...
Term YES YES YES YES
Topics YES YES YES YES
N 447 447 447 447
Pseudo R2 0.166 0.174 0.159 0.174
Model χ2 84.55 84.56 75.18 82.71
Table C.1: Model of Constitutional Case Outcomes with Number of Words in
Presidential Statement
◦ p < 0.1, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001. The unit of analysis is each constitutional review case from August 13, 2003
to October 2, 2013. The dependent variable is binary indicating if the Constitutional Court voted for unconstitutionality. The
entries are logit coefficients with robust standard errors in parentheses. Coefficients for other variables not shown. Constants
are omitted. The expected direction of the coefficients appears in brackets.
In this Appendix, I utilize an alternative measure of presidential preferences to address
both problems.1 I take the log of the number of words in the president’s statement as a sign
of the intensity of the president’s preferences in the case. This measure has three benefits.
First, because it costs time and effort to write a longer brief, the president’s lawyers are
more likely to invest those resources when they feel strongly about a policy. Second, because
the length of the brief is observable, it can communicate information about the president’s
preferences to the justices. Finally, it is less likely that the length of the president’s brief
will be driven primarily by the president’s beliefs about the likelihood of petitioner success.
Multiple factors, such as the complexity of the legal issues involved and amount of supporting
evidence required, influence the length of the brief.
In Table C.1, I rerun the models from Tables 5.3-5.6, but substitute the new variable
for presidential briefs in place of the dummy variable (I omit the other variables from the
table for ease of reference). Just as for the dummy variable, the effect of presidential briefs
on the probability that the Court grants a petition is positive. In other words, the Court is
more likely to grant a petition for constitutional review if it receives a longer statement from
1I also considered several instrumental variables to overcome this potential endogeneity problem, but
none satisfied the exclusion restriction (i.e., all potential Z had an effect on Y outside of X).
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Figure C.1: Probability of Unconstitutionality vs. Presidential Statements
The plots represent the probability that the Constitutional Court will grant a petition/vote for unconstitutionality at given
lengths of presidential briefs (as measured by the log of the number of words). Results are taken from model 4a in Table C.1.
All other variables are held at their means. Dashed lines represent 95% confidence intervals.
the president. I plot the results in Figure C.1, which shows that the effect of presidential
statements is larger for longer briefs. This shows that the effect is not simply driven by cases
without any presidential statements as the positive relationship remains even for longer
briefs. Overall, these results suggest that my findings in Chapter V were not driven merely
by endogeneity or measurement issues.
227
APPENDIX D
Topic Model for Related Parties
In Chapter VI, I used topic variables as controls when testing the extent to which
the Indonesian Constitutional Court adopts text from briefs. I derived the topic variables
from the posteriors of a latent topic model. For petitions, I simply used the results of the
Structural Topic Model from Chapter IV. For related parties (pihak terkait), I needed to
create a new topic model to capture information about topics in related party briefs. In this
appendix, I briefly summarize the results of that topic model.
I generally used the same procedure and parameters for the related parties topic model
that I had used for petitions in Chapter IV.1 However, this is a different model utilizing
data from a different corpus of documents. As such, the topic clusters will not be the same
as those for petitions. Moreover, I set the number of topics to 14 rather than 22. As seen in
Figure D.1, the perplexity score – held-out likelihood – for the related party model increases
rapidly until around k = 14, after which the rate of increase flattens out.
The topic clusters for related party briefs are presented in Table D.1.2 These topics
differ from those in Table 4.3 (see Section 4.3). In general, the topics for related party
briefs tend to be less refined. For example, there are no distinct topics for subfields like
1I added a few stopwords, such as “petition” (“mohon”) and “law” (“hukum”), that were automatically
removed from the petitions due to frequency, but not from the related party briefs.
2For ease of reference, I only show the five most frequent terms and omit the FREX terms.
228
●●
●
●
● ●
5 10 15 20
−6
.6
−6
.4
−6
.2
Held−Out Likelihood
Number of Topics (K)
He
ld−
Ou
t L
ike
lih
oo
d
●
●
●
●
● ●
5 10 15 20
2.
5
3.
0
3.
5
Residuals
Number of Topics (K)
Re
sid
ua
ls
●
●
●
●
●
●
5 10 15 20
−4
0
−3
5
−3
0
−2
5
−2
0
Semantic Coherence
Number of Topics (K)
Se
m
an
tic
 C
oh
er
en
ce
●
●
●
●
●
●
5 10 15 20
−1
55
00
00
−1
45
00
00
Lower Bound
Number of Topics (K)
Lo
we
r B
ou
nd
Diagnostic Values by Number of Topics
Figure D.1: Perplexity Analysis of Structural Topic Model Results
election or environmental law (Topics 10 & 14, respectively). On the other hand, the model
yields several niche topic clusters, such as “narcotics” (Topic 6) and “religion” (Topic 4),
that were not found amongst the topic clusters for petitions. These differences likely reflect
the different priorities of related parties. For example, fully 11.3% of related parties were
religious organizations, compared to just 1.8% for petitioners.3
3P.B.B. in Topic 7 is an acronym for for “Pajak Bumi dan Bangunan,” a type of property tax.
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Topic 1 hukum mahkamah hak rugi konstitusi
Constitution (law) (court) (rights) (loss) (constitution)
Topic 2 negara daerah perintah dpr dewan
Government (country) (area) (command) (dpr) (board)
Topic 3 siar lembaga atur milik hukum
Business (broadcast) (agency) (set) (property) (law)
Topic 4 agama orang islam beba negara
Religion (religion) (people) (islam) (beba) (country)
Topic 5 dokter hukum profesi layan praktik
Professions (doctor) (law) (profession) (service) (practice)
Topic 6 rokok tembakau sehat zat adiktif
Narcotics (cigarettes) (tobacco) (healthy) (substances) (addictive)
Topic 7 pusat pbb hak raya pajak
Tax (center) (PBB) (rights) (highway) (taxes)
Topic 8 pidana hukum hakim laku tindak
Criminal (criminal) (law) (judge) (behavior) (acts)
Topic 9 kabupaten daerah provinsi perintah camat
Regional (district) (county) (province) (command) (camat)
Topic 10 daerah pilih kepala wakil kpu
Elections (area) (select) (head) (representative) (KPU )
Topic 11 didik nasion negara bangsa ajar
Education (students) (nations) (countries) (nations) (teach)
Topic 12 advokat organisasi hukum profesi mahkamah
Lawyers (advocate) (organization) (law) (profession) (tribunal)
Topic 13 hak anak hukum perempuan cara
Rights (right) (child) (law) (woman) (way)
Topic 14 usaha tambang perintah hutan laku
Environmental (business) (mining) (orders) (forest) (behavior)
Table D.1: Topics 1-22 from Structural Topic Model of Related Party Briefs
The top five stemmed Indonesian words are listed in the first row of each topic, with translations below.
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APPENDIX E
Text-Matching Content Analysis
In Chapter VI, I used WCopyfind to measure the similarity between legal briefs and the
Constitutional Court’s final decision. I use the similarity between texts as an approximation
of the extent to which one document might have influenced another. In particular, I argued
that the Court was more likely to quote or adopt text from a brief if it found that brief to
be credible and/or informative.
However, WCopyfind quantifies language in texts, not ideas or legal arguments per
se. Thus, not all text matches necessarily imply influence. This leads to three possible
inferential errors. First, WCopyfind might not find a match even if the Constitutional Court
directly discusses a brief if it does so by paraphrasing the brief’s contents. This would
lead to false negatives and fewer matches. Second, because Indonesian is a relatively sparse
language, there is a risk of text matching because the brief and the Court independently
use similar language to discuss the same concept. Finally, because WCopyfind does not and
cannot directly capture information about the context or sentiment of the matching text, it
is possible that the Court will cite a brief not because it finds it persuasive, but rather to
critique it.
The first two problems should pose less of a risk to my research. False negatives should
bias the results against my hypotheses, meaning that WCopyfind will not detect matches
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even when the Court discusses a brief it finds credible or informative. I attempt to minimize
this risk of false positives by only using perfect matches (see above). The third problem raises
a greater concern. Collins, Corley and Hamner (2015, 928) find that the U.S. Supreme Court
rarely cites amicus briefs simply to criticize them, so they presume that quoting text from
a brief indicates favorable treatment. I do not go so quite far as I merely use text-matching
to gain insight into the justices’ perceptions of a brief’s information value. Nevertheless, it
is unclear if their presumption holds true for petitions in Indonesia.
To get a sense of the context in which the Indonesian Constitutional Court quotes
petitions, I randomly selected five cases from the corpus and observed where matching text
appeared in the Court’s written opinion (see Figure E.1 for example paragraphs from each
decision).1 In Table E.1, I provide summary statistics for how much text from the petition
matched that of the Court’s decision, as well as the context in which that text was quoted.
For all but the 2003 case, over 50% of the text in the petition matched text in the decision.
However, the overwhelming majority of this text was quoted in the Court’s summary of the
petition. The Court summarizes almost all of the petitions, government statements, and
related party briefs it receives in an objective manner.
Case No. 10/2003 31/2006 49/2012 55/2012 114/2009
Matching Words 162 1510 2691 3708 2290
% Matching 5% 57% 58% 65% 56%
Words in Reasoning 59 81 44 62 125
% in Reasoning 36.4% 5.4% 1.6% 1.7% 5.5%
% Positive 0.0% 3.7% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
% Negative 0.0% 0.8% 0.0% 0.0% 1.0%
Table E.1: Summary Statistics of Text-Matching Examples
Match words indicates the total number of words from the petition that appeared in the Constitutional Court’s written
decision in that case. Words in Reasoning indicates the number of matched words that appeared in the section of the Court’s
opinion explaining its legal reasoning (pertimbangan hukum). The percentages are out of the total number of matched words.
For positive and negative treatment, I coded instances in which the Court explicitly affirmed or disagreed with information
and/or arguments in the quoted text.
The justices only provide their assessment of information and/or arguments in the
briefs in the section explaining the Court’s legal reasoning (pertimbangan hukum), if at all.
1The five petitions are from MK Decision Nos. 10/PUU-I/2003; 31/PUU-IV/2006; 49/PUU-X/2012;
55/PUU-X/2012; & 114/PUU-VII/2009.
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With the exception of the 2003 case, between 1-5% of the quoted text appeared in the legal
reasoning section. Even here, the Court did not usually adopt a clear stance on quoted
text. Only twice did the Court quote text and then clearly state that it disagreed with the
argument in the text (less than 1% of the total text), and in both cases the Court ultimately
ruled against the petition.2
These results suggest that the Constitutional Court generally quotes a brief to summa-
rize it, not to comment on its legal arguments or information. This means that text matches
do not necessarily indicate favorable treatment, but there is also relatively little risk that
that indicate negative or unfavorable treatment. As noted above, at best we can interpret
text matches as evidence that the Court finds the brief credible or informative, even if not
ultimately persuasive. Because the Court consistently summarizes the briefs it receives, we
can still use WCopyfind to make inferences about the information value of the brief. If the
Court quotes text from a brief, even if to summarize it, at a higher rate than average, then
presumably it does so because it finds that brief relatively credible or informative.
2MK Decision Nos. 31/PUU-IV/2006 & 114/PUU-VII/2009.
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Case No. 10/PUU-I/2003
[...] kemudian berdasarkan Surat 
Bupati dan DPRD Kabupaten 
Kampar tersebut diusulkan oleh 
Gubernur Riau kepada Menteri 
Dalam Negeri dan DPR-RI 
melalui surat tanggal 15 Juni 
1999 Nomor 136/TP/1433 [...] 
(p. 30)
[...] then based on the Letter of 
Regent and DPRD of Kampar 
Regency proposed by the 
Governor of Riau to the Minister 
of Home Affairs and the House of 
Representatives by letter dated 
June 15, 1999 Number 136/TP/ 
1433 [...]
Case No.  31/PUU-IV/2006
Pengaturan penyiaran dengan 
dengan Peraturan Pemerintah 
sebagaimana diperintahkan oleh 
Pasal 62 Ayat (1) dan (2) UU 
Penyiaran yang menurut 
Pemohon menimbulkan 
ketidakpastian hukum dan 
karenanya bertentangan dengan 
Pasal 28D Ayat (1) UUD 1945, 
adalah pandangan yang keliru 
[...] (p. 129)
Broadcasting arrangements with 
the Government Regulation as 
mandated by Article 62 
Paragraphs (1) and (2) of the 
Broadcasting Law which, 
according to the Petitioners, 
create legal uncertainty and 
therefore contradictory to Article 
28D Paragraph (1) of the 1945 
Constitution , is a false view [...]
Case No.   49/PUU-X/2012
Bahwa ketentuan Pasal 66 ayat 
(1) UU JN [bukti P-1] tersebut
sepanjang frasa/kalimat “dengan 
persetujuan Majelis Pengawas 
Daerah” adalah sangat 
bertentangan dengan ketentuan 
Pasal 27 ayat (1) dan Pasal 28D 
ayat (1) UUD 1945 [bukti P-2], 
karena apabila frasa/kalimat 
“dengan persetujuan Majelis 
Pengawas Daerah” pada Pasal 
66 ayat (1) UU JN [bukti P-1] 
tersebut tetap berlaku, maka 
tidak menutup kemungkinan 
pelaku-pelaku kejahatan dengan 
modus menggunakan Akta 
Authentik yang dibuat oleh 
Notaris berlindung dibalik Pasal 
66 ayat (1) UU JN [bukti P-1] 
dengan harapan Notaris yang 
bersangkutan tidak dapat 
diperiksa oleh Penyidik 
Kepolisian Republik Indonesia 
sehingga tidak terungkap 
pelakunya; (p. 16)
Whereas the provision of the a 
quo article is contradictory to 
Article 27 paragraph (1) and 
Article 28D paragraph (1) of the 
1945 Constitution because if the 
article remains in force then 
does not rule out the 
perpetrators of crime by mode 
using the authentic acts made 
by Notaries taking cover behind 
article a quo, in the hope that the 
notary concerned can not be  
examined by the police 
investigator so that the 
perpetrator is not disclosed so 
that it can cripple / remove the 
constitutional rights and human 
rights of justice seekers;
Case No.  55/PUU-X/2012
Bahwa praktek demokrasi justru 
menjadi sumber konflik, karena 
yang berkembang bukan lagi 
kesejatian makna demokrasi, 
tetapi varianvarian penyakit 
demokrasi. Demokrasi dilihat 
sebagai peluang dan proses 
perebutan kekuasaan. Rakyat 
tidak diposisikan sebagai 
subjek, tetapi alat/sarana 
perebutan kekuasaan, baik di 
tingkat pusat maupun di daerah. 
Partai politik yang ada saat ini 
hanya menjadi mesin alat 
kekuasaan, bukan untuk 
mengabdi pada kepentingan 
rakyat banyak dalam mencapai 
tujuan berbangsa dan 
bernegara. (p. 23)
That the practice of democracy is 
the source of conflict, because 
the developing is no longer the 
authenticity of the meaning of 
democracy, but the variant of 
democracy. Democracy is seen 
as an opportunity and a process 
of power struggles. The people 
are not positioned as subjects, 
but the means to seize power, 
both at the central and regional 
levels. Political parties that exist 
today is only a machine tool of 
power, not to serve the interests 
of ordinary people in achieving 
the goals of nation and state. 
Case No. 114/PUU-VII/2009
Bahwa sepanjang petitum para 
Pemohon yang meminta agar 
Pasal 74 ayat (3) UU MK harus 
dibaca bahwa hal tersebut tidak 
menghalangi pemohon 
perselisihan hasil pemilihan 
umum untuk mengajukan 
permohonan setelah selesainya 
tenggat waktu 3 x 24 (tiga kali 
dua puluh empat) jam 
sepanjang permohonan yang 
diajukan benar-benar signifikan 
mempengaruhi hasil Pemilu dan 
meminta agar Mahkamah 
menyatakan Pasal 74 ayat (3) 
tidak berlaku khusus bagi para 
Pemohon. (p.18)
Whereas in the petitum of the 
Petitioners requesting that Article 
74 Paragraph (3) of the 
Constitutional Court Law should 
be read that it does not prevent 
the applicant from dispute over 
the results of the general election 
to file an application after the 
completion of the 3 x 24 (three 
times twenty four) significantly 
affects the election results and 
requests that the Court declare 
that Article 74 paragraph (3) shall 
not apply exclusively to the 
Petitioners.
Figure E.1: Examples of Text Matching for Petitions and Judicial Decisions
Each box contains a representative text from the petition next to the corresponding judicial decision for each case. WCopyfind was used to calculate the similarity between
the brief and the Constitutional Court’s decision in MK Decision Nos. 10/PUU-I/2003; 31/PUU-IV/2006; 49/PUU-X/2012; 55/PUU-X/2012; 114/PUU-VII/2009. The text
underlined and highlighted in red indicates imperfections.
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